888 research outputs found

    James Francis Burke’s Zorita (c. 1968): a transcribed edition for solo cornet and brass quintet

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    James Francis Burke (1923-1981) was one of the most renowned cornet soloists of the Twentieth Century. Despite having no use of his right arm, the result of suffering an injury at birth, Burke learned to play the cornet at an early age and began to perform solos for movies and radio shows by the age of 11. He is remembered primarily as the Cornet Soloist of the Goldman Band, a position he held for 32 years (1943-1975). Burke also performed extensively with the Baltimore Symphony, Radio City Music Hall, and Brooklyn Philharmonic Orchestras and held teaching positions at the Peabody Conservatory (Baltimore, MD), Ithaca College (NY), Hofstra University (NY), and the University of Bridgeport (CT). During his lifetime Burke performed a number of cornet solos with band accompaniment and composed solos that he performed with the Goldman Band and others including Danza Alegre, The Magic Trumpet, Amourette, Hocus Polka, Jimala Beguine, Joneta, Jolene, and Zorita. Of these compositions, only Zorita is unpublished. The purpose of this study was to transcribe the accompaniment for Burke's cornet solo, Zorita (c. 1968) for brass quintet. A secondary purpose of this study was to present a brief biographical sketch about Burke to provide historical context and background for the solo. A brief discussion of the work is included in this document, although complete analysis was beyond the scope of this study as was a complete biography of Burke. The transcribed edition of the solo was created by consulting unpublished scores of Zorita and a recording of the solo performed by Burke. The original cornet solo remained intact and is presented with the transcribed brass quintet accompaniment. The accompaniment was scored for the traditional brass quintet instrumentation: two trumpets, horn, trombone, and tuba. This transcription, therefore, requires an additional cornet performer to be the soloist. Appropriate for concert performance by advanced students, Zorita balances bel canto melodies with highly technical scalar passages and extended sections of multiple articulation

    2000 elemental analysis of lichens in Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore and George Washington Carver National Monument: Final report

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    1 PDF computer file (12 pages; tabular data)In the final report of the first study of the lichens and air quality in the Sleeping Bear Dunes National Lakeshore (SLBE) (Wetmore 1988) and George Washington Carver National Monument (GWCA) (Wetmore 1992) it was recommended that a restudy of the elemental analysis of lichens be done every five years. This report is on the results of a restudy done in 2000. In August; 2000, four species of lichens were collected at three of the same localities in SLBE as the previous studies. In GWCA only one species was resampled at one locality in May, 2000. The methods used were the same as in the previous studies. Statistical analyses of data from SLBE indicated that of the 15 elements measured in both years, six were significantly different for Cladina: Cd, Cr, Mn, Na, Pb and S. Chromium, Mn and Na all increased, while the other three decreased. The analysis of the GWCA data showed that twelve elements out of 23 plus ash changed significantly between 1991 and 2000, although this is based on very small sample sizes. The recommendation is made that the periodic restudy of elemental analyses of both areas be continued but on a more frequent interval in GWCA and with more samples to determine if the changes are consistent. The five-year periodic restudy in SLBE seems to be adequate.U. S. Geological Survey Biological Resources Division Purchase Order #00 MWSA 022

    RACIALLY/ETHNICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMIST (RMVE) ATTACK PLANNING AND UNITED STATES FEDERAL RESPONSE, 2014-2019

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    Executive Summary After a five-year period between 2014 and 2019 in which the frequency and lethality of domestic terrorism incidents in the United States substantially increased, federal counterterrorism authorities now view domestic violent extremism (DVE) as the foremost terrorist threat facing the country. In March 2021, the Office for the Director of National Intelligence released an assessment that the “most lethal domestic violent extremist threat[s]” to the United States were racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVE).1 This assessment mirrored similar findings by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) during the past half-decade, all of which point to RMVE as the principal domestic terrorism threat to the United States. Responding to RMVE-inspired terrorists will require a close, data-driven assessment of the nature and scope of the threat. To this end, this report evaluates 40 cases of individuals charged in United States federal courts between 2014 and 2019, who are alleged to have planned or conducted violent attacks in the United States in furtherance of RMVE causes or ideologies. By evaluating the demographic, ideological, and organizational backgrounds of the perpetrators, as well as their attack-planning methods and processes, this report evaluates the successes and failures of federal law enforcement in investigating and prosecuting RMVE attack planners. The report finds: • RMVE attack planners in the U.S. had a wide range of demographic backgrounds, but tended to be older than other categories of violent extremist attack planners, and were predominantly male. • Attack planners’ ideologies were situated across the RMVE spectrum, from affiliates of well-established white supremacist and neo-Nazi groups to members of relatively newer organizations. However, the most lethal RMVE attack planners were organizationally unaffiliated, and despite drawing from a variety of RMVE ideologies, did not have membership in any RMVE organization or group. • RMVE attack planners tended to target religious institutions, particularly Jewish, Black, and Muslim places of worship. The most common attack-planning method involved the use of firearms; RMVEs also experimented with a range of other methods from bombings to arson and vehicular assault. • Due in part to the lack of a federal domestic terrorism statute, the FBI and DOJ utilized a range of charges to investigate and prosecute RMVEs. This study finds that the patchwork of offenses used to investigate RMVE sometimes led to failures in interdicting attack planners. • As compared to other violent extremist attack planners, RMVEs receive a slightly shorter average sentence in prison after conviction. Based on these findings, the study recommends a data-driven reevaluation and reallocation of FBI and DOJ resources and staff dedicated to investigating and prosecuting RMVE. It also proposes broader information-sharing between federal, state, and local partners on RMVE threats, particularly between the FBI and local religious communities. Finally, the report argues that a federal statute that criminalizes acts of domestic terrorism, similar to 18 U.S. Code § 2332b, would be most applicable to prosecutions of attack planning cases involving RMVEs

