The effect of pension rules on retirement monetary incentives with an application to pension reforms in Spain

In this work we theoretically disentangle the effects of pension provisions on a variety of financial incentives to retirement, trying to reconcile them with some key Spanish retirement patterns. We find that the "average" individual, who is never affected by any cap of contributions or benefits, has weak incentives to retire early and strong incentives to retire at the normal retirement age. Alternatively, individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution have strong incentives to retire as early as possible, because ot the interaction between age-related penalties and the minimun pension. Both findings perfectly accommodate the retirement hazard of medium and low earners respectively. In contrast, high earners (those that have their contributions capped) despite having strong incentives to retire at the Early Retirement Age, do not do so. This is because, for those workers, financial incentives are not a good proxy for the marginal utility from working. Finally, we analyze the reasons behind the failure of the 1997 reform in improving the sustainability of the Spanish public pension system

Endogenous retirement and public pension system reform in Spain

All around the world , developed countries have resorted to parametric reforms of their Social Security systems, in an attempt to lessen the impact of the population aging. In particular, pension formulae have been modified to reduce the generosity of the systems and to induce longer working careers. In this paper we explore the capacity of these reforms to alleviate the expected financial difficulties of current PAYG systems. This is accomplished by developing and Heterogeneous Agents, Applied General Equilibrium model where individuals can freely adjust their retirement ages in response to the incentives provided by the pension regulations. This inclusion is relevant, as parametric changes tend to significantly alter retirement incentives. We find that the calibrated model successfully reproduces the basic stylized facts of retirement behavior in Spain. In particular, it mimics the early retirement pattern of low income workers under the effects of minimum pensions. The model is then used to explore the effects of several changes in pension formula, including the reform actually implemented in 1997. The general conclusion is that parametric changes can significantly improve the financial condition of the system, but are far away from being able to fully restoring it

The effect of pension rules on retirement monetary incentives with an application to pension reforms in Spain

In this work we theoretically disentangle the effects of pension provisions on a variety of financial incentives to retirement, trying to reconcile them with some key Spanish retirement patterns. We find that the «average» individual, who is never affected by any cap of contributions or benefits, has weak incentives to retire early and strong incentives to retire at the normal retirement age. Alternatively, individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution have strong incentives to retire as early as possible, as a result of the interaction between age-related penalties and the minimum pension. Both findings perfectly accommodate the retirement hazard of medium and low earners respectively. In contrast, high earners (those that have their contributions capped) do not retire early despite having strong incentives to do so. This is because, for those workers, financial incentives are not a good proxy for the marginal utility from working. Finally, we analyze the reasons behind the failure of the 1997 reform in improving the sustainability of the Spanish public pension system.retirement, Social Security, Monetary incentives, Pension Reform, Spain

The effect of pension rules on retirement monetary incentives with an application to pension reforms in Spain.

In this work we theoretically disentangle the effects of pension provisions on a variety of financial incentives to retirement, trying to reconcile them with some key Spanish retirement patterns. We find that the "average" individual, who is never affected by any cap of contributions or benefits, has weak incentives to retire early and strong incentives to retire at the normal retirement age. Alternatively, individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution have strong incentives to retire as early as possible, because ot the interaction between age-related penalties and the minimun pension. Both findings perfectly accommodate the retirement hazard of medium and low earners respectively. In contrast, high earners (those that have their contributions capped) despite having strong incentives to retire at the Early Retirement Age, do not do so. This is because, for those workers, financial incentives are not a good proxy for the marginal utility from working. Finally, we analyze the reasons behind the failure of the 1997 reform in improving the sustainability of the Spanish public pension system.

Endogenous Retirement and Public Pension System Reform in Spain

All around the world, population aging has spurred developed countries to reform their PAYG pension systems. In particular, delaying legal retirement ages and reducing the generosity of pension benefits have been widely implemented changes. In this paper we assess how successful those policies can be in the case of the Spanish economy, and compare with the results obtained by the already implemented reforms (1997 and 2001). This evaluation is accomplished in a heterogeneous-agents, applied general equilibrium model where individuals can adjust their retirement ages in response to changes in pension rules. We check the ability of the model to reproduce the basic stylized facts of retirement behavior (specially the pattern of early retirement induced by minimum pensions). We then use to model to explore the impact of pension reforms. We find that already implemented changes actually increase the implicit liabilities of the system, while delaying the legal retirement age to 68 may roughly halve the size of the current pension debt.Pension System Reform, Applied General Equilibrium, Retirement.

