21 research outputs found
La chair ouverte Ă la portance de lâĂȘtre
LâĂȘtre humain est une maniĂšre singuliĂšre dâĂȘtre corps, en rapport au monde, en relation avec autrui. Ce style qui constitue sa chair sâexprime dans certaines attitudes typiques marquĂ©es par une conjonction, parfois extrĂȘme, de passivitĂ© et dâactivitĂ© â dĂšs lâamplitude comme la profondeur de sa perception du monde, dans lâaccueil et lâĂ©coute quâil peut accorder Ă autrui, dans une posture fonciĂšrement interrogative intriquĂ©e avec des dimensions de consentement et de foi. Ces attitudes montrent ..
Introdução à noção de sustentação
We attempt to introduce the necessity, meaning and anthropological issues surrounding anew concept, âliftâ [portance]. This thinking stems from both a clinical and philosophicalbackground that explores the carnal (fleshly) foundation of desire. From a phenomenologyin dialogue with psychology, psychoanalysis and philosophy of education, the concept oflift addresses the very foundations of our openness to the world and to others
Carne e Espelho em Merleau-Ponty
Interwoven with natural structurations and personal history, the flesh, in Merleau-Ponty's gradually-forged conception, is nourished by the combined influences of neurology, Gestalt psychology and psychoanalysis. This triple influence undergirds a recurring theme in his later writings: the mirror. "The flesh is a mirror phenomenon," Merleau-Ponty tells us. The unpublished manuscripts reveal that this famous clause refers neither directly to Husserl, nor to Wallon and Lacan, but is driven by contemporary readings of Paul Schilder and Wolfgang Metzger, who study the phenomena of distanciated migrations of the body-image in vision. The mirror mingles objective body with phenomenal body, in an effective community between my lived body and its external image. It shows how the flesh lives both within and outside of itself, animated by an essential incompleteness that engages perception in a process of incorporation and, thus, hints at intercorporeity.  Entrelaçada com estruturaçÔes naturais e histĂłria pessoal, a carne, na concepção gradualmente  forjada  por  Merleau-Ponty,  é  nutrida  pelas  influĂȘncias  combinadas  da neurologia, Gestalt psicologia e psicanĂĄlise. Essa tripla influĂȘncia sustenta um tema recorrente em seus Ășltimos escritos: o espelho. "A carne Ă© um fenĂŽmeno de espelho", nos diz Merleau-Ponty. Os manuscritos nĂŁo publicados revelam que esta famosa sentença nĂŁo se refere diretamente a  Husserl,  nem  a  Wallon  e  Lacan,  mas  é conduzida pelas  leituras contemporĂąneas  de  Paul  Schilder e Wolfgang Metzger,  que  estudam  o  fenĂŽmeno  de migraçÔes distanciadas da imagem corporal na visĂŁo.  O espelho mistura corpo objetivo e corpo fenomenal, em uma comunidade efetiva entre meu corpo vivido e sua imagem externa. Ele mostra como a carne vive tanto em si quanto fora de si, animada por uma incompletude essencial que envolve a percepção em um processo de incorporação e, consequentemente, aponta para a intercorporeidade.Â
Endurer la surprise
1. Active passivitĂ© La surprise, en tant que telle, implique un « dehors », un Ă©vĂ©nement dans notre relation au monde : elle nâest pas purement immanente Ă notre vie psychique. Il est impossible de se faire Ă soi-mĂȘme une vĂ©ritable surprise, il est bien difficile de simuler mentalement un effet de surprise. Plus transversal quâun simple sentiment, le phĂ©nomĂšne de la surprise peut solliciter lâensemble de notre ĂȘtre, Ă commencer par notre institution corporelle la plus Ă©lĂ©mentaire. La surprise..
