The Law According to She-Hulk

First introduced in Marvel comics in 1979, Jennifer Walters is the fictional character best known as the She-Hulk. Her profession is an attorney. While this article occasionally draws from source material elsewhere in the Marvel comics, its primary focus is the third She-Hulk series, which was published in twelve issues from 2014 to 2015. This series is considered to be the most legally focused of the She-Hulk series and was written by an attorney, Charles Soule. Soule himself describes the series as “a book starring a superhero who rarely super heroes. Instead of that, she *gulp* lawyers.” As is normal with any work of fiction that depicts attorneys at work, the law in the She-Hulk series deviates from the actual law that exists in the world in which we live. That does not mean, however, that Soule ‘got the law wrong.’ Rather, it should be assumed that he got the law right for She-Hulk’s universe. He is, after all, the author of the series, and an author creates the rules of his characters’ universe

Restitution and the Excessive Fines Clause

The article offers solutions to further the conversation regarding the U.S. constitution\u27s Eighth Amendment\u27s limits on restitution. Topics discussed include application of Excessive Fines Clause; the case law interpreting the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment; and ways in which Excessive Fines Clause should be applied to restitution in criminal cases

\u3cem\u3eUnited States v. Erwin\u3c/em\u3e and the Folly of Intertwined Cooperation and Plea Agreements

Cooperation agreements and plea agreements are separate and independent promises by criminal defendants to: (1) assist the Government in the prosecution of another person and (2) plead guilty. A defendant’s breach of one should not affect the Government’s obligation to perform under the other. All too often, however, these agreements are inappropriately intertwined so that a minor breach of the plea agreement relieves the Government of its obligation to move for a downward sentencing departure in recognition of the defendant’s substantial assistance. This intertwining undermines sentencing policy as set forth in the federal sentencing statute. Thus, a district court should continue to consider a defendant’s substantial assistance when imposing a criminal sentence even if a breach of the plea agreement alleviates the Government of its duty to move for a sentence reduction under an intertwined cooperation agreement

United States v. Erwin and the Folly of Intertwined Cooperation and Plea Agreements

Cooperation agreements and plea agreements are separate and independent promises by criminal defendants to: (1) assist the Government in the prosecution of another person and (2) plead guilty. A defendant’s breach of one should not affect the Government’s obligation to perform under the other. All too often, however, these agreements are inappropriately intertwined so that a minor breach of the plea agreement relieves the Government of its obligation to move for a downward sentencing departure in recognition of the defendant’s substantial assistance. This intertwining undermines sentencing policy as set forth in the federal sentencing statute. Thus, a district court should continue to consider a defendant’s substantial assistance when imposing a criminal sentence even if a breach of the plea agreement alleviates the Government of its duty to move for a sentence reduction under an intertwined cooperation agreement

Slaying Contingent Beneficiaries

This Article analyzes what impact, if any, the slaying of one beneficiary by another should have on distribution of a decedent’s property. This issue could arise in a variety of conveyances, such as intestate succession, wills, pay-on-death bank accounts, transfer-on-death securities, or life insurance proceeds. Based on equity, the Restatement (Third) of Restitution takes the position that a beneficiary may never move forward in the line of succession as the result of a slaying. This result is thought to be an extension of the traditional “slayer rule,” which disallows a slayer from inheriting from her victim. The Article argues for the opposite conclusion: the slaying of a higher-priority beneficiary by a contingent beneficiary does not result in unjust enrichment because it does not result in a transfer of a property interest to the slayer. Although the slayer advances in the line of succession as a result of the slaying, the slayer still only possesses a defeasible expectancy, not a property interest. Because an expectancy is the legal equivalent of nothing, the slayer has not profited as a result of the killing. Thus, the property distribution should be governed by the likely intent of the owner of the estate rather than by the Restatement’s misguided notion of equity. When there is no governing instrument, the best approach is to presume that the owner of the estate would neither wish to totally disinherit the slayer nor permit the slayer’s share to increase as a result of the slaying. Thus, the slayer’s distribution should be calculated as if the victim of the slaying did not predecease the owner of the estate. But when there is a governing instrument that was either republished after the slaying or went unchanged for a reasonable time after the slaying, the law should simply carry out the property distribution as directed in the instrument even if it results in a larger share for the slayer than the slayer would have received if the slayer’s victim was still alive. This result is most likely in keeping with the intent of the estate’s owner