The Gibbs Paradox Revisited

The Gibbs paradox has frequently been interpreted as a sign that particles of the same kind are fundamentally indistinguishable; and that quantum mechanics, with its identical fermions and bosons, is indispensable for making sense of this. In this article we shall argue, on the contrary, that analysis of the paradox supports the idea that classical particles are always distinguishable. Perhaps surprisingly, this analysis extends to quantum mechanics: even according to quantum mechanics there can be distinguishable particles of the same kind. Our most important general conclusion will accordingly be that the universally accepted notion that quantum particles of the same kind are necessarily indistinguishable rests on a confusion about how particles are represented in quantum theory.Comment: to appear in Proceedings of "The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective 2009

The Logic of Identity: Distinguishability and Indistinguishability in Classical and Quantum Physics

The suggestion that particles of the same kind may be indistinguishable in a fundamental sense, even so that challenges to traditional notions of individuality and identity may arise, has first come up in the context of classical statistical mechanics. In particular, the Gibbs paradox has sometimes been interpreted as a sign of the untenability of the classical concept of a particle and as a premonition that quantum theory is needed. This idea of a quantum connection stubbornly persists in the literature, even though it has also been criticized frequently. Here we shall argue that although this criticism is justified, the proposed alternative solutions have often been wrong and have not put the paradox in its right perspective. In fact, the Gibbs paradox is unrelated to fundamental issues of particle identity; only distinguishability in a pragmatic sense plays a role (in this we develop ideas of van Kampen [10]), and in principle the paradox always is there as long as the concept of a particle applies at all. In line with this we show that the paradox survives even in quantum mechanics, in spite of the quantum mechanical (anti-)symmetrization postulates

Is There a Unique Physical Entropy? Micro versus Macro

Entropy in thermodynamics is an extensive quantity, whereas standard methods in statistical mechanics give rise to a non-extensive expression for the entropy. This discrepancy is often seen as a sign that basic formulas of statistical mechanics should be revised, either on the basis of quantum mechanics or on the basis of general and fundamental considerations about the (in)distinguishability of particles. In this article we argue against this response. We show that both the extensive thermodynamic and the non-extensive statistical entropy are perfectly alright within their own fields of application. Changes in the statistical formulas that remove the discrepancy must be seen as motivated by pragmatic reasons (conventions) rather than as justified by basic arguments about particle statistics.Comment: To appear in "New Challenges to the Philosophy of Science", PSE Volume 4, Springer 201

Probability in modal interpretations of quantum mechanics

Modal interpretations have the ambition to construe quantum mechanics as an objective, man-independent description of physical reality. Their second leading idea is probabilism: quantum mechanics does not completely fix physical reality but yields probabilities. In working out these ideas an important motif is to stay close to the standard formalism of quantum mechanics and to refrain from introducing new structure by hand. In this paper we explain how this programme can be made concrete. In particular, we show that the Born probability rule, and sets of definite-valued observables to which the Born probabilities pertain, can be uniquely defined from the quantum state and Hilbert space structure. We discuss the status of probability in modal interpretations, and to this end we make a comparison with many-worlds alternatives. An overall point that we stress is that the modal ideas define a general framework and research programme rather than one definite and finished interpretation

How Classical Particles Emerge from the Quantum World.

The symmetrization postulates of quantum mechanics (symmetry for bosons, antisymmetry for fermions) are usually taken to entail that quantum particles of the same kind (e.g., electrons) are all in exactly the same state and therefore indistinguishable in the strongest possible sense. These symmetrization postulates possess a general validity that survives the classical limit, and the conclusion seems therefore unavoidable that even classical particles of the same kind must all be in the same state--in clear conflict with what we know about classical particles. In this article we analyze the origin of this paradox. We shall argue that in the classical limit classical particles emerge, as new entities that do not correspond to the "particle indices" defined in quantum mechanics. Put differently, we show that the quantum mechanical symmetrization postulates do not pertain to particles, as we know them from classical physics, but rather to indices that have a merely formal significance. This conclusion raises the question of whether the discussions about the status of identical quantum particles have not been misguided from the very start

Complementarity in the Bohr-Einstein Photon Box

The photon box thought experiment can be considered a forerunner of the EPR-experiment: by performing suitable measurements on the box it is possible to ``prepare'' the photon, long after it has escaped, in either of two complementary states. Consistency requires that the corresponding box measurements be complementary as well. At first sight it seems, however, that these measurements can be jointly performed with arbitrary precision: they pertain to different systems (the center of mass of the box and an internal clock, respectively). But this is deceptive. As we show by explicit calculation, although the relevant quantities are simultaneously measurable, they develop non-vanishing commutators when calculated back to the time of escape of the photon. This justifies Bohr's qualitative arguments in a precise way; and it illustrates how the details of the dynamics conspire to guarantee the requirements of complementarity. In addition, our calculations exhibit a ``fine structure'' in the distribution of the uncertainties over the complementary quantities: depending on \textit{when} the box measurement is performed, the resulting quantum description of the photon differs. This brings us close to the argumentation of the later EPR thought experiment