Sustentação e reconhecimento
Este artigo Ă© parte de um trabalho em andamento sobre a fenomenologia da sustentação (portance), uma noção no entrecruzamento da antropologia e da ontologia, com inĂșmeros desafios clĂnicos e Ă©ticos. As principais formas de sustentação associadas ao reconhecimento sĂŁo consideradas aqui, atravĂ©s dos laços profundos que envolvem reconhecimento e ser sustentado, reconhecer e sustentar, mas tambĂ©m reconhecer e ser reconhecido. Como uma realização da dimensĂŁo perceptiva da inteligĂȘncia, o reconhecimento se abre conjuntamente Ă existĂȘncia e ao estilo do ser percebido, discerne e atesta sua singularidade, experimentando assim uma das trĂȘs grandes qualidades ontolĂłgicas da sustentação
On the motivations for Merleau-Pontyâs ontological research
This paper attempts to clarify Merleau-Pontyâs later work by tracing a hitherto overlooked set of concerns that were of key consequence for the formulation of his ontological research. I argue that his ontology can be understood as a response to a set of problems originating in reflections on the intersubjective use of language in dialogue, undertaken in the early 1950s. His study of dialogue disclosed a structure of meaning-formation and pointed towards a theory of truth (both recurring ontological topics) that post-Phenomenology premises could not account for. A study of dialogue shows that speakersâ positions are interchangeable, that speaking subjects are active and passive in varying degrees, and that the intentional roles of subjects and objects are liable to shift or âtransgressâ themselves. These observations anticipate the concepts of âreversibilityâ and ânarcissismâ, his later view of activity and passivity, and his later view of intentionality, and sharpened the need to adopt an intersubjective focus in ontological research
Merleau-Ponty and the Measuring Body
In recent years a growing number of scholars in science studies and related fields are developing new ontologies to displace entrenched dualisms. These efforts often go together with a renewed interest in the roles played by symbolisms and tools in knowledge and being. This article brings Maurice Merleau-Ponty into these conversations, positioning him as a precursor of todayâs innovative recastings of technoscience. While Merleau-Ponty is often invoked in relation to his early work on the body and embodiment, this article focuses on his later work, where the investigation of perception is integrated with an ontological exploration. The resulting approach revolves around the highly original idea of the body as a standard of measurement. We further develop this idea by coining the term âthe measuring bodyâ, which to a greater extent than did Merleau-Ponty accentuates the relative autonomy of symbolisms and tools and their capacity to decentre the perceiving body
Merleau-Ponty face à Husserl et Heidegger : illusions et rééquilibrages
 Il a longtemps Ă©tĂ© habituel, en France plus quâailleurs, de prĂ©senter Merleau-Ponty comme un philosophe avant tout imprĂ©gnĂ© de lâĆuvre de Husserl et de Heidegger, traçant sa voie dans son rapport aux deux gĂ©ants de la phĂ©nomĂ©nologie allemande. La relecture de lâĆuvre du philosophe français Ă la lumiĂšre de ses nombreux inĂ©dits conduit Ă relativiser cette reprĂ©sentation commune, en identifiant les illusions dâoptique qui la soutenaient et les directions essentielles des rĂ©Ă©quilibrages Ă opĂ©rer. Les recherches rĂ©centes dessinent ainsi progressivement la carte des influences, philosophiques ou non, mais aussi des oppositions, qui ont soutenu lâĂ©mergence et lâĂ©volution continue de lâintention philosophique de Merleau-Ponty, dont les interlocuteurs imaginaires principaux ont de bout en bout Ă©tĂ© Sartre et Descartes. Cet environnement effectif transforme trĂšs souvent son rapport Ă Husserl et Ă Heidegger en un rapport indirect et brouillĂ©, voire critique et expĂ©ditif â tout particuliĂšrement Ă lâĂ©gard de Heidegger, que Merleau-Ponty a en rĂ©alitĂ© lu trĂšs tard. Il nous faut davantage prendre la mesure du contexte intellectuel français qui Ă©tait celui dâun homme occupĂ© par les dĂ©bats de son temps, dĂ©couvrir lâimportance de nombre de sources allemandes et anglaises encore peu Ă©tudiĂ©es, et mieux comprendre Ă quel point la pensĂ©e de Merleau-Ponty