9 research outputs found
The distribution of participant's number of group identities across 22 countries.
<p>The distribution of participant's number of group identities across 22 countries.</p
Corruption and the Other(s): Scope of Superordinate Identity Matters for Corruption Permissibility
<div><p>The decision to engage in corruption—public and private corruption, nepotism, and embezzlement—is often attributed to rational actors maximizing benefits to themselves. However, the importance of reciprocal relationships in humans suggests that an actor may weigh the costs of harms of her corrupt behavior to individuals who may generate future benefits for her. We hypothesize that actors who have a larger circle of actual and potential social partners will have more individuals to consider when generating harms and will thus be less likely to find corrupt acts permissible than actors with smaller circles of valued others. Using data from the World Values Survey and European Values Study (WVS), we explore whether participants with a larger geographic identity or a greater number of group memberships (i.e. a larger scope of actual and potential social partners) are less likely to find accepting bribes permissible. We find mixed support for our hypotheses, but consistently find that WVS participants with local, country, continent, or world geographic identities are less likely to find accepting a bribe permissible than those with regional identities—that is, actors whose primary identities that encompass more than their region find corruption less permissible. We discuss the importance of considering an actor’s valuation of others when modeling corruption persistence, noting that establishing scopes of positive valuation is a precursor to predicting where actors will target benefits and shunt costs.</p></div
Number of group memberships and corruption permissibility<sup>1</sup>,<sup>2</sup>.
<p><sup>1</sup>Models with random country intercepts, country-level variables, or town population size (with country fixed effects) provide highly similar results, and so are not reported. Reported model n = 23,288.</p><p><sup>2</sup>AIC selection criteria suggest that the model including primary geographic identity provides a better fit than the model with only controls and resource shortfall variables (AIC<sub>in-group size</sub> = 0.99; AIC<sub>null</sub> = 22,277.93, AIC<sub>in-group size</sub> = 22,245.83).</p><p>Number of group memberships and corruption permissibility<a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0144542#t004fn001" target="_blank"><sup>1</sup></a>,<a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0144542#t004fn002" target="_blank"><sup>2</sup></a>.</p
Proportion (box height) of participants with each primary geographic identity (box width) across 55 countries.
<p>“Cont.+” represents participants with a continent or world identity.</p
Odds of finding corruption permissible with each additional membership in countries whose 95% CI >0.
<p>Odds of finding corruption permissible with each additional membership in countries whose 95% CI >0.</p
Primary geographic identity (baseline = local) and corruption permissibility<sup>1</sup>,<sup>2</sup>.
<p><sup>1</sup>Models with random country intercepts, country-level variables, or town population size (with country fixed effects) provide highly similar results, and so are not reported. Reported model n = 80,390. Country fixed effects not reported.</p><p><sup>2</sup>AIC selection criteria suggest that the model including primary geographic identity provides a better fit than the model with only controls (weighted AIC<sub>in-group size</sub> = 1; AIC<sub>null</sub> = 79,565.87, AIC<sub>in-group size</sub> = 79,489.08).</p><p><sup>3</sup>The intercept represents participants with regional identities, who had the lowest household resource shortfall, the lowest level of education, reported the lowest confidence in police and civil services, did not believe in God, had no children, were 0 years old, and male.</p><p>Primary geographic identity (baseline = local) and corruption permissibility<a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0144542#t003fn001" target="_blank"><sup>1</sup></a>,<a href="http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0144542#t003fn002" target="_blank"><sup>2</sup></a>.</p
Descriptive statistics for continuous variables.
<p>Descriptive statistics for continuous variables.</p
Odds of finding corruption permissible for three levels of primary geographic identity relative to regional identity.
<p>Odds of finding corruption permissible for three levels of primary geographic identity relative to regional identity.</p
Negatively-Biased Credulity and the Cultural Evolution of Beliefs
<div><p>The functions of cultural beliefs are often opaque to those who hold them. Accordingly, to benefit from cultural evolution’s ability to solve complex adaptive problems, learners must be credulous. However, credulity entails costs, including susceptibility to exploitation, and effort wasted due to false beliefs. One determinant of the optimal level of credulity is the ratio between the costs of two types of errors: erroneous incredulity (failing to believe information that is true) and erroneous credulity (believing information that is false). This ratio can be expected to be asymmetric when information concerns hazards, as the costs of erroneous incredulity will, on average, exceed the costs of erroneous credulity; no equivalent asymmetry characterizes information concerning benefits. Natural selection can therefore be expected to have crafted learners’ minds so as to be more credulous toward information concerning hazards. This negatively-biased credulity extends general negativity bias, the adaptive tendency for negative events to be more salient than positive events. Together, these biases constitute attractors that should shape cultural evolution via the aggregated effects of learners’ differential retention and transmission of information. In two studies in the U.S., we demonstrate the existence of negatively-biased credulity, and show that it is most pronounced in those who believe the world to be dangerous, individuals who may constitute important nodes in cultural transmission networks. We then document the predicted imbalance in cultural content using a sample of urban legends collected from the Internet and a sample of supernatural beliefs obtained from ethnographies of a representative collection of the world’s cultures, showing that beliefs about hazards predominate in both.</p></div