Where is the problem of “Where is the mind?”?

We propose that the discussions about “where the mind is” depend directly on the metaphysical preconception and definition of “mind”. If we see the mind from one perspective (individualist), it will be only in the brain, and if we see it from another (active externalist), it will be embedded in the body and extended into the world. The “whereabouts” of the mind depends on our <concept|definition>1 of mind. Therefore, we should not ask if the mind is somewhere, but if it is somehow

Contextuality: A Philosophical Paradigm, with Applications to Philosophy of Cognitive Science

We develop on the idea that everything is related, inside, and therefore determined by a context. This stance, which at first might seem obvious, has several important consequences. This paper first presents ideas on Contextuality, for then applying them to problems in philosophy of cognitive science. Because of space limitations, for the second part we will assume that the reader is familiar with the literature of philosophy of cognitive science, but if this is not the case, it would not be a limitation for understanding the main ideas of this paper. We do not argue that Contextuality is a panaceic answer for explaining everything, but we do argue that everything is inside a context. And because this is always, we sometimes ignore it, but we believe that many problems are dissolved with a contextual approach, noticing things we ignore because of their obviousity. We first give a notion of context. We present the idea that errors are just incongruencies inside a context. We also present previous ideas of absolute being, relative being, and lessincompleteness. We state that all logics, and also truth judgements, are contextdependent, and we develop a “Context-dependant Logic”. We apply ideas of Contextuality to problems in semantics, the problem of “where is the mind”, and the study of consciousness

Measuring Complexity in an Aquatic Ecosystem

We apply formal measures of emergence, self-organization, homeostasis, autopoiesis and complexity to an aquatic ecosystem; in particular to the physiochemical component of an Arctic lake. These measures are based on information theory. Variables with an homogeneous distribution have higher values of emergence, while variables with a more heterogeneous distribution have a higher self-organization. Variables with a high complexity reflect a balance between change (emergence) and regularity/order (self-organization). In addition, homeostasis values coincide with the variation of the winter and summer seasons. Autopoiesis values show a higher degree of independence of biological components over their environment. Our approach shows how the ecological dynamics can be described in terms of information.Comment: 6 pages, to be published in Proceedings of the CCBCOL 2013, 2nd Colombian Computational Biology Congress, Springe

The dynamics of critical Kauffman networks under asynchronous stochastic update

We show that the mean number of attractors in a critical Boolean network under asynchronous stochastic update grows like a power law and that the mean size of the attractors increases as a stretched exponential with the system size. This is in strong contrast to the synchronous case, where the number of attractors grows faster than any power law.Comment: submitted to PR

Self-Organization Leads to Supraoptimal Performance in Public Transportation Systems

The performance of public transportation systems affects a large part of the population. Current theory assumes that passengers are served optimally when vehicles arrive at stations with regular intervals. In this paper, it is shown that self-organization can improve the performance of public transportation systems beyond the theoretical optimum by responding adaptively to local conditions. This is possible because of a “slower-is-faster” effect, where passengers wait more time at stations but total travel times are reduced. The proposed self-organizing method uses “antipheromones” to regulate headways, which are inspired by the stigmergy (communication via environment) of some ant colonies

Learning, Social Intelligence and the Turing Test - why an "out-of-the-box" Turing Machine will not pass the Turing Test

The Turing Test (TT) checks for human intelligence, rather than any putative general intelligence. It involves repeated interaction requiring learning in the form of adaption to the human conversation partner. It is a macro-level post-hoc test in contrast to the definition of a Turing Machine (TM), which is a prior micro-level definition. This raises the question of whether learning is just another computational process, i.e. can be implemented as a TM. Here we argue that learning or adaption is fundamentally different from computation, though it does involve processes that can be seen as computations. To illustrate this difference we compare (a) designing a TM and (b) learning a TM, defining them for the purpose of the argument. We show that there is a well-defined sequence of problems which are not effectively designable but are learnable, in the form of the bounded halting problem. Some characteristics of human intelligence are reviewed including it's: interactive nature, learning abilities, imitative tendencies, linguistic ability and context-dependency. A story that explains some of these is the Social Intelligence Hypothesis. If this is broadly correct, this points to the necessity of a considerable period of acculturation (social learning in context) if an artificial intelligence is to pass the TT. Whilst it is always possible to 'compile' the results of learning into a TM, this would not be a designed TM and would not be able to continually adapt (pass future TTs). We conclude three things, namely that: a purely "designed" TM will never pass the TT; that there is no such thing as a general intelligence since it necessary involves learning; and that learning/adaption and computation should be clearly distinguished.Comment: 10 pages, invited talk at Turing Centenary Conference CiE 2012, special session on "The Turing Test and Thinking Machines

The properties of attractors of canalyzing random Boolean networks

We study critical random Boolean networks with two inputs per node that contain only canalyzing functions. We present a phenomenological theory that explains how a frozen core of nodes that are frozen on all attractors arises. This theory leads to an intuitive understanding of the system's dynamics as it demonstrates the analogy between standard random Boolean networks and networks with canalyzing functions only. It reproduces correctly the scaling of the number of nonfrozen nodes with system size. We then investigate numerically attractor lengths and numbers, and explain the findings in terms of the properties of relevant components. In particular we show that canalyzing networks can contain very long attractors, albeit they occur less often than in standard networks.Comment: 9 pages, 8 figure

Traffic flow on realistic road networks with adaptive traffic lights

We present a model of traffic flow on generic urban road networks based on cellular automata. We apply this model to an existing road network in the Australian city of Melbourne, using empirical data as input. For comparison, we also apply this model to a square-grid network using hypothetical input data. On both networks we compare the effects of non-adaptive vs adaptive traffic lights, in which instantaneous traffic state information feeds back into the traffic signal schedule. We observe that not only do adaptive traffic lights result in better averages of network observables, they also lead to significantly smaller fluctuations in these observables. We furthermore compare two different systems of adaptive traffic signals, one which is informed by the traffic state on both upstream and downstream links, and one which is informed by upstream links only. We find that, in general, both the mean and the fluctuation of the travel time are smallest when using the joint upstream-downstream control strategy.Comment: 41 pages, pdflate