Between Exclusion and Assimilation: Experimentalizing Multiculturalism

With increasing frequency, members of cultural minorities are demanding not only equality and non-discrimination as individuals, but also the legal recognition of their collective identities. Their claims to cultural protection and accommodation are necessarily philosophical, political, moral, and (both constitutionally and normatively) legal. This paper is a reflection on the last dimension, the legal axis. The author sets out to delineate the descriptive, interpretive, and normative scope of section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He is influenced by the approaches to constitutional innovation expounded by theories of democratic experimentalism.The first part of the paper outlines the textual and normative framework of the Charter’s multiculturalism provision. Section 27 creates two distinct types of interests that give rise to claims: one individual and one group-based, described respectively as “accommodation” and “autonomy”.The second part of the paper applies the normative framework to two case studies: female genital cutting and sharia tribunals. These examples provide a setting in which to explore the potential of section 27 to address the cultural demands in ways that go beyond conventional doctrinal and normative understandings. The author suggests that an experimentalist interpretation of multiculturalism under section 27 would create a space in which different approaches and institutional arrangements could be tried in order to determine the best practices for handling difficult, highly contextual questions. Instead of limiting possibilities by adopting restrictive approaches that extinguish cultural claims and risk radicalizing groups, the author argues that the normative force of section 27 includes an imperative to create the institutional conditions within which measures can be tried and tested, with the expectation that benchmarks will emerge through practice.Les membres des minorités culturelles demandent, de plus en plus fréquemment, non seulement l’égalité et l’absence de discrimination en tant qu’individus, mais aussi la reconnaissance par le droit de leurs identités collectives. Leurs revendications de protection culturelle et d’accommodation sont philosophiques, politiques, morales et juridiques. Cet article est une réflexion sur l’aspect juridique de ces revendications. L’auteur cherche à délimiter l’étendue descriptive, interprétative et normative de l’article 27 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés. Il est influencé par les approches de l’innovation constitutionnelle mises de l’avant par les théories de l’expérimentalisme démocratique.Dans la première partie de l’article, l’auteur traite du cadre textuel et normatif de la disposition de la Charte sur le multiculturalisme. L’article 27 crée deux types d’intérêts distincts qui donnent lieu à des revendications : un intérêt individuel et un intérêt collectif, désignés respectivement par les termes «accommodation» et «autonomie».Dans la seconde partie, l’auteur applique le cadre normatif à deux études de cas : la coupe génitale féminine et les tribunaux de la charia. Ces exemples offrent un cadre d’analyse pour étudier la possibilité d’utiliser l’article 27 dans le but d’aborder les revendications culturelles en allant au-delà des approches doctrinales et normatives conventionnelles. L’auteur suggère qu’une interprétation expérimentaliste du multiculturalisme créerait un espace au sein duquel des approches et arrangements institutionnels divers pourraient être essayés afin de déterminer les meilleures pratiques. Au lieu de limiter les possibilités en adoptant des mesures restrictives qui mettent fin aux revendications culturelles et risquent de radicaliser certains groupes, l’auteur soutient que la force normative de l’article 27 inclut l’impératif de créer des conditions institutionnelles propices à l’essai et au test de pratiques, avec l’idée que des standards émergeront de la pratique

R v. NS: What\u27s Fair in a Trial? The Supreme Court of Canada\u27s Divided Decision on the Niqab in the Courtroom

In 2008, a woman entered an Ontario courtroom to give evidence at a preliminary inquiry involving childhood sexual assault charges against her uncle and cousin. She sought to testify while wearing a niqab, a garment that conceals the entire head and face, leaving only an opening for the eyes. The court was asked to decide the novel question whether it could accommodate the Muslim veil in a system of justice that provided the accused with a right to face his accuser. The Supreme Court of Canada divided three ways, with justices disagreeing deeply both about the analysis for determining whether to permit a witness to wear the niqab, and the values and interests at play in this analysis

Stewart v. Elk Valley: The Case of the Cocaine-Using Coal Miner

It has for some time been settled under section 15 of the Charter and within anti-discrimination code definitions that disability includes addictions . Labour boards and human rights tribunals have long accepted that alcohol and drug addiction are illnesses and are physical and mental disabilities for the purposes of the Human Rights Code. There are no reasons to consider them any less an illness or disability than any other serious affliction. \u27 The shift in expert consensus led to notable changes to the key American diagnostic instrument, the DSM 5, adopted in 2013 with a completely revised approach to addictions. What is significant for the purposes of disability law is that addiction, including both substance and behavioural addictions (e.g. gambling), is now broadly accepted as a mental illness

