The Budget Process and Legislative Behavior: Individual Amendments, Support for the Executive, and Government Programs

ABSTRACT The article challenges the contention that individual amendments are crucial for a system of exchanging favors with the Administration by members of Congress interested in distributive policies as a way of guaranteeing their reelection. By analyzing funds allocated through Congressional amendments, their distribution in different government programs, and roll-call votes in the Brazilian House of Representatives from 1996 to 2001, the authors show that: individual amendments are not prioritized either by Congress in the budget's approval or by the Administration in its implementation; there are no differences between the agenda dictated by the Administration and that of the legislators; and party affiliation explains both House floor votes and the implementation of individual amendments and is thus an explanatory variable in the Executive-Legislative relationship

Governabilidade e concentração de poder institucional: o governo FHC

O artigo analisa o governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso como parte de um padrão mais geral de relações Executivo-Legislativo que se caracteriza por forte concentração de poder nas mãos do Presidente da República e dos líderes partidários. A centralização decisória que se observa nesse governo tem bases institucionais, distinguindo-se do chamado "presidencialismo imperial", de base personalista. Os poderes institucionais de agenda e o controle sobre o processo legislativo têm forte impacto na produção legal e na capacidade do governo em obter apoio para a sua agenda legislativa.This article tries to analyses the government of FHC as part of a more general pattern of Executive-Legislative relationship which are featured by a strong concentration of power in the hands of the President and the Party leaders as well. The centralization of the decisions that is noticed in this government has institutional basis, distinguishing itself from the called "imperial presidencialism", with personalistic basis. The institutional power and the control over the legislative process have a strong impact in the legal production and in the capacity of the government in obtaining the support for his legislative agenda

Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo – Coalizões governamentais na democracia brasileira

Tradução do artigo (2007) “Coalition government in the Brazilian democracy”. Brazilian Political Science Review,vol. 1, n. 2, p. 182-216