entretenait un rapport Ă©troit constant avec divers champs non-philosophiques, notamment la Gestalttheorie, la psychologie du dĂ©veloppement et la psychanalyse. Un rapport jusquâau bout essentiel Ă la formation du concept central de cette philosophie, la chair â non substituable au Leib husserlien â, comme Ă lâĂ©laboration de lâontologie que cette mĂȘme conception cherchait Ă dĂ©livrer â dont lâanalogie avec lâentreprise heideggĂ©rienne reste formelle ou mĂ©taphorique.It has long been customary, particularly in France, to present Merleau-Ponty as a philosopher steeped in the work of Husserl and Heidegger, tracing his own path in relation to these two giants of German phenomenology. A re-reading of the French philosopherâs work in the light of his numerous unpublished writings leads to a relativisation of this common representation, by identifying the optical illusions that have supported it and the essential directions of the rectifications to be made. Recent research is thus progressively drawing a map of the influences, philosophical and other, and also the oppositions, which supported the emergence and continual evolution of Merleau-Pontyâs philosophical intention â of which the principle imaginary interlocutors were, from start to finish, Sartre and Descartes. This more veritable account often transforms his relationship with Husserl and Heidegger into something more indirect and troublesome, even critical and cursory â particularly with regard to Heidegger, whom Merleau-Ponty in fact only read at a very late stage. We need to take greater account of the French intellectual context of a man occupied with the debates of his time, discover the importance of the little-studied English and German sources, and better understand the point at which Merleau-Pontyâs thought began to foster a constant and close relationship with diverse non-philosophical fields, notably Gestalt Theory, developmental psychology, and psychoanalysis. This relationship was, to the end, as essential for the formation of the central concept of his philosophy, the flesh â not a substitute for the Husserlian Leib â as it was for the elaboration of the ontology which this same conception sought to deliver â of which the analogy with the Heideggerian enterprise remains formal or metaphorical.Besonders in Frankreich war es lange ĂŒblich, Merleau-Ponty als einen hauptsĂ€chlich von Husserl und Heidegger beeinflussten Philosophen darzustellen, der seine eigene Bahn im VerhĂ€ltnis zu den beiden Riesen der deutschen PhĂ€nomenologie entwarf. Die RelektĂŒre des französischen Philosophen im Lichte der zahlreichen unveröffentlichten Schriften fĂŒhrt zu einer Relativisierung dieser gĂ€ngigen Vorstellung, indem die sie stĂŒtzenden optischen Illusionen und die zu vollziehenden, korrigierenden Umorientierungen identifiziert werden. Neuere Forschungen erstellen somit progressiv die Karte der philosophischen oder nichtphilosophischen EinflĂŒsse, stellen aber auch die GegensĂ€tze heraus, auf welchen die Herausbildung und die Intention Merleau-Pontys philosophischer Intention basieren, dessen wesentliche imaginĂ€re GesprĂ€chspartner durchwegs Descartes und Sartre waren. Unter dem Einfluss dieses effektiven Umfelds wandelt sich sein VerhĂ€ltnis zu Husserl und Heidegger zu einem indirekten und problematischen, oder gar kritischen und oberflĂ€chlichen VerhĂ€ltnis, insbesondere in Hinsicht auf Heidegger, den Merleau-Ponty tatsĂ€chlich sehr spĂ€t gelesen hat. Der spezifisch französische Kontext eines Denkers, dem die intellektuellen Debatten seiner Zeit gegenwĂ€rtig waren, sowie die zahlreichen deutschen und englischen, noch wenig studierten Quellen, mĂŒssten somit in Betracht gezogen werden. Auch mĂŒsste das durchgehend enge VerhĂ€ltnis von Merleau-Pontys Denken zu nichtphilosophischen Disziplinen wie Gestalttheorie, Entwicklungspsychologie und Psychoanalyse besser durchleutet werden. Dieses VerhĂ€ltnis ist wesentlich fĂŒr die Bildung des zentralen Begriffs dieser Philosophie, das Fleisch (chair), das mit dem Husserlschen Leib nicht zusammenfĂ€llt, sowie fĂŒr die Ausarbeitung seiner Ontologie, dessen Vergleich mit Heideggers Unternehmen formal oder metaphorisch bleibt
L'empiÚtement (relire Merleau-Ponty à la lumiÚre des inédits)
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