Mild acute stress improves response speed without impairing accuracy or interference control in two selective attention tasks: Implications for theories of stress and cognition.

Acute stress is generally thought to impair performance on tasks thought to rely on selective attention. This effect has been well established for moderate to severe stressors, but no study has examined how a mild stressor-the most common type of stressor-influences selective attention. In addition, no study to date has examined how stress influences the component processes involved in overall selective attention task performance, such as controlled attention, automatic attentional activation, decision-making, and motor abilities. To address these issues, we randomly assigned 107 participants to a mild acute stress or control condition. As expected, the mild acute stress condition showed a small but significant increase in cortisol relative to the control condition. Following the stressor, we assessed attention with two separate flanker tasks. One of these tasks was optimized to investigate component attentional processes using computational cognitive modeling, whereas the other task employed mouse-tracking to illustrate how response conflict unfolded over time. The results for both tasks showed that mild acute stress decreased response time (i.e., increased response speed) without influencing accuracy or interference control. Further, computational modeling and mouse-tracking analyses indicated that these effects were due to faster motor action execution time for chosen actions. Intriguingly, however, cortisol responses were unrelated to any of the observed effects of mild stress. These results have implications for theories of stress and cognition, and highlight the importance of considering motor processes in understanding the effects of stress on cognitive task performance

Cortical and subcortical contributions to state- and strength-based perceptual judgments

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Distinct profiles of impaired associative memory and underlying cerebral networks in Alzheimer's disease

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Episodic memory function is associated with multiple measures of white matter integrity in cognitive aging

Previous neuroimaging research indicates that white matter injury and integrity, measured respectively by white matter hyperintensities (WMH) and fractional anisotropy (FA) obtained from diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), differ with aging and cerebrovascular disease (CVD) and are associated with episodic memory deficits in cognitively normal older adults. However, knowledge about tract-specific relationships between WMH, FA, and episodic memory in aging remains limited. We hypothesized that white matter connections between frontal cortex and subcortical structures as well as connections between frontal and temporo-parietal cortex would be most affected. In the current study, we examined relationships between WMH, FA and episodic memory in 15 young adults, 13 elders with minimal WMH and 15 elders with extensive WMH, using an episodic recognition memory test for object-color associations. Voxel-based statistics were used to identify voxel clusters where white matter measures were specifically associated with variations in episodic memory performance, and white matter tracts intersecting these clusters were analyzed to examine white matter-memory relationships. White matter injury and integrity measures were significantly associated with episodic memory in extensive regions of white matter, located predominantly in frontal, parietal, and subcortical regions. Template based tractography indicated that white matter injury, as measured by WMH, in the uncinate and inferior longitudinal fasciculi were significantly negatively associated with episodic memory performance. Other tracts such as thalamo-frontal projections, superior longitudinal fasciculus, and dorsal cingulum bundle demonstrated strong negative associations as well. The results suggest that white matter injury to multiple pathways, including connections of frontal and temporal cortex and frontal-subcortical white matter tracts, plays a critical role in memory differences seen in older individuals

How Emotion Strengthens the Recollective Experience: A Time-Dependent Hippocampal Process

Emotion significantly strengthens the subjective recollective experience even when objective accuracy of the memory is not improved. Here, we examine if this modulation is related to the effect of emotion on hippocampal-dependent memory consolidation. Two critical predictions follow from this hypothesis. First, since consolidation is assumed to take time, the enhancement in the recollective experience for emotional compared to neutral memories should become more apparent following a delay. Second, if the emotion advantage is critically dependent on the hippocampus, then the effects should be reduced in amnesic patients with hippocampal damage. To test these predictions we examined the recollective experience for emotional and neutral photos at two retention intervals (Experiment 1), and in amnesics and controls (Experiment 2). Emotional memories were associated with an enhancement in the recollective experience that was greatest after a delay, whereas familiarity was not influenced by emotion. In amnesics with hippocampal damage the emotion effect on recollective experience was reduced. Surprisingly, however, these patients still showed a general memory advantage for emotional compared to neutral items, but this effect was manifest primarily as a facilitation of familiarity. The results support the consolidation hypothesis of recollective experience, but suggest that the effects of emotion on episodic memory are not exclusively hippocampally mediated. Rather, emotion may enhance recognition by facilitating familiarity when recollection is impaired due to hippocampal damage

Bridging Consciousness and Cognition in Memory and Perception: Evidence for Both State and Strength Processes

Subjective experience indicates that mental states are discrete, in the sense that memories and perceptions readily come to mind in some cases, but are entirely unavailable to awareness in others. However, a long history of psychophysical research has indicated that the discrete nature of mental states is largely epiphenomenal and that mental processes vary continuously in strength. We used a novel combination of behavioral methodologies to examine the processes underlying perception of complex images: (1) analysis of receiver operating characteristics (ROCs), (2) a modification of the changedetection flicker paradigm, and (3) subjective reports of conscious experience. These methods yielded converging results showing that perceptual judgments reflect the combined, yet functionally independent, contributions of two processes available to conscious experience: a state process of conscious perception and a strength process of knowing; processes that correspond to recollection and familiarity in long-term memory. In addition, insights from the perception experiments led to the discovery of a new recollection phenomenon in a long-term memory change detection paradigm. The apparent incompatibility between subjective experience and theories of cognition can be understood within a unified state-strengt