55 research outputs found
Armée et Parti au Viêt-Nam : une symbiose au service de l'économie de marché
L'expérience historique tout à fait exceptionnelle du Viêt-Nam depuis 1945 suffit à légitimer le caractère très spécifique du rôle assumé par l'Armée populaire du Viêt-Nam (APV). Avec l'adoption du Dôi Moi - ou grand programme de réformes - en 1986, et la fin de l'Union soviétique, on pouvait penser que les autorités vietnamiennes s'écarteraient progressivement de la logique de la « nation en armes » . En fait, il n'en fut rien et le Viêt-Nam associe désormais encore plus étroitement VAPV à des activités économiques importantes. Le Parti communiste vietnamien, et cela contrairement à son homologue chinois, ne cherche pas à professionnaliser véritablement son armée qui devient plus que jamais l'instrument du maintien de l'ordre intérieur. Cette symbiose volontairement renforcée se traduit par l'attribution de nouvelles fonctions civiles à VAPV. Divisé en trois parties , cet article étudie donc l'imbrication des rapports Parti-Armée, la mobilisation des militaires sur le front économique et l'amorce d'un professionnalisme immédiatement compensé par la définition de nouvelles tâches civiles.The analysis of civil-military relations is largely dominated by liberal theories. This paper demonstrates that the Vietnam People's Army remains in a symbiotic relation with the communist party although it is just starting to occupy a more autonomous role in the political system. The first part is an overview of the historical background in which the VPA was founded, the second part is concerned with the involvement of the army in economic reforms ; it discusses the way the VPA appears to be at the fore front of Vietnam's transition to a market economy. Although there has been, until now, no attempt to curtail the VPA'S roles in commercial and economic activities, the communist party is extending the army's role in the maintenance of internal order and security. A process of increasing professionalism, however, has begun, thus compensating for the decline of the VPA'S defense mission
The origins of the National Front for the liberation of South Viet-Nam
Any examination of the origins of the National Front for
the Liberation of South Viet-Nam must give prominence to the
role of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party. During the period 1954-60
the VWP was enveloped in a continuing debate over how to
achieve national unification. In 1954, despite disagreement
within the VWP's Central Committee, it was decided to accept a
negotiated settlement to the war. Accordingly the Party set
out a two-year policy of political struggle synchronized with
the various provisions of the Geneva Agreements. The VWP saw
its tasks in each zone as being fundamentally different:
priority was given to socialist construction in the north,
while cadres in the south were expected to carry out a people's
national democratic revolution.
Implementation of this new policy in the south was
hampered by the growing strength of the Diem government, and
by the failure of VWP diplomacy to secure either French or
Russian commitment to general elections. The failure to hold
consultations in July 1955 led to growing southern
disenchantment. In September 1955 the Fatherland Front was
created. Its program in effect recognized the need for a
policy of political struggle based on something other than the
Geneva Agreements.
This policy proved difficult to implement. Although
alliances of convenience were forged with the armed forces of
the dissident sects, the Diem regime proved successful in
meeting and overcoming this challenge. By late 1956 southern
pressures for increased use of revolutionary violence coincided
with failures in conducting land reform in the north. These circumstances led to leadership changes in which the southern
lobby was given an increased voice. The immediate result was
the drafting of another long-range policy. Political struggle
was given renewed emphasis but a limited policy of
"extermination of traitors" was permitted. The prime task was
to rebuild the Party organization. This policy was carried out
during 1957-58 at which time great efforts were made to
consolidate the north and to win international sympathy and
support.
In 1959 the southern lobby argued convincingly for a new
policy sanctioning reunification "by all appropriate means".
