Banks and managerial discipline: Does regulatory monitoring play a role?

This paper examines the impact of performance, board independence, and regulatory evaluations on CEO turnover in a recent sample of banks. Similar to earlier studies, the results suggest weak performance and greater board independence are positively related to CEO turnover. In addition, poor regulatory ratings and recent rating downgrades are found to have a positive impact on turnover, not fully explained by performance or board characteristics. Finally, the relation between CEO turnover and weak regulatory evaluations is only significant for banks with more independent boards. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that regulatory monitoring enhances managerial discipline in banks but that such discipline may be severely limited in banks with less independent boards.Executive turnover Regulatory oversight Performance Monitoring mechanisms

Limits to relative performance evaluation: evidence from bank executive turnover

Purpose – The paper aims to revisit the topic of relative performance evaluation (RPE) of top management using a large panel of community banks. Design/methodology/approach – The empirical tests for RPE utilized a two-stage approach in a unique dataset of community banks executive turnover over a ten-year period. This allowed the authors to better estimate the benchmark performance relative to which bank executives should be evaluated under RPE. Moreover, bank regulatory evaluations allowed the authors to control for the impact of poor governance. Findings – The paper shows that penalizing executives for poor performance arising from economic downturns is not necessarily inconsistent with the theory. The empirical results indicate that weak downturn-linked performance is strongly related to increased executive turnover. Furthermore, this relationship is more pronounced in better-governed banks, which are more likely to engage in value-enhancing disciplinary actions. Research limitations/implications – The analysis suggests that executive dismissals during adverse economic conditions are not necessarily a result of bad luck; rather, the analysis implies that bad times are informative about management quality. Practical implications – The main practical implication is that both relative and absolute performance should be incorporated in the incentive structure of bank executives. Originality/value – The paper shows that the assumptions used in prior RPE studies may not be applicable to top executives which could explain the inconsistency between the theory and the empirical evidence. Further, the finding that better governed firms are more likely to penalize management for bad exogenously driven performance is unique and strengthens the case that disciplinary actions amid adverse economic times may not be due to bad luck.Banks, Employee turnover, Governance, Performance appraisal, Performance measures, Senior management

Female leadership and bank risk-taking : Evidence from the effects of real estate shocks on bank lending performance and default risk

This paper examines whether banks with female Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and chairpersons of the board are associated with better lending performance and lower default risk when faced with severe real estate price shocks. Using a large panel of U.S. commercial banks, we document that female-led banks with high real estate exposure are associated with lower loan charge-offs and lower non-accrual loans relative to similar male-led banks. Furthermore, our empirical findings indicate that female-led banks with high real estate exposure have lower default risk and are less likely to fail in the aftermath of real estate price shocks. However, we find no evidence of superior lending performance or reduced default risk for female-led banks which are not exposed to severe real estate price shocks through high levels of real estate lending.©2020 Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution–NonCommercial–NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY–NC–ND 4.0) license, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/fi=vertaisarvioitu|en=peerReviewed

The costs and benefits of bank capital - a review of the literature

In 2010, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published an assessment of the long-term economic impact (LEI) of stronger capital and liquidity requirements. This paper considers this assessment in light of estimates from later studies of the macroeconomic benefits and costs of higher capital requirements. Consistent with the Basel Committee's original assessment, this paper finds that the net macroeconomic benefits of capital requirements are positive over a wide range of capital levels. Under certain assumptions, the literature finds that the net benefits of higher capital requirements may have been understated in the original committee assessment. Put differently, the range of estimates for the theoretically optimal level of capital requirements—where marginal benefits equal marginal costs—is likely either similar to, or higher than was originally estimated by the Basel Committee. The above conclusion is however subject to a number of important considerations. First, estimates of optimal capital are sensitive to a number of assumptions and design choices. For example, the literature differs in judgments made about the permanence of crisis effects as well as assumptions about the efficacy of post crisis reforms, such as liquidity regulations and bank resolution regimes, in reducing the probability and costs of future banking crisis. In some cases, these judgements can offset the upward tendency in the range of optimal capital. Second, differences in (net) benefit estimates can reflect different conditioning assumptions such as starting levels of capital or default thresholds (the capital ratio at which firms are assumed to fail) when estimating the impact of capital in reducing crisis probabilities. Finally, the estimates are based on capital ratios that are measured in different units. For example, some studies provide optimal capital estimates in risk-weighted ratios, others in leverage ratios. And, across the risk-weighted ratio estimates, the definition of capital and risk-weighted assets (RWAs) can also differ (e.g., tangible common equity (TCE) or Tier 1 or common equity tier 1 (CET1) capital; Basel II RWAs vs. Basel III measures of RWAs). A full standardisation of the different estimates across studies to allow for all of these considerations is not possible on the basis of the information available and lies beyond the scope of this paper. This paper also suggests a set of