25 research outputs found
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A systems approach to cultural evolution
AbstractA widely accepted view in the cultural evolutionary literature is that culture forms a dynamic system of elements (or âtraitsâ) linked together by a variety of relationships. Despite this, large families of models within the cultural evolutionary literature tend to represent only a small number of traits, or traits without interrelationships. As such, these models may be unable to capture complex dynamics resulting from multiple interrelated traits. Here we put forward a systems approach to cultural evolutionary researchâone that explicitly represents numerous cultural traits and their relationships to one another. Basing our discussion on simple graph-based models, we examine the implications of the systems approach in four domains: (i) the cultural evolution of decision rules (âfiltersâ) and their influence on the distribution of cultural traits in a population; (ii) the contingency and stochasticity of system trajectories through a structured state space; (iii) how trait interrelationships can modulate rates of cultural change; and (iv) how trait interrelationships can contribute to understandings of inter-group differences in realised traits. We suggest that the preliminary results presented here should inspire greater attention to the role of multiple interrelated traits on cultural evolution, and should motivate attempts to formalise the rich body of analyses and hypotheses within the humanities and social science literatures.</jats:p
What are cultural attractors?
Concepts from cultural attractor theory are now used in domains far from their original home in anthropology and cultural evolution. Yet these concepts have not been consistently characterised. I here distinguish four ways in which the cultural attractor concept has been used and identify three kinds of factors of attraction typically appealed to. Clarifying these explanatory concepts identifies problems and ambiguities in the work of cultural epidemiologists and commentators alike.The research leading to this paper was supported by funding from the European Research Council under the European Unionâs Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC Grant Agreement No. 284123
Uniqueness in the life sciences: how did the elephant get its trunk?
AbstractResearchers in the life sciences often make uniqueness attributions; about branching events generating new species, the developmental processes generating novel traits and the distinctive cultural selection pressures faced by hominins. Yet since uniqueness implies non-recurrence, such attributions come freighted with epistemic consequences. Drawing on the work of Aviezer Tucker, we show that a common reaction to uniqueness attributions is pessimism: both about the strength of candidate explanations as well as the ability to even generate such explanations. Looking at two case studiesâelephant trunks and human teachingâwe develop a more optimistic account. As we argue, uniqueness attributions are revisable claims about the availability of several different kinds of comparators. Yet even as researchers investigate the availability of such comparators, they are able to mobilize complex sets of empirical and theoretical tools. Rather than hindering scientific investigation, then, we argue that uniqueness attributions often spur the generation of a range of epistemic goods.</jats:p
Beyond brain size: Uncovering the neural correlates of behavioral and cognitive specialization
© Comparative Cognition Society. Despite prolonged interest in comparing brain size and behavioral proxies of "intelligence" across taxa, the adaptive and cognitive significance of brain size variation remains elusive. Central to this problem is the continued focus on hominid cognition as a benchmark and the assumption that behavioral complexity has a simple relationship with brain size. Although comparative studies of brain size have been criticized for not reflecting how evolution actually operates, and for producing spurious, inconsistent results, the causes of these limitations have received little discussion. We show how these issues arise from implicit assumptions about what brain size measures and how it correlates with behavioral and cognitive traits. We explore how inconsistencies can arise through heterogeneity in evolutionary trajectories and selection pressures on neuroanatomy or neurophysiology across taxa. We examine how interference from ecological and life history variables complicates interpretations of brain-behavior correlations and point out how this problem is exacerbated by the limitations of brain and cognitive measures. These considerations, and the diversity of brain morphologies and behavioral capacities, suggest that comparative brain-behavior research can make greater progress by focusing on specific neuroanatomical and behavioral traits within relevant ecological and evolutionary contexts. We suggest that a synergistic combination of the "bottom-up" approach of classical neuroethology and the "top-down" approach of comparative biology/psychology within closely related but behaviorally diverse clades can limit the effects of heterogeneity, interference, and noise. We argue that this shift away from broad-scale analyses of superficial phenotypes will provide deeper, more robust insights into brain evolution
Ingredients for understanding brain and behavioral evolution: Ecology, phylogeny, and mechanism
This is the final version of the article. Available from The Comparative Cognition Society via the DOI in this record.Uncovering the neural correlates and evolutionary drivers of behavioral and cognitive traits has been held back by traditional perspectives on which correlations to look for-in particular, anthropocentric conceptions of cognition and coarse-grained brain measurements. We welcome our colleagues' comments on our overview of the field and their suggestions for how to move forward. Here, we counter, clarify, and extend some points, focusing on the merits of looking for the "best" predictor of cognitive ability, the sources and meaning of "noise," and the ways in which we can deduce and test meaningful conclusions from comparative analyses of complex traits
Cultural longevity: Morin on cultural lineages
Morin has written a rich and valuable book. Its main aim is to isolate the factors involved in maintaining behavioural lineages over time, and to understand how these factors might interact. In doing so, it takes issue with the abstract and idealised models and arguments of dual-inheritance theorists, which are alleged in this account to rely on an overly simplistic notion of imitative learning. Morinâs book is full of ethnographic, anthropological, and psychological research, and there is much to commend in it. However, Morinâs arguments against the dual-inheritance theorists are less convincing when put under scrutiny, and his positive picture which includes appeals to ostensive communication, intrinsic appeal and cultural attraction has some difficulties. I argue that when we contrast dual-inheritance theorists and Morin, we find that there may be fewer differences and greater commonalities than Morinâs book might suggest.This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Springer via https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-015-9506-
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Cumulative culture and complex cultural traditions
Cumulative cultural evolution is taken to be a distinctive feature of human culture. This claim of distinctiveness is often secured by pointing to complex, late-appearing human technologies. Yet by adopting such technologies as paradigm cases of cumulative culture, researchers have unhelpfully lumped together a range of features and processes associated with the concept. This article thus has two aims. First, to disentangle four trends associated with cumulative culture: adaptiveness, complexity, efficiency, and disparity. Second, to highlight the epistemic implications of adopting (typically late-appearing) complex human technologies as the primary explanatory target of research in cumulative culture. By disaggregating the four accumulative trends, and identifying other explanatory targets, this article opens up conceptual and empirical space for work on cumulative culture in non-human animals and earlier stages in hominin evolution.Leverhulme Trust, Isaac Newton Trus
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Demographic Cultures and Demographic Skepticism
Acknowledgements: I am grateful to audiences at the University of Cambridge, Brunel University London, and the Cultural Evolution Online group for valuable feedback on this paper. Special thanks to Alberto Acerbi, Rohan KapitĂĄny, Tim Lewens, and Cristina Moya for their comments and insights.AbstractThe social sciences often explain behavioral differences by appealing to membership in distinct cultural groups. This work uses the concepts of âculturesâ and âcultural groupsâ like any other demographic category (e.g. âgenderâ, âsocioeconomic statusâ). I call these joint conceptualizations of âculturesâ and âcultural groupsâ demographic cultures. Such demographic cultures have long been subject to scrutiny. Here I isolate and respond to a set of arguments I call demographic skepticism. This skeptical position denies that the demographic cultures concept can support metaphysically plausible and empirically principled research. I argue against the skeptic, showing that their position relies on a questionable alignment between the demographic cultures concept and what I call the folk anthropological model. While the commitments of that model are problematicâthey are not necessary for comparative work in the social sciences. In addition to clarifying skeptical arguments, then, I provide four recommendations for the comparative social scientist that allow them to avoid demographic skepticism.</jats:p