60 research outputs found

    The epistemic predicament of a pseudoscience: social constructivism confronts Freudian psychoanalysis

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    Social constructivist approaches to science have often been dismissed as inaccurate accounts of scientific knowledge. In this paper, we take the claims of robust social constructivism seriously and attempt to find a theory which does instantiate the epistemic predicament as described by SC. We argue that Freudian psychoanalysis, in virtue of some of its well known epistemic complications and conceptual confusions, provides a perfect illustration of what SC claims is actually going on in science. In other words, the features SC mistakenly ascribes to science in general correctly characterize the epistemic status of Freudian psychoanalysis. This sheds some light on the internal disputes in the field of psychoanalysis, on the sociology of psychoanalytic movement, and on the “war” that has been waged over Freud’s legacy with his critics. In addition, our analysis offers an indirect and independent argument against SC as an account of bona fide science, by illustrating what science would look like if it were to function as SC claims it does

    The dark side of the loon: explaining the temptations of obscurantism

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    After contrasting obscurantism with bullshit, we explore some ways in which obscurantism is typically justified by investigating a notorious test-case: defences of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Obscurantism abuses the reader's natural sense of curiosity and interpretive charity with the promise of deep and profound insights about a designated subject matter that is often vague or elusive. When the attempt to understand what the speaker means requires excessive hermeneutic efforts, interpreters are reluctant to halt their quest for meaning. We diagnose this as a case of psychological loss aversion, in particular, the aversion to acknowledging that there was no hidden meaning after all, or that whatever meaning found was projected onto the text by the reader herself

    Covert Institutionality: Sacred Mountains, Witches and Exorcists

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    I develop an account of covert institutional facts by examining sacred objects, witches, shamans and exorcists. I present an account of sacred objects as covert institutional entities, and distinguish between true beliefs that help create the institutional facts and false beliefs about their origin and/or their physical powers

    Is Somaliland a Country? An Essay on Institutional Objects in the Social Sciences

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    Searle claims that his theory of institutional reality is particularly suitable as a theoretical scheme of individuation for work in the social sciences. We argue that this is not the case. The first problem with regulatory individuation is due to the familiar fact that institutional judgments have constrained revisability criteria. The second problem with regulatory individuation is due to the fact that institutions amend their declarative judgments based on the inferential (syntactic) properties of the judgments and in response to regulatory pressure, and not based on descriptive (semantic) properties and in response to matters of descriptive adequacy. These two problems imply that ‘regulatory kinds' (countries, borders, kings) will almost inevitably be disjunctive kinds that are ill-suited for scientific theorizing. This also explains why the law often makes odd pronouncements, e.g. calling ketchup a vegetable, considering an arm bent fifteen degrees to be straight, and not admitting that Somaliland is a country

    Cigarettes, dollars and bitcoins – an essay on the ontology of money

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    What does being money consist in? We argue that something is money if, and only if, it is typically acquired in order to realise the reduction in transaction costs that accrues in virtue of agents coordinating on acquiring the same thing when deciding what thing to acquire in order to exchange. What kinds of things can be money? We argue against the common view that a variety of things (notes, coins, gold, cigarettes, etc.) can be money. All monetary systems are best interpreted as implementing the same basic protocol. Money, i.e. the thing that we coordinate on acquiring in order to lower our transaction costs, is, in all cases, a set of positions on an abstract mathematical object, namely a relative ratio scale. The things that we ordinarily call ‘money’ are merely records of positions on such a scale

    What is money? An alternative to Searle's institutional facts

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    In The Construction of Social Reality, John Searle develops a theory of institutional facts and objects, of which money, borders and property are presented as prime examples. These objects are the result of us collectively intending certain natural objects to have a certain status, i.e. to ‘count as’ being certain social objects. This view renders such objects irreducible to natural objects. In this paper we propose a radically different approach that is more compatible with standard economic theory. We claim that such institutional objects can be fully understood in terms of actions and incentives, and hence the Searlean apparatus solves a non-existent problem

    Disagreement in Matters of Taste, Attitudinal Alignment and Coordination

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    Recent research on disagreement in matters of taste has focused on the semantics of predicates of taste (contextualism and relativism are the main contenders here), but the conceptual and empirical issues relevant for understanding the communicative dimension of such disputes – why we have them, and when we aim at when we try to resolve them -- extend beyond semantics and touches on areas such as the evolutionary psychology of expressing attitudes (Green, 2009), the nature of disagreement in attitude (Stevenson 1944), the role of social emotions and argumentation in morality (Haidt, 2001) and the function of cohesion and trust in small and large groups (Davis, 2001). Systematic fault lines in matters of taste typically reveal where and how individuals were socialized and where the in-group/outgroup consensus lies. The capacity to distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’ often focuses on attitudes that play a key role in organizing our social preferences. In socialization and integration the adoption of pre-existing interests, values and preferences (often required for the creation and maintenance of joint, or shared projects) plays a key role. Disagreements in matters of taste have two easily recognizable dimensions that do not easily fit together. On the one hand, there is a sense of faultlessness – each party seems to be prima facie right about her judgement because it reflects how she herself is affected by a state of affairs or where her preferences lie- the judgements are de se, as Egan stresses (Egan, 2014). On the other hand, occasions that prompt such judgements often reveal that it matters, in the context of the conversation, to the participants that it becomes common knowledge that she is so affected. Seeking the coordination of intentions is the basis for the formation of joint goals, projects and the creation and maintenance of delicate social bonds. What are the games that form the background of attempts to coordinate in matters of taste? I first explore a typical coordination game (Battle of the sexes) and the problem of equilibrium selection. Then I look at a classification of speech acts in terms of what speakers want from their audience. It will turn out that a typical judgement of taste has two separable goals: one of seeking to inform the other party about one’s preferences, and one of seeking coordination of intentions and actions based on those preferences. Audiences can focus on one of these goals, focus on both, or even rationally ignore one of these goals. I will end with an explanation of the difference between disagreement in matters of taste and moral disagreement. It will turn out that the underlying game in moral disagreements is not a coordination game, but a mixed motive game, like the Prisoner’s Dilemma or the Stag Hunt
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