    A retrospective report (2003–2013) of the complications associated with the use of a one-man (head and tail) rope recovery system in horses following general anaesthesia

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    Abstract Background The mortality rate of horses undergoing general anaesthesia is high when compared to humans or small animal patients. One of the most critical periods during equine anaesthesia is recovery, as the horse attempts to regain a standing position. This study was performed in a private equine practice in Belgium that uses a purpose-designed one-man (head and tail) rope recovery system to assist the horse during the standing process. The main purpose of the retrospective study was to report and analyse complications and the mortality rate in horses during recovery from anaesthesia using the described recovery system. Information retrieved from the medical records included patient signalment, anaesthetic protocol, duration of anaesthesia, ASA grade, type of surgery, recovery time and complications during recovery. Sedation was administered to all horses prior to recovery with the rope system. Complications were divided into major complications in which the horse was euthanized and minor complications where the horse survived. Major complications were further subdivided into those where the rope system did not contribute to the recovery complication (Group 1) and those where it was not possible to determine if the rope system was of any benefit (Group 2). Results Five thousand eight hundred fifty two horses recovered from general anaesthesia with rope assistance. Complications were identified in 30 (0.51%). Major complications occurred in 12 horses (0.20%) of which three (0.05%) were assigned to Group 1 and nine (0.15%) to Group 2. Three horses in Group 2 suffered musculoskeletal injuries (0.05%). Eighteen horses (0.31%) suffered minor complications, of which five (0.08%) were categorised as failures of the recovery system. Conclusions This study reports the major and minor complication and mortality rate during recovery from anaesthesia using a specific type of rope recovery system. Mortality associated with the rope recovery system was low. During recovery from anaesthesia this rope system may reduce the risk of lethal complications, particularly major orthopaedic injuries

    Mayhem, Murder, and Misdirection: Violent Extremist Attack Plots Against Critical Infrastructure in the United States, 2016-2022

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    In the United States, critical infrastructure, or “assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, [that] are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof,” are prime targets in violent extremist attack plots.1 While a variety of violent extremist movements have attempted to assault American critical infrastructure throughout modern history, the Department of Homeland Security and other national security authorities have recently sounded the alarm that U.S.-based violent extremists have developed “credible, specific plans” to attack critical infrastructure.2 To understand the current dimensions of this threat, this paper reviews 94 cases of individuals charged in the U.S. federal court system from 2016 to 2022 with planning to conduct violent extremist attacks, 35 of whom attempted to attack critical infrastructure systems. 19 of these cases are associated with the Salafi-jihadist movement; 16 are associated with white supremacist groups. Evaluating these cases, the report finds: ● Salafi-jihadist attack planners were significantly more likely to consider critical infrastructure systems as targets for attack than their white supremacist counterparts. ● Salafi-jihadist and white supremacist attack planners attempted to target different critical infrastructure sectors, with the former focusing on the commercial facilities, government facilities, and emergency services sectors, and the latter predominantly focusing on the energy sector. ● Since 2019, white supremacist attacks plots against critical infrastructure systems have distinctly increased. ● Between 2016 and 2022, white supremacist plots targeting energy systems dramatically increased in frequency. 13 individuals associated with the movement were arrested and charged in federal court with planning attacks on the energy sector; 11 of these attack planners were charged after 2020. ● The rise of accelerationist ideology and doctrine during the past decade likely fueled the increased risk of attack plots within white supremacist milieus targeting critical infrastructure, and the energy sector in particular

