114 research outputs found
Biased but in Doubt: Conflict and Decision Confidence
Human reasoning is often biased by intuitive heuristics. A central question is whether the bias results from a failure to detect that the intuitions conflict with traditional normative considerations or from a failure to discard the tempting intuitions. The present study addressed this unresolved debate by using people's decision confidence as a nonverbal index of conflict detection. Participants were asked to indicate how confident they were after solving classic base-rate (Experiment 1) and conjunction fallacy (Experiment 2) problems in which a cued intuitive response could be inconsistent or consistent with the traditional correct response. Results indicated that reasoners showed a clear confidence decrease when they gave an intuitive response that conflicted with the normative response. Contrary to popular belief, this establishes that people seem to acknowledge that their intuitive answers are not fully warranted. Experiment 3 established that younger reasoners did not yet show the confidence decrease, which points to the role of improved bias awareness in our reasoning development. Implications for the long standing debate on human rationality are discussed
Intuition rather than deliberation determines selfish and prosocial choices
Human interactions often involve a choice between acting selfishly (in ones' own interest) and acting
prosocially (in the interest of others). Fast-and-slow models of prosociality posit that people intuitively favour
one of these choices (the selfish choice in some models, the prosocial choice in other models), and need to
correct this intuition through deliberation in order to make the other choice. We present 7 studies that force
us to reconsider this longstanding “corrective” dual process view. Participants played various economic
games in which they had to choose between a prosocial and a selfish option. We used a two-response
paradigm in which participants had to give their first, initial response under time-pressure and cognitive load.
Next, participants could take all the time they wanted to reflect on the problem and give a final response. This
allowed us to identify the intuitively generated response that preceded the final response given after
deliberation. Results consistently showed that both prosocial and selfish responses were predominantly made
intuitively rather than after deliberate correction. Pace the deliberate correction view, the findings indicate
that making prosocial and selfish choices does typically not rely on different types of reasoning modes
(intuition vs deliberation) but rather on different types of intuitions
Intuition rather than deliberation determines selfish and prosocial choices
Human interactions often involve a choice between acting selfishly (in ones' own interest) and acting
prosocially (in the interest of others). Fast-and-slow models of prosociality posit that people intuitively favour
one of these choices (the selfish choice in some models, the prosocial choice in other models), and need to
correct this intuition through deliberation in order to make the other choice. We present 7 studies that force
us to reconsider this longstanding “corrective” dual process view. Participants played various economic
games in which they had to choose between a prosocial and a selfish option. We used a two-response
paradigm in which participants had to give their first, initial response under time-pressure and cognitive load.
Next, participants could take all the time they wanted to reflect on the problem and give a final response. This
allowed us to identify the intuitively generated response that preceded the final response given after
deliberation. Results consistently showed that both prosocial and selfish responses were predominantly made
intuitively rather than after deliberate correction. Pace the deliberate correction view, the findings indicate
that making prosocial and selfish choices does typically not rely on different types of reasoning modes
(intuition vs deliberation) but rather on different types of intuitions
Cognitive Control and Individual Differences in Economic Ultimatum Decision-Making
Much publicity has been given to the fact that people's economic decisions often deviate from the rational predictions of standard economic models. In the classic ultimatum game, for example, most people turn down financial gains by rejecting unequal monetary splits. The present study points to neglected individual differences in this debate. After participants played the ultimatum game we tested for individual differences in cognitive control capacity of the most and least economic responders. The key finding was that people who were higher in cognitive control, as measured by behavioral (Go/No-Go performance) and neural (No-Go N2 amplitude) markers, did tend to behave more in line with the standard models and showed increased acceptance of unequal splits. Hence, the cognitively highest scoring decision-makers were more likely to maximize their monetary payoffs and adhere to the standard economic predictions. Findings question popular claims with respect to the rejection of standard economic models and the irrationality of human economic decision-making
Causal conditional reasoning and semantic memory retrieval: A test of the semantic memory framework
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