219 research outputs found
Better regulation and the Lisbon agenda
Conference paper given at the European Evaluation Society Conference: 'Evaluation in Society: Critical Connections', London, October 4th-6th 2006This paper assesses the congruence between the initiatives for regulatory reform known as ‘better regulation’ and the recently re-formulated ‘growth and jobs’ Lisbon agenda of the European Union. To do that, better regulation is re-conceptualised as meta-regulation - sets of rules on the process of rule-formulation, adoption, implementation, and evaluation. Meta-regulation has both structural and discursive properties. Better regulation discourse has been re-defined over the years. Its malleability has enabled policy-makers to address different objectives and to push for their shifting regulatory reform agendas. This explains how the better regulation pendulum has been able to swing between regulatory quantity (or de-regulation) and quality across time and even across the same country. In terms of structural properties, there is diversity across time and countries on fundamental issues such as the dominant stakeholders and the contents of regulatory impact assessment. ‘Better regulation’ has been re-defined by the Barroso Commission to fit in with the ‘growth and jobs’ priorities of Lisbon. This re-definition, however, has also narrowed the scope, the range of stakeholders, and the ambitions in terms of governance and regulatory legitimacy. Diversity, proliferation of objectives and better regulation rhetoric make the relationship between meta-regulation, the Lisbon agenda, and, looking at the long-term impact, the dynamics of the regulatory state problematic. The quality-quantity divide and the role played by credibility and regulatory legitimacy are critical for the development of meta-regulation and its impact on the regulatory state
The puzzle of regulatory competition
Our understanding of international competition in regulatory policies has not progressed much because conventional theories lead to a bewildering range of conclusions. Empirical evidence has shown the limitations of simplistic models. Fresh work should overcome the obsession with ‘races’ and ‘final outcomes’ of conventional theoretical approaches and start modelling real-world mechanisms of regulatory competition. The first part of the article shows the limitations of conventional theories. The second introduces eight problems that explanations of international regulatory competition should address. It also discusses how the articles presented here contribute to the solution to problematic aspects of the puzzle. The conclusion reports results achieved in terms of key concepts of regulatory competition, sequences of cooperation and competition, the role of non-unitary actors in networked regulatory action, and why regulatory competition is still limited, both in the EU and in transatlantic relations
Europeanisation: solution or problem?
Is there something new in recent research on Europeanisation? Or should we go back to what we already know about political integration in Europe and avoid the term? This article reviews recent work in four steps: the identification of the specific domain of Europeanisation; the relationship between Europeanisation, on the one hand, and governance, institutions, and discourse, on the other; the methodological problems and the models emerging in this new field of research; and an assessment of the results arising out of theoretical and empirical research. One theme throughout the article is that, in order to develop a progressive agenda, Europeanisation should be seen as a
problem, not as a solution. It is neither a new theory, nor an ad-hoc approach. Rather, it is a way of orchestrating existing concepts and to contribute to cumulative research in political science. Europeanisation does not provide any simple fix to theoretical or empirical problems. Quite the
opposite, it can deliver if approached as a set of puzzles. A problem in search of explanation – not the explanation itself (Gualini 2003). The conclusion is that Europeanisation has contributed to the
emergence of new insights, original explanations, and interesting questions on three important issues: the understanding and analysis of 'impact', how to endogeneise international governance in models of domestic politics, and the relationship between agency and change. These three issues
are prominent in the research agendas of international relations, theoretical policy analysis, and comparative politics. To contribute to major issues at the core of political science is a valuable result for a relatively new field of inquiry
What Does Regulatory Impact Assessment Mean in Europe?
