Accountability and Coalitions: Evidence from a Negotiation Experiment

This article tests the effect of accountability on negotiation outcomes in a face-to-face classroom experiment. Student participants were asked to form coalitions in groups of three. In the treatment condition, negotiators were held accountable by a personal forum during the formation of the coalition. In the control condition, negotiators were not held accountable. Results show that accountability leads to lower group performance in coalition negotiations. Accountability also reduced the willingness of negotiators to include all negotiators in a “grand coalition.” Rather, accountable negotiators reached agreement with a subset of negotiators. Accountability increased the odds of reaching no agreement. These findings challenge the idea of increased performance as a result of public accountability in the context of coalition negotiations

Speltheorie en strategische besluitvorming in organisaties

Contains fulltext : 46862.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)12 oktober 200636 p

Speltheorie: wat is nu de meerwaarde?

Contains fulltext : 86994.pdf (author's version ) (Open Access

Coalition formation and social choice

Contains fulltext : mmubn000001_118136445.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 1 januari 1991Promotores : T. Bezembinder en H. de Swart cum laude239, 8, 1 p

An Extension of the Condorcet Paradox to Organizational Decision-making

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Winst hangt af van inzet lokale partijleden

Item does not contain fulltext15 november 200