7 research outputs found

    "Ought Implies Can,” Framing Effects, and "Empirical Refutations"

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    This paper aims to contribute to the current debate about the status of the “Ought Implies Can” principle and the growing body of empirical evidence that undermines it. We report the results of an experimental study which show that people judge that agents ought to perform an action even when they also judge that those agents cannot do it and that such “ought” judgments exhibit an actor-observer effect. Because of this actor-observer effect on “ought” judgments and the Duhem-Quine thesis, talk of an “empirical refutation” of OIC is empirically and methodologically unwarranted. What the empirical fact that people attribute moral obligations to unable agents shows is that OIC is not intuitive, not that OIC has been refuted

    Does Non-Moral Ignorance Exculpate? Situational Awareness and Attributions of Blame and Forgiveness

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    In this paper, we set out to test empirically an idea that many philosophers find intuitive, namely that non-moral ignorance can exculpate. Many philosophers find it intuitive that moral agents are responsible only if they know the particular facts surrounding their action. Our results show that whether moral agents are aware of the facts surrounding their action does have an effect on people’s attributions of blame, regardless of the consequences or side effects of the agent’s actions. In general, it was more likely that a situationally aware agent will be blamed for failing to perform the obligatory action than a situationally unaware agent. We also tested attributions of forgiveness in addition to attributions of blame. In general, it was less likely that a situationally aware agent will be forgiven for failing to perform the obligatory action than a situationally unaware agent. When the agent is situationally unaware, it is more likely that the agent will be forgiven than blamed. We argue that these results provide some empirical support for the hypothesis that there is something intuitive about the idea that non-moral ignorance can exculpate

    Rumination And The Mood-As-Input Hypothesis: Does Congruence Matter?

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    Background and objectives: The mood-as-input hypothesis (MAIH), which emphasizes the role of mood and stop rules on perseverative thinking, has been extensively studied in relation to worry (Meeten & Davey, 2011). However, relatively few studies have focused on the applicability of the MAIH to depressive rumination. Consequently, two studies were conducted to further examine the potential relevance of the MAIH to depressive rumination. Methods: In the first study, a sample of undergraduate students completed a rumination interview under one of four conditions, including mood (positive vs. negative) and stop rule (as-many-as can (AMA) and feel like stopping (FL)). It was anticipated that participants in the negative mood/AMA and the positive mood/FL conditions would exhibit the most persistence in the rumination interview. A second, follow-up study was conducted in which a positive rumination condition was added to examine the role of congruence between mood induction and task valence on interview performance. Results: In the first study, support for predictions of the MAIH was found in the negative mood conditions but not the positive mood conditions. In the second study, as predicted, under conditions of mood congruence, the original predictions of the MAIH were supported. However, under conditions of mood incongruence, participants appeared to default to the assigned stop rule. Limitations: Although the findings are promising, it is noteworthy that the sample was non-clinical. Further, this approach to studying depressive rumination may have somewhat limited ecological validity, as the research was conducted in a controlled laboratory setting. Conclusions: Overall, the current findings provide insight into the conditions under which depressive rumination is most likely to occur

    Rumination and the mood-as-input hypothesis: Does congruence matter?

    No full text
    Background and objectives: The mood-as-input hypothesis (MAIH), which emphasizes the role of mood and stop rules on perseverative thinking, has been extensively studied in relation to worry (Meeten & Davey, 2011). However, relatively few studies have focused on the applicability of the MAIH to depressive rumination. Consequently, two studies were conducted to further examine the potential relevance of the MAIH to depressive rumination. Methods: In the first study, a sample of undergraduate students completed a rumination interview under one of four conditions, including mood (positive vs. negative) and stop rule (as-many-as can (AMA) and feel like stopping (FL)). It was anticipated that participants in the negative mood/AMA and the positive mood/FL conditions would exhibit the most persistence in the rumination interview. A second, follow-up study was conducted in which a positive rumination condition was added to examine the role of congruence between mood induction and task valence on interview performance. Results: In the first study, support for predictions of the MAIH was found in the negative mood conditions but not the positive mood conditions. In the second study, as predicted, under conditions of mood congruence, the original predictions of the MAIH were supported. However, under conditions of mood incongruence, participants appeared to default to the assigned stop rule. Limitations: Although the findings are promising, it is noteworthy that the sample was non-clinical. Further, this approach to studying depressive rumination may have somewhat limited ecological validity, as the research was conducted in a controlled laboratory setting. Conclusions: Overall, the current findings provide insight into the conditions under which depressive rumination is most likely to occur

    Rumination and the mood-as-input hypothesis: Does congruence matter?

    No full text
    Background and objectives: The mood-as-input hypothesis (MAIH), which emphasizes the role of mood and stop rules on perseverative thinking, has been extensively studied in relation to worry (Meeten & Davey, 2011). However, relatively few studies have focused on the applicability of the MAIH to depressive rumination. Consequently, two studies were conducted to further examine the potential relevance of the MAIH to depressive rumination. Methods: In the first study, a sample of undergraduate students completed a rumination interview under one of four conditions, including mood (positive vs. negative) and stop rule (as-many-as can (AMA) and feel like stopping (FL)). It was anticipated that participants in the negative mood/AMA and the positive mood/FL conditions would exhibit the most persistence in the rumination interview. A second, follow-up study was conducted in which a positive rumination condition was added to examine the role of congruence between mood induction and task valence on interview performance. Results: In the first study, support for predictions of the MAIH was found in the negative mood conditions but not the positive mood conditions. In the second study, as predicted, under conditions of mood congruence, the original predictions of the MAIH were supported. However, under conditions of mood incongruence, participants appeared to default to the assigned stop rule. Limitations: Although the findings are promising, it is noteworthy that the sample was non-clinical. Further, this approach to studying depressive rumination may have somewhat limited ecological validity, as the research was conducted in a controlled laboratory setting. Conclusions: Overall, the current findings provide insight into the conditions under which depressive rumination is most likely to occur
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