An evaluation of the life-cycle effects of minimum pensions on retirement behaviour: Extended Version

In this paper we explore the effects of the minimum pension program on welfare and retirement in Spain. This is done with a stylized life-cycle model which provides a convenient analytical characterization of optimal behavior. We use data from the Spanish Social Security to estimate the behavioral parameters of the model and then simulate the changes induced by the minimum pension in aggregate retirement patterns. The impact is substantial: there is a threefold increase in retirement at 60 (the age of first entitlement) with respect to the economy without minimum pensions, and total early retirement (before or at 60) is almost 50% larger.Retirement, life cycle model, minimum pension, structural estimation

THE EFFECT OF PENSION RULES ON RETIREMENT MONETARY INCENTIVES WITH AN APPLICATION TO PENSION REFORMS IN SPAIN

In this work we theoretically disentangle the effects of pension provisions on a variety of financial incentives to retirement, trying to reconcile them with some key Spanish retirement patterns. We find that the “average” individual, who is never affected by any cap of contributions or benefits, has weak incentives to retire early and strong incentives to retire at the normal retirement age. Alternatively, individuals at the bottom of the wage distribution have strong incentives to retire as early as possible, because ot the interaction between age-related penalties and the minimun pension. Both findings perfectly accommodate the retirement hazard of medium and low earners respectively. In contrast, high earners (those that have their contributions capped) despite having strong incentives to retire at the Early Retirement Age, do not do so. This is because, for those workers, financial incentives are not a good proxy for the marginal utility from working. Finally, we analyze the reasons behind the failure of the 1997 reform in improving the sustainability of the Spanish public pension system.

An evaluation of the life-cycle effects of minimum pensions on retirement behavior

In this paper we explore the effects of the minimum pension program on welfare and retirement in Spain. This is done with a stylized life-cycle model which provides a convenient analytical characterization of optimal behavior. We use data from the Spanish Social Security to estimate the behavioral parameters of the model and then simulate the changes induced by the minimum pension in aggregate retirement patterns. The impact is substantial: there is threefold increase in retirement at 60 (the age of first entitlement) with respect to the economy without minimum pensions, and total early retirement (before or at 60) is almost 50% larger.Retirement, life cycle model, minimum pension, structural estimation

Ranking Alternatives on the Basis of the Intensity of Dominance and Fuzzy Logic within MAUT

We introduce dominance measuring methods to derive a ranking of alternatives to deal with incomplete information in multi-criteria decision making problems on the basis of Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT). We consider the situation where the alternative performances are represented by uniformly distributed intervals, and there exists imprecision concerning the decision-makers¿ preferences, by means of classes of individual utility functions and imprecise weights represented by weight intervals or fuzzy weights, respectively. An additive multi-attribute utility model is used to evaluate the alternatives under consideration, which is considered a valid approach in most practical cases. The approaches we propose are based on the dominance values between pairs of alternatives that can be computed by linear programming, which are then transformed into dominance intensities from which a dominance intensity measure is derived. The methods proposed are compared with other existing dominance measuring methods and other methodologies by Monte Carlo simulation techniques. The performance is analyzed in terms of two measures of efficacy: hit ratio, the proportion of all cases in which the method selects the same best alternative as in the TRUE ranking, and the Rank-order correlation, which represents how similar the overall rank structures of alternatives are in the TRUE ranking and in the ranking derived from the method. The approaches are illustrated with an example consisting on the selection of intervention strategies to restore an aquatic ecosystem contaminated by radionuclides

State-Uncertainty preferences and the Risk Premium in the Exchange rate market

This paper introduces state-uncertainty preferences into the Lucas (1982) economy, showing that this type of preferences helps to explain the exchange rate risk premium. Under these preferences we can distinguish between two factors driving the exchange rate risk premium: “macroeconomic risk” and “the risk associated with variation in the private agents’ perception on the level of uncertainty”. State-uncertainty preferences amount to assuming that a given level of consumption will yield a higher level of utility the lower is the level of uncertainty perceived by consumers. Furthermore, empirical evidence from three main European economies in the transition period to the euro provides empirical support for the modelRisk premium, taste shocks, fundamental uncertainty.