Legal Education Unbundled (and Rebundled)

This essay calls for an unbundling of legal education, much like the kind of unbundling we have seen in the cable, music, and print news media. It suggests that the standard legal education bundle -the generalized JD-is just one of many forms of legal education that can be packaged appropriately for today\u27s legal education market needs

Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples: Adapting Copyright Law to the Needs of a Global Community

The definition and scope of intellectual property and associated laws are under intense debate in the emerging discourse surrounding intellectual property and human rights. These debates primarily arise within the context of indigenous peoples\u27 rights to protection and ownership of culturally specific properties. It is true that intellectual property laws are based on Western, developed markets, Western concepts of creation and invention, and Western concepts of ownership. But whatever their origins, those laws have been, and currently are, the primary vehicle for the protection of artistic, literary, and scientific works worldwide. To segregate indigenous interests from this international legal regime, particularly in light of the increasing globalization of markets, is to deny indigenous peoples both a powerful legal shield and a powerful legal sword. This Article argues that copyright laws can, and must, be expanded so as to maintain the vitality of, and protect, the creative artistic and literary works of indigenous cultures. The article proposes three major changes to international copyright law: the incorporation of collective and communal notions of authorship, the expansion of the originality requirement to reflect these forms of authorship, and the application of limits on the duration of copyright protection in a broader community context. The article further proposes that a variety of intellectual property mechanisms be drawn upon to provide special protection for “sacred” cultural works

Will Work\u27: The Role of Intellectual Property in Transitional Economies -- From Coal to Content

The development and exploitation of intellectual property, and participation in the global information economy, are not dependent upon geography. It can take place from anywhere, from the inside of an empty factory in Detroit, to a small country road, nestled between the rhododendron and the river. From the R&D lab at a university, to a barren plain in New Mexico. To move from coal to content, we must foster a dynamic and profitable environment for entrepreneurship, through a supportive and robust university community, through state legislation and institutional support and through effective utilization of intellectual property laws. Intellectual property and technology can be used in transitional economies to create meaningful opportunities for young people to live and to work in their communities, to make efficient use of their own resources. This issue spans art and science, business and industry, culture and environment. Twin-pops and telephones. Intellectual property can help people use traditional resources in the new economy -- the art, the music, the know-how -- and to cultivate human knowledge and creation in a manner that benefits these communities across the country. This is the American story, too - to create wealth from within. To \u27Will Work\u27

Contextual Healing: What to Do About Scandalous Trademarks and Lanham Act 2(a)

Offensive trademarks have come to the forefront of trademark policy and practice in recent years. While it was once true that more attention had been paid to Lanham Act section 2(a) in the pages of law reviews than in the courts, recent prominent cases have focused attention on the ban on registration of offensive marks and the widespread impact of this ban on trademark owners. In this Article, I answer the fundamental question: Given the problems that my previous research has identified, what should be done about the 2(a) bar on registration of scandalous trademarks? This Article argues, as a preliminary matter, that the registration bar on scandalous marks should be removed from the Lanham Act because morality is outside the function and purpose of trademark law. Furthermore, removal of the bar would be in line with other forms of intellectual property, which have moved away from regulating morality. Finally, removing the bar would resolve concerns about the constitutionality of section 2(a). However, if the 2(a) bar remains part of the Lanham Act, it should be applied in a way that is fair and effective within in the legal framework of trademark law. Specifically, this Article argues that trademark examiners should evaluate offensiveness in the same way other bars to registration — and content in broadcast media — are evaluated: by considering the context of the marketplace

NSFW: An Empirical Study of Scandalous Trademarks

This project is an empirical analysis of trademarks that have received rejections based on their “scandalous” nature. It is the first of its kind. The Lanham Act bars registration for trademarks that are “scandalous” and “immoral.” While much has been written on the morality provisions in the Lanham Act, this piece is the first scholarly project that engages an empirical analysis of the Section 2(a) rejections based on scandalousness; it contains a look behind the scenes at how the morality provisions are applied throughout the trademark registration process. This study analyzes which marks are being rejected, what evidence is being used to reject them, and who the applicants are. Our data pays particularly close attention to the evidence used to determine whether a mark is scandalous. We also consider whether this bar is effective at removing these marks from the consumer marketplace

Calling Bulls**t on the Lanham Act: The 2(a) Bar for Immoral, Scandalous, and Disparaging Marks

As the Lanham Act approaches the age of 65, it is a good time to take stock of its application to, and place within, the object and purpose of trademark law. Trademark law seeks to promote fair competition by reducing consumer search costs and preventing confusion in the minds of consumers as to the source of goods and services. However, Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act prevents registration of marks that are “immoral,” “scandalous,” “disparaging,” “deceptive,” or which “create a false association” with persons, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols. The 2(a) bar expands trademark law well beyond its basic goals. While a bar to registration for marks that are deceptive or create a false association is related to the overall object and purpose of trademark law, we argue that the bar to registration for marks that are immoral, scandalous, or disparaging is not, and that the 2(a) bar is — both in definition and application — ineffective, inconsistent, and vague, and that it should be removed from the Lanham Act