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) has emerged on the European political agenda. It is an idea whose time has come. Both the member states and the institutions of the European Union (EU) are presently investing in programmes for "better regulation" and "good regulatory governance." RIA is the cornerstone of these programmes. This paper explains how RIA is being diffused in Europe. Is the introduction of RIA in Europe simply the diffusion of an idea, the content of which remains very different in the various national contexts' Or, alternatively, has the diffusion of ideas brought about convergence at the level of how RIA is performed' As shown by Hahn and Litan (2004), European impact assessments are often different from North-American RIAs. This paper shows that the adoption of a common RIA "bottle" has not produced similar European wines. The language of RIA has produced a community of discourse for policy-makers and has stimulated the introduction of some instruments that are similarly labelled "impact assessment." But RIA practice may exist only on paper, and in some cases the "RIA label" may reveal basic assessments of administrative burdens. The paper explains how ideas can be diffused without convergence of results. The argument here is not the trivial one that context matters, but how it matters. Hence the paper breaks down "context" into four dimensions, that is, institutions, models of the policy process, actors, and legitimacy. Institutional design, the capacity to deal with distributional problems, heterogeneity in multi-level governance systems, policy styles, and the "weights" given to the preferences of different RIA actors explain the lack of convergence.Regulatory Reform
The Politics of Governance Architectures: Creation, Change and Effects of the EU Lisbon Strategy
Governance architectures are strategic and long-term institutional arrangements of international organisations exhibiting three features, namely, they address strategic and long-term problems in a holistic manner, they set substantive output-oriented goals, and they are implemented through combinations of old and new organizational structures within the international organisation in question. The Lisbon Strategy is the most high-profile initiative of the European Union for economic governance of the last decade. Yet it is also one of the most neglected subjects of EU studies, probably because not being identified as an object of study on its own right. We define the Lisbon strategy as a case of governance architecture, raising questions about its creation, evolution, and impact at the national level. We tackle these questions by drawing on institutional theories about emergence and change of institutional arrangements and on the multiple streams model. We formulate a set of propositions and hypotheses to make sense of the creation, evolution and national impact of the Lisbon Strategy. We argue that institutional ambiguity is used strategically by coalitions at the EU and national level in (re-)defining its ideational and organisational elements
Indicators of regulatory quality: final report
Project was part of the Multiannual Programme for Enterprise and Entrepreneurship 2001-2005.Report for DG Enterprise, European Commission, December 2004
Impact Assessment in the European Union: Lessons from a Research Project
publication-status: Acceptedtypes: ArticleIn this article, we present some major lessons drawn from a recently completed research project. Our research dealt with ex-ante evaluation, mainly impact assessment (IA). We shed new light on research questions about the control of bureaucracy, the role of IA in decision-making, economics and policy learning, and the narrative dimension of appraisal. We identify how our findings stand in relation to conventional arguments about these issues, and reflect on their normative implications. We finally reason on the possible extensions of our arguments to the wider field of policy evaluation, connecting IA and ex-post evaluation.European Research Council (ERC) project
Analysis of Learning in Regulatory Governance (ALREG
Regulatory impact assessment
This chapter brings theories and conceptual frameworks to bear on the analysis of regulatory impact analysis (RIA). First, we introduce the reader to the different notions and debates on the two sides of the Atlantic. We then provide the theoretical justifications of RIA, contrasting principal-agent explanations with pluralist and civic-republican rationales, and exploring the key issue of rationality in rulemaking. Turning to evidence, we discuss empirical papers and more conceptual studies carried out recently, and make some critical remarks. Finally, we suggest how research on RIA can be usefully organised, covering the economic, administrative, and political consequences of regulatory oversight
Overcoming Illusions of Control: How to Nudge and Teach Regulatory Humility