This meant the use of armed forces. This new policy of
combining political and armed struggle was ratified at the
VWP's 3rd National Congress in September 1960. The growing
influence of the southerners was evident in leadership
appointments to the Politburo, Secretariat and Central
Committee. Le Duan, the outspoken advocate for armed struggle,
became the Party's First Secretary. The 3rd National Congress
committed the entire VWP to carrying out the people's national
democratic revolution in the south. Southern cadres set about
creating a national united front and regroupees in the north
began returning south. In December 1960 an organizing
committee met and proclaimed the formation of the NFLSVN. Over
a year later, after much organizational work, the First Congress
of the NFLSVN was held. The origins of this Front lie both in
the interaction between contending factions within the VWP
leadership and the interaction between the VWP and various
southern social forces and personalities on the one hand, and
the Diem regime and its American backers on the other
Do Associations Support Authoritarian Rule? Tentative Answers from Algeria, Mozambique, and Vietnam
Whether associations help to democratise authoritarian rule or support those in power is a contested issue that so far lacks a cross-regional perspective. Drawing on relational sociology, this paper explores the impact of state power in Algeria, Mozambique, and Vietnam on associations and vice versa. We focus on decision-making in associations and on three policy areas - welfare policy concerning HIV/AIDS, economic policy concerning small and mediumsized enterprises, policies concerning gender equality and the rights of women and sexual minorities - to assess the relations between associations and the state's infrastructural and discursive power. Most associations interviewed by us in the three countries accept or do not openly reject the state's and/or the state ruling party's various forms of interference in internal decision-making processes. Whereas associations in Algeria and Vietnam help to maintain the state's control through welfare provision, associations in Mozambique can weaken this form of infrastructural state power. Moreover, business and professionals' associations in all three countries help maintain the state's control through limited participation, i.e. another form of infrastructural state power. Finally, associations in all three countries support the state's discourse and policies in the area of gender equality and women's rights, though in all three countries at least some NGOs help weaken this form of state power
Finishing the euchromatic sequence of the human genome
The sequence of the human genome encodes the genetic instructions for human physiology, as well as rich information about human evolution. In 2001, the International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium reported a draft sequence of the euchromatic portion of the human genome. Since then, the international collaboration has worked to convert this draft into a genome sequence with high accuracy and nearly complete coverage. Here, we report the result of this finishing process. The current genome sequence (Build 35) contains 2.85 billion nucleotides interrupted by only 341 gaps. It covers ∼99% of the euchromatic genome and is accurate to an error rate of ∼1 event per 100,000 bases. Many of the remaining euchromatic gaps are associated with segmental duplications and will require focused work with new methods. The near-complete sequence, the first for a vertebrate, greatly improves the precision of biological analyses of the human genome including studies of gene number, birth and death. Notably, the human enome seems to encode only 20,000-25,000 protein-coding genes. The genome sequence reported here should serve as a firm foundation for biomedical research in the decades ahead
Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea and Southeast Asian Responses
This article reviews Chinese assertive behaviour towards the Philippines and Vietnam over South China Sea issues in 2011. The article compares and contrasts Chinese diplomatic behaviour in the period before and after the adoption by ASEAN member states and China of Guidelines for the Implementation the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in July. In the first period China aggressively asserted its claims to sovereignty by interfering with commercial fishing and oil exploration activities of vessels operating in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Vietnam and the Philippines. Both states resisted Chinese actions. The Philippines allocated increased funding for defence modernization, lobbied ASEAN states and shored up its alliance with the United States. Vietnam too protested Chinese action and undertook symbolic steps to defend national sovereignty. In the second period all states moved to contain South China Sea tensions from affecting their larger bilateral relations. It remains to be seen, however, if proposed confidence building measures will ameliorate Chinese assertiveness
Recent developments in the South China Sea : grounds for cautious optimism?
This paper provides a broad overview of four major topics. First, it discusses tensions in China-United States relations and their implications for Southeast Asia. This
section will focus on how China and the United States employ naval power to shape the political environment. This section also critically examines the concept of “core
national interest” that is attributed to Chinese officials. Second, the paper review
multilateral efforts to address the South China Sea with a particular focus on the 17th
ASEAN Regional Forum ministerial meeting and the inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus Eight. Third, the paper reviews China-Vietnam
interaction in the South China Sea with a particular focus on China’s annual unilateral
fishing ban and seizure of Vietnamese fishing boats. Fourth, the paper reviews the
status of the Declaration on Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea and
progress by the China-ASEAN working group to implement the DOC. The paper
concludes on a note of cautious optimism that there is likely to be some progress in
implementing confidence building measures in the South China Sea but that sovereignty claims will remain intractable
Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea and Southeast Asian Responses
This article reviews Chinese assertive behaviour towards the Philippines and Vietnam over South China Sea issues in 2011. The article compares and contrasts Chinese diplomatic behaviour in the period before and after the adoption by ASEAN member states and China of Guidelines for the Implementation the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in July. In the first period China aggressively asserted its claims to sovereignty by interfering with commercial fishing and oil exploration activities of vessels operating in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Vietnam and the Philippines. Both states resisted Chinese actions. The Philippines allocated increased funding for defence modernization, lobbied ASEAN states and shored up its alliance with the United States. Vietnam too protested Chinese action and undertook symbolic steps to defend national sovereignty. In the second period all states moved to contain South China Sea tensions from affecting their larger bilateral relations. It remains to be seen, however, if proposed confidence building measures will ameliorate Chinese assertiveness
Political Legitimacy of Vietnam’s One Party-State: Challenges and Responses
This article focuses on the challenges to the authority of Vietnam’s one-party state that emerged in 2009 and state responses. Three separate challenges are discussed: opposition to bauxite mining in the Central Highlands; mass protests by the Catholic Church over land ownership issues; and revived political dissent by pro-democracy activists and bloggers. The Vietnam Communist Party bases its claims to political legitimacy on multiple sources. The bauxite mining controversy challenged the state’s claim to political legitimacy on the basis of performance. The Catholic land dispute challenged the state’s claim to legitimacy on rational-legal grounds. Revived political dissent, including the linkage of demands for democracy with concerns over environmental issues and relations with China, challenged the state’s claim to legitimacy based on nationalism. Vietnam responded in a “soft authoritarian” manner. Future challenges and state responses will be debated as Vietnam moves to convene its eleventh national party congress in 2010
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