Development of Quantitative and Temporal Scalar Implicatures in a Felicity Judgment Task

Experimental investigations into children’s interpretation of scalar terms show that children have difficulties with scalar implicatures in tasks. In contrast with adults, they are for instance not able to derive the pragmatic interpretation that “some” means “not all” (Noveck, 2001; Papafragou and Musolino, 2003). However, there is also substantial experimental evidence that children are not incapable of drawing scalar inferences and that they are aware of the pragmatic potential of scalar expressions. In these kinds of studies, the prime interest is to discover what conditions facilitate implicature production for children. One of the factors that seem to be difficult for children is the generation of the scalar alternative. In a Felicity Judgment Task (FJT) the alternative is given. Participants are presented with a pair of utterances and asked to choose the most felicitous description. In such a task, even 5-year-old children are reported to show a very good performance. Our study wants to build on this tradition, by using a FJT where not only “some-all” choices are given, but also “some-many” and “many-all.” In combination with a manipulation of the number of successes/failures in the stories, this enabled us to construct control, critical and ambiguous items. We compared the performance of 59 5-year-old children with that of 34 11-year-old children. The results indicated that performance of both age groups was clearly above chance, replicating previous findings. However, for the 5-year-old children, the critical and ambiguous items were more difficult than the control items and they also performed worse on these two types of items than the 11-year-old children. Interestingly with respect to the issue of scalar diversity, the 11-year-old children were also presented temporal items, which turned out to be more difficult than the quantitative ones

Do typical birds usually fly normally?

‘Birds fly, Tweety is a bird, does Tweety fly? ’ has become the canonical example to introduce default reasoning. Since its introduction many variations on this example, stretching from ‘Birds normally fly...’ (Lifschitz, 1988) to ‘If something is a bird, then it flies...’, (Schurz, 2002) appeared in the literature. All these sentences are believed to express the same default rule. But do they? In order to do proper experimental research on default reasoning, this is an important question to be answered. Experiment Fifty-one students in Psychology, without prior logic course, participated as a partial fulfilment of a course requirement. In case of occasionally left-open items (0.8%), the analysis was conducted with a lower n (minimal n = 46). Each participant received a booklet with written instructions and 22 items in randomized order. They solved the paper-and-pencil task individually and in a self-paced manner. Each item consisted of a nonsensical rule, an affirmation of the first part, and a question about the second part (see Table 1). Below the question, a seven point scale was drawn

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Truth Table Task: Working Memory Load, Latencies and Perceived Relevance

The aim of the present study is to uncover the relation between cognitive ability and the answer patterns yielded by the truth table task. According to the Classical Mental Models Theory, people with high working memory capacity answer according to two-valued or "logical" answer patterns. The Suppositional Theory and the Revised Mental Models Theory predict that the answer patterns given by the most intelligent ones are three-valued or "defective". Correlations are examined, and in three experiments it is tested with a dual task paradigm whether a differential working memory load alters participants' answer patterns. A positive correlation is observed between cognitive ability and three-valued answer patterns, but no effect of the working memory load manipulation is revealed. With an inspection of the classification times we shed light on the processes underlying truth table judgements. We conclude that the Revised Mental Models Theory provides the best account for our results. © 2013 Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.status: publishe

Development of Quantitative and Temporal Scalar Implicatures in a Felicity Judgment Task

Experimental investigations into children's interpretation of scalar terms show that children have difficulties with scalar implicatures in tasks. In contrast with adults, they are for instance not able to derive the pragmatic interpretation that "some" means "not all" (Noveck, 2001; Papafragou and Musolino, 2003). However, there is also substantial experimental evidence that children are not incapable of drawing scalar inferences and that they are aware of the pragmatic potential of scalar expressions. In these kinds of studies, the prime interest is to discover what conditions facilitate implicature production for children. One of the factors that seem to be difficult for children is the generation of the scalar alternative. In a Felicity Judgment Task (FJT) the alternative is given. Participants are presented with a pair of utterances and asked to choose the most felicitous description. In such a task, even 5-year-old children are reported to show a very good performance. Our study wants to build on this tradition, by using a FJT where not only "some-all" choices are given, but also "some-many" and "many-all." In combination with a manipulation of the number of successes/failures in the stories, this enabled us to construct control, critical and ambiguous items. We compared the performance of 59 5-year-old children with that of 34 11-year-old children. The results indicated that performance of both age groups was clearly above chance, replicating previous findings. However, for the 5-year-old children, the critical and ambiguous items were more difficult than the control items and they also performed worse on these two types of items than the 11-year-old children. Interestingly with respect to the issue of scalar diversity, the 11-year-old children were also presented temporal items, which turned out to be more difficult than the quantitative ones.status: publishe

Is the Truth Table Task Mistaken?

There is ample evidence that in classical truth table task experiments false antecedents are judged as "irrelevant". Instead of interpreting this in support of a suppositional representation of conditionals, Schroyens (2010a, 2010b) attributes it to the induction problem: the impossibility of establishing the truth of a universal claim on the basis of a single case. In the first experiment a truth table task with four options is administered and the correlation with intelligence is inspected. It is observed that "undetermined" is chosen in one third of the judgements and "irrelevant" in another third. A positive correlation is revealed between intelligence and the number of "irrelevant" and "undetermined" judgements. The data do not exclude that a part of the "irrelevant" judgements in classical truth table task experiments might be caused by the induction problem. In the second experiment participants are presented with a simplified four-option truth table task and asked for a justification of their judgements. These justifications show the induction problem is not the reason for choosing the "irrelevant" or "undetermined" option, which is supportive for a suppositional representation of conditionals. © 2012 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.status: publishe

Truth Table Tasks: Irrelevance and Cognitive Ability

Two types of truth table task are used to examine people's mental representation of conditionals. In two within-participants experiments, participants either receive the same task-type twice (Experiment 1) or are presented successively with both a possibilities task and a truth task (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 examines how people interpret the three-option possibilities task and whether they have a clear understanding of it. The present study aims to examine, for both task-types, how participants' cognitive ability relates to the classification of the truth table cases as irrelevant, and their consistency in doing so. Looking at the answer patterns, participants' cognitive ability influences their classification of the truth table cases: A positive correlation exists between cognitive ability and the number of falseantecedent cases classified as "irrelevant", both in the possibilities task and the truth task. This favours a suppositional representation of conditionals. © 2011 Psychology Press.status: publishe