Barriers to Building Partnerships Between Major Stakeholders in Affordable Housing Investment in Queensland

Barriers to building partnerships betwen major stakeholders in affordable housing investment in Queenslan

Urban design guidelines for places with restorative values

Bakgrund: Den tredje januari 2018 trädde EU-direktivet Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) i kraft. Direktivet ämnar öka investerarskyddet genom att eliminera informationsasymmetri och intressekonflikter på finansmarknaden, och samtidigt harmonisera reglerna mellan EU-länder. Inom investeringsrådgivning innebär det nya regelverket ökad dokumentation, ett större fokus på att försäkra sig om att investerarna förstår risker, hårdare krav på hur avgifter kommuniceras och striktare regler kring incitament. Allt detta för att skydda investerarna, som ofta visat sig ha en bristfällig finansiell kunskap och ett lågt intresse för privatekonomi. Syfte: Syftet med uppsatsen är att utifrån värdepappersföretagens perspektiv skapa förståelse för vilken påverkan EU-direktivet MiFID II har haft på principal-agent problem som uppstår vid investeringsrådgivning. Genomförande: Uppsatsen är en kvalitativ fallstudie. Vidare har ett fenomenologiskt forskningsperspektiv använts, med en abduktiv ansats. Det empiriska materialet har samlats in genom semistrukturerade intervjuer med sammanlagt sju respondenter som alla jobbar på värdepappersföretag, vilka valdes ut med ett målstyrt bekvämlighetsurval. Resultat: Uppsatsen kommer fram till att principal-agent problemen inom investeringsrådgivning inte har eliminerats. Informations- asymmetrin är enligt vår tolkning av de traditionella teorierna närmast obefintlig, men utgör fortfarande ett stort problem på grund av investerarnas ointresse och relativt låga förmåga att ta till sig informationen. Vi argumenterar därav att dessa dimensioner bör inkluderas i teorin för vilka trösklar som kan orsaka informationsasymmetrin. Intressekonflikterna har reducerats, men finns till viss mån fortfarande kvar. Motivationen att agera i ett egenintresse har dock inte påverkats. Uppsatsen visar således på att MiFID II inte har förflyttat principal-agent relationen till en stewardship relation. Kunskapsbidrag: Det teoretiska bidraget gällande informationsasymmetri utmanar antagandet om att principalen vill ha information som är relevant för denne. Uppsatsen visar att så inte alltid är fallet. Förutom att det uppstår informationsasymmetri om det är kostsamt eller svårt att ta reda på agentens handlingar, kan det även uppstå i situationer där principalen är ointresserad av, eller oförmögen att ta till sig av informationen enligt vår mening. Vidare har MiFID II inneburit att det är svårare för agenten att tillgodose sitt egenintresse om detta strider mot principalens. Däremot har direktivet inte inneburit att den interna motivationen ändrats och det går därför inte att förutsätta att ett kontraktsförhållande som haft en principal-agent relation övergår till en stewardship relation när dessa problem elimineras. Genom en ökad förståelse för hur tvingande lagstiftningar påverkar principal-agent problem kan det empiriska bidraget hjälpa tillsynsmyndigheter i sitt arbete att hantera principal-agent problem. Uppsatsen skulle således kunna underlätta vidareutveckling av regleringen som finns idag, likväl som utformningen av framtida direktiv och lagar. Med ett utomstående perspektiv på vilka intressekonflikter som kan uppstå vid investeringsrådgivning skulle det empiriska bidraget också kunna vara gynnsamt för värdepappersföretag och deras arbete för att hantera intressekonflikter.Background: On January 3, 2018, the EU directive Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) came into effect. The directive is intended to expand investor protection through eliminating information asymmetry and conflicts of interest in the financial market, while also harmonizing the regulations between nations within the EU. For investment advising, the directive results in more extensive documentation and stricter regulation of how fees and risks are communicated, as well as how incentives are handled; all with the aim of protecting investors. At the same time, the general public shows low interest in personal finance, as well as inadequate financial knowledge. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to further the understanding of how the introduction of the EU directive MiFID II has affected the principal-agent problem that arises during investment advising, from an investment firm perspective. Completion: This is a qualitative case-study which utilizes a phenomenological research perspective and an abductive approach. The empirical material has been collected through semi-structured interviews at investment firms with a total of seven respondents, whom were selected through goal-oriented convenience sampling.  Conclusion: The study concludes that the principal-agent problems in investment advising have not been eliminated. According to our interpretation of the traditional theories, information asymmetry is nearly non-existent. Yet it remains a significant problem due to lack of interest and an inability to assimilate the information. Thus, we argue that the theoretical framework should be revised to include these barriers, as they may lead to information asymmetry. Conflicts of interest have been reduced, but still remain to some extent. Furthermore, the motivation to act based on self-interest still remain. Hence, the study shows that MiFID II has not turned the principal-agent relationship into a stewardship relationship. Contribution: The theoretical contribution to information asymmetry challenges the assumption that the principal is interested in all the information that is of relevance for them. The study show that this is not always the case. Apart from information asymmetry arising when ascertaining the actions of the agent is expensive or difficult, it can also arise due to the principal’s lack of interest or inability to assimilate the information. Moreover, MiFID II has made it more difficult for the agent to act in their own self-interest, should it deviate from the interest of the principal. The directive has not, however, affected the intrinsic motivation of the agent. Thus, we cannot assume that the elimination of these problems causes a principal-agent relationship to transform into a stewardship relationship. Through an increased understanding of how binding legislation affects principal-agent problems, the empirical contribution can help regulatory bodies in their work to mitigate the aforementioned problems. Hence, the study may help to not only expand existing legislation, but also in the development of future legislation and directives. By providing an outside perspective of what conflicts of interests could arise in investment advising, the empirical contribution could also be of use for investment firms in their work to identify and manage conflicts of interes

Partnerships in Affordable Housing: The Impact of Conflicting Investment Criteria

Accessibility to housing for lower income groups in Australia has been experiencing a severe decline in the last few years. On the supply side the public sector has been reducing its commitment to the direct provision of public housing at a time when market demand has strengthened, creating substantial price increases in all sectors of the housing market and in most urban centres. One possible solution to address the problem of reduced accessibility to affordable housing has been through the development of partnerships but recent investigation of the literature (Susilawati and Armitage, 2004a) and previous research by the author (Susilawati and Armitage, 2004b) suggest that the attractions of this approach may be specious. The research reported in this paper investigates the nature and incidence of these impediments as presented by survey of a number of stakeholders who have been involved in partnership arrangements in the Queensland affordable housing sector. By means of a series of in-depth interviews, the investment criteria and the impediments to achieving the desired outcomes of the participants in the partnerships are identified. Interestingly, the incidence of conflict and diversity between partners has elicited some unanticipated outcomes and responses which have ironically strengthened the process. Some of the negativity attached to future commitment to such partnerships has been found to be the anticipation of a worse outcome than that expected from independent action