64 research outputs found
Product Innovation and Stability of Collusion
We study the nature of market competition in relation to stability of collusion in the infinitely repeated play of a two-stage game of product innovation and market competition, and show that cooperation in giving R&D efforts is more easily sustained when firms compete in quantity than in price.R&D Effort, Product differentiation, Collusion
Does partial privatization improve the environment?
This paper shows that, in case of differentiated products mixed duopoly, environmental damage increases (decreases) with the level of privatization, if the level of privatization is less (more) than certain level. It also shows that partial privatization is optimal from the social welfare point of view. However, the social welfare maximizing level of privatization damages the environment most.Privatization, mixed duopoly, environmental damage, environmental tax, social welfare
Wage bargaining and quality competition
In a standard model of vertical differentiation, wage is assumed to determine the quality. Wage is also subject to bargaining. Increased bargaining power of the worker in the low quality firm reduces quality differential, and increases price competitiveness. The Opposite happens from a similar change in the high quality firm.Wage bargaining; Quality competition
Entry Threats, and Inefficiency in Ă¢ââÂŹĂĹEfficient BargainingĂ¢ââââ¢
We examine whether the outcome of bargaining over wage and employment between an incumbent firm and a union remains efficient under entry threat. The workers\' reservation wage is not known to the entrant, and entry is profitable only against the high reservation wage. The entrant observes the pre-entry price, but not necessarily the wage agreements. When wage is not observed, contracts feature over-employment. Under separating equilibrium the low type is over-employed, and under pooling equilibrium the high type is over-employed. But when wage is observed, pooling equilibrium may not always exist, and separating equilibrium does not involve any inefficiency.Efficient Bargaining, Entry Threat, Signalling, Inefficiency
Corruption, Default and Optimal Credit in Welfare Programs
In this paper we present a dynamic model of subsidized credit provision to examine how asymmetric information exacerbates ineciency caused by corruption. Though designed to empower the underprivileged, the fate of such credit programs largely depends on the eciency of the credit delivery system. Corruption often erodes this eciency. Nevertheless, when a corrupt loan ocial and a borrower interact with symmetric information, credit terms can be so designed that corruption will aect only the size of the surplus, but not repayment. With private information on the borrower's productivity this result changes. The corrupt loan ocial may induce the low productivity borrower to default, mainly because of high revelation costs. The government can improve the repayment rate, but will have to under-provide the rst period loan. On the other hand it can permit default by the low productivity borrower, and maintain a higher credit level. The second option may sometimes be preferred. This inecient outcome is caused by two factors - informational ratchet eects and countervailing incentives, which are commonly present in many agency relationships.corruption, Information rent, Countervailing incentives
Asymmetric Information in the Labor Market, Immigrants and Contract Menu
Immigrant workers and their labor force participation in host countries have received critical attention in all concerned disciplines, principally owing to its strong implications for well-being of natives. The ageing population in many rich countries and several related and unrelated issues including global integration, pension provisions or security threats keeps immigration under continuous impact evaluation. However, of the several studies that dealt with patterns and consequences aspects of labor migration, only a handful discusses asymmetric information across transnational labor markets despite agreement that a standardized screening mechanism is unavailable. At the same time, several empirical studies show that immigrants are proportionally overrepresented in self-employment, vis-Ă -vis natives of equivalent skill levels. We try to explain this phenomenon based on asymmetric information in the host country labor market. We focus on the design of a contract menu by the employers, which when offered to a mixed cohort of immigrants facilitates self-selection in favor of paid employment or the outside option of self-employment/entrepreneurship. We also discuss countervailing incentives among the mixed cohort.immigrants, asymmetric information, labor contracts, self-employment, incentive compatibility
Product Innovation and Stability of Collusion
We study the nature of market competition in relation to stability of collusion in the infinitely repeated play of a twostage game of product innovation and market competition, and show that cooperation in giving R&D efforts is more easily sustained when firms compete in quantity than in price
Wage bargaining and quality competition
In a standard model of vertical differentiation, wage is assumed to determine the quality. Wage is also subject to bargaining. Increased bargaining power of the worker in the low quality firm reduces quality differential, and increases price competitiveness. The Opposite happens from a similar change in the high quality firm
Reviving the informal sector from the throes of demonetisation
While recent measures announced by the government indicate some awareness of the hardships inflicted on the informal sector by the note ban, more needs to be done. In this article, Kaushik Bhattacharya, Siddhartha Mitra, Sarmistha Pal and Bibhas Saha summarise the emerging evidence on the significant adverse impact of demonetisation on the informal sector, and suggest policy measures to ensure a steady recovery
Wage bargaining and quality competition
In a standard model of vertical differentiation, wage is assumed to determine the quality. Wage is also subject to bargaining. Increased bargaining power of the worker in the low quality firm reduces quality differential, and increases price competitiveness. The Opposite happens from a similar change in the high quality firm
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