From Saumur to L. (S.): Tracing the the ory and Concept of Religious Freedom under Canadian Law

This paper takes as its starting point a the oretical gap in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada in relation to freedom of religion claims. The author argues that, under the Amselem analysis, the Court restricts itself to making decisions involving contested values while avoiding substantive consideration of normative questions. As a result, judicial reasoning in recent cases dealing with religious freedom has been characterized by formalistic doctrinal applications coupled with covert substantive review. The paper argues that the Court should be more explicit in justifying its protection of relational interests within freedom of religion jurisprudence. Neo-republican political the ory offers a justificatory framework for the move away from an individual rights approach to adjudicating social nuances of contemporary religious freedom claims, in a way which recognizes the interdependency of interests, and mediates tensions in social relations. Such a conception of religious freedom balances the impulse to individualism against the interest in co-reliance, and suggests that responsibility and social commitments ought to be understood as a constituent part of freedom, rather than as a threat or toll. The author surveys Supreme Court case law from the 1950s, the pre-Charter or human rights era, to show how the Court grounded its protection of religion and religious freedom in historical and contextual considerations, philosophical values, cultural norms and unwritten constitutional principles. The Court engaged in conceptual analyses about freedom and the role of religion in public life, and decided constitutional rights without reference to positive law. Freedom was understood the n as a moral and political concept, if not yet a legal right. The author the n jumps forward to the recent judgment in L. (S.), in which the Supreme Court found itself again engaging with conceptual issues related to religious freedom, but within the doctrinal framework of section 2(a) and the Charter right to freedom of religion. The author finds that the conceptual questions in L. (S.) focused the Court on defining freedom in alignment with shared public values. The paper closes by examining these shared values, gleaned from a number of recent cases, in an effort to describe the Court’s emerging framework for a relational conception of freedom — one in which permissions and restrictions flow in all directions between the state, the individual and the collective

R v. NS: What\u27s Fair in a Trial? The Supreme Court of Canada\u27s Divided Decision on the Niqab in the Courtroom

In 2008, a woman entered an Ontario courtroom to give evidence at a preliminary inquiry involving childhood sexual assault charges against her uncle and cousin. She sought to testify while wearing a niqab, a garment that conceals the entire head and face, leaving only an opening for the eyes. The court was asked to decide the novel question whether it could accommodate the Muslim veil in a system of justice that provided the accused with a right to face his accuser. The Supreme Court of Canada divided three ways, with justices disagreeing deeply both about the analysis for determining whether to permit a witness to wear the niqab, and the values and interests at play in this analysis

International Human Rights in Canada: At the Juncture of Law and Politics

This paper addresses the topic of international human rights law from the Canadian perspective. As the title suggests, this paper’s analysis of the topic sits at the intersection of law and politics, where all questions of international law necessarily do. It proceeds in three parts. First, it provides a sketch of the political context, drawing from recent events and trends, to describe a conflicted official government approach to international human rights. Next, it examines the formal legal status of international human rights law in Canada, drawing selectively from Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence. Finally, it addresses the adoption of the newest international human rights treaty, the Disability Convention, and discusses calls to promote access to justice at the international level for breaches of Convention norms domestically. Notwithstanding important efforts to advance the status of international human rights law in Canada, the author\u27s overall observation is that, in both law and politics, the Canadian approach to international human rights is predominantly inward looking

International Human Rights in Canada: At the Juncture of Law and Politics

This paper addresses the topic of international human rights law from the Canadian perspective. As the title suggests, this paper’s analysis of the topic sits at the intersection of law and politics, where all questions of international law necessarily do. It proceeds in three parts. First, it provides a sketch of the political context, drawing from recent events and trends, to describe a conflicted official government approach to international human rights. Next, it examines the formal legal status of international human rights law in Canada, drawing selectively from Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence. Finally, it addresses the adoption of the newest international human rights treaty, the Disability Convention, and discusses calls to promote access to justice at the international level for breaches of Convention norms domestically. Notwithstanding important efforts to advance the status of international human rights law in Canada, the author\u27s overall observation is that, in both law and politics, the Canadian approach to international human rights is predominantly inward looking