Human interactions often involve a choice between acting selfishly (in ones' own interest) and acting
prosocially (in the interest of others). Fast-and-slow models of prosociality posit that people intuitively favour
one of these choices (the selfish choice in some models, the prosocial choice in other models), and need to
correct this intuition through deliberation in order to make the other choice. We present 7 studies that force
us to reconsider this longstanding “corrective” dual process view. Participants played various economic
games in which they had to choose between a prosocial and a selfish option. We used a two-response
paradigm in which participants had to give their first, initial response under time-pressure and cognitive load.
Next, participants could take all the time they wanted to reflect on the problem and give a final response. This
allowed us to identify the intuitively generated response that preceded the final response given after
deliberation. Results consistently showed that both prosocial and selfish responses were predominantly made
intuitively rather than after deliberate correction. Pace the deliberate correction view, the findings indicate
that making prosocial and selfish choices does typically not rely on different types of reasoning modes
(intuition vs deliberation) but rather on different types of intuitions