In this chapter we focus on how to use insights from behavioural theory in the process of impact assessment of EU policy proposals. Over the last decade, the European Commission and more generally the European Union (EU) have developed an integrated approach to impact assessment of policy proposals – legislative or not. The impact assessment process is now a major step in the development of proposals by the European Commission. Recently, the European Parliament being biased in this way!!as invested in analytical capacity to work dialogically with the Commission on this issue. Extant literature has established that the EU impact assessment system is, comparatively speaking (for example, in comparison to the systems of the 28 Member States and the United States [US]), sufficiently robust and comprehensive (Fritsch et al., 2013; Renda, 2011; Radaelli, 2009; Wiener and Alemanno, 2010). In the debate of how to conduct impact assessment and train policymakers, there are calls for integrating the insights of behaviour science into policymaking and design regulatory options that take into account the various biases that affect citizens’ responses (Alemanno and Spina, 2013; John, 2013; John et al., 2013; Sunstein, 2011; Van Bavel et al, 2013; Vandebergh, Carrico and Schultz, 2011). But policymakers have a brain too, and therefore their own choices can be biased. The starting point for this chapter is the potential impact of one over-arching bias – the illusion of control (Langer, 1975). The proposition is that this illusion – which leads humans to over-estimate their competence and ability to control outcomes – may be particularly damaging when the tendency to regulate is institutionalised. Specifically, while the EU impact assessment process obliges policymakers to consider the status quo option (non-intervention), this is rarely ever selected. We should be clear: we do not claim that cognitive biases explain the preference for public intervention. There are different political and economic justifications for intervention. An organisation can also deliberatively decide to manipulate the IA procedures towards interventionist choices. If this is so, cognitive biases have no role to play since the organisation is not misdiagnosing the facts; rather it is manipulating them. Rather, we are interested in increasing policy makers’ awareness of ‘regulatory humility’ (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2015b). We believe this should be encouraged among policy-makers, and specifically that the option of not using public intervention (so called ‘do nothing’ option in IA) be given due consideration – whether it is rejected or not. The classic policy-making literature has always pointed toward the limits of policymaking and policymakers (notably, Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Simon, 1956; Vickers, 1965: chapter 8; Wildavsky, 1979: especially part 2). The increased complexity of the policy environment, the difficulty of getting evidence into policy, and greater clarity about human biases have all led to a re-discovery of these limitations. The result has been a renewed call for regulatory humility and humble decision-making (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2015b; Etzioni, 2014). We are interested in how EU policymakers might be de-biased in two main ways: first by structuring IA in ways that encourage policymakers act in ways that work with biases and second by using training to stimulate awareness and reflection about the biases and their possible impact on policymakers’ work. The chapter is structured as follows. In section one, we set up the proposition that EU policymakers are especially susceptible to an illusion of control. Then we explore what can be done to combat a pre-eminent bias. We outline two categories of solutions. In section two we look at how the IA system in the EU can be implemented and amended in ways that ‘go with the grain’ of cognitive biases (Dolan et al, 2009: 7). Here, we accept the reality of that policymakers often operate in ‘fast’ mode (Kahneman, 2011). Rather than try to re-wire the policymaker’s brain, we focus on re-wiring the context within which they work to ensure that what is automatic to them is also beneficial to policymaking. In short, how can we nudge EU policymakers to explore the ‘do-nothing option’, and indeed all policy options, with humility about the control they can exercise? Section three takes a slightly different tack. Here we focus on how policymakers can be exhorted to engage in more ‘slow’ thinking about the biases they carry. Such reflection can be triggered through training. We explore the possible teaching tools that can be and are being used including in-class behavioural experiments. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how some of these ideas can be taken forward by the Commission
Crisis, learning and policy change in the European Union
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from the publisher via the DOI in this record.What is the causal relationship between crisis, learning and change? How does causality works in the current responses to the sovereign debt crisis provided by the European Union? We question the conventional identification of the cause-and-effect relationship provided by theories of crisis management, integration and policy learning. Drawing on models of contingent learning developed within psychology and behavioural and evolutionary economics, we theorise that surprise produces behavioural change via a fast-paced associative cue-outcome mechanism and that policy learning follows change. We then run our exercise in causal identification through a plausibility probe. We show that our argument passes the plausibility probe. Our conclusions on cognition and situational effects on learning suggest a new research agenda, more sensitive to how individuals behave in the real world and more robust in its micro-foundations
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