    Imitators or Innovators? Comparing Salafi-Jihadist and White Supremacist Attack Planning in the United States

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    As the threat from white supremacist and Salafi-jihadist extremists to the United States grew in prominence in recent years, the two movements have become the subjects of several comparative studies. These works frequently focus on contrasting their methods of radicalization, recruitment, use of digital communications technologies, and connections to transnational extremist movements, but only a handful concern their methods of planning attacks on American soil. This report seeks to add to this emerging literature by examining what, if any, relationships there are between the tactics and targets chosen by white supremacist and Salafi-jihadist terrorists in America. In doing so, it will also contribute to our understanding of how, and indeed if, modern terrorists in America are learning from each other or from the current American counterterrorism posture. This report finds that: ● Jihadist and white supremacist attack planners in the U.S. selected different targets for their attacks. Jihadists tended towards attacking “hard targets” (for instance, military bases and law enforcement facilities) and devising plots to assassinate individuals. White supremacists erred towards “soft targets,” especially religious institutions and houses of worship. ● Jihadists were more likely than white supremacists to consider multiple targets for their attacks. ● The tactics of jihadists and white supremacists were relatively similar in frequency to one another. Both movements’ attack plotters relied heavily on plots involving firearms and explosives, but also experimented with non-conventional means such as vehicle rammings, arson, and train derailments. ● Despite some evidence of ideological cross-pollination, particularly in the form of manifestos and instructional material, evidence of direct learning between jihadist and white supremacist attack planners in the U.S. is limited. ● Independent innovation in the face of U.S. domestic counterterrorism approaches is a more likely explanation for similarities in targets and tactics between white supremacists and jihadists than cross-group tactical imitatio

    The Islamic State in America: After the Caliphate

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    The time period in which the Islamic State (IS) controlled territory in Syria and Iraq between 2014 and 2019 coincided with the largest groundswell of homegrown jihadist activity in United States history. This unprecedented wave of jihadist activism, which hit its peak between 2014 and 2016, could be measured through several indicators. Senior officials in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) testified that the Bureau managed, at any given time between 2014 and 2019, 1,000 active investigations into IS supporters throughout the U.S.; at least 239 alleged supporters were charged in U.S. courts. Meanwhile, more than 80 Americans traveled to Syria and Iraq to join IS, and 16 IS sympathizers that remained in the U.S. conducted terrorist attacks that were inspired by or directed by the group. Others provided resources for IS’ global project in different ways, most notably by supporting IS’ online propaganda dissemination and social media recruitment campaigns

    ANTISEMITISM AS AN UNDERLYING PRECURSOR TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AMERICAN FAR-RIGHT AND ISLAMIST CONTEXTS

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    Executive Summary Antisemitism is pervasive throughout several categories of American extremist movements, both violent and non-violent. American extremists incorporate antisemitic tropes and narratives in every level of their worldviews, using them to help construct “us/them” dichotomies and wide-sweeping conspiracies that are essential to their movements. During the past several decades, the American extremist movements that have been among the most violent—specifically, far-right and jihadist groups—have used antisemitism to target Jewish people, Jewish houses of worship, Jewish community institutions, and Americans supporting the Jewish state of Israel. Antisemitism, as a belief and world-structuring theory, can at times serve as a gateway issue for individuals into further radicalization to violent extremism. Non-violent and violent iterations of the same extremist milieus often share antisemitic views as central elements of their belief system, and thus antisemitism constitutes a linkage between activist and violent extremist segments of the same movement. Several case studies of violent American extremists, representing far-right and jihadist movements respectively, demonstrate that antisemitism can be an integral part of American extremists’ progression through the radicalization process and in justifying terrorist attacks. Based on this report’s finding that antisemitism is foundational to multiple violent extremist movements in the United States, counter-extremism practitioners and scholars may consider incorporating antisemitism as a diagnostic factor for extremist radicalization. o While there is no single profile of an American extremist, antisemitism has long been widespread among American extremist movements of multiple persuasions, acting as a least common denominator between extremist groups. o Antisemitic beliefs often serve as a key entry point for individuals to radicalize, join extremist groups, and progress into violent mobilization. o By using promotion of antisemitism as a factor in identifying key influencers and ideologues in extremist movements, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programming can isolate key nodes in extremist groups and debunk the narratives they promote without engaging in theological debates. Studying the role of antisemitism in extremist groups can assist scholars in identifying common themes between different types of extremism, as well as between non-violent and violent strands of the same extremist movements. This can improve analysis on the broader relationships between and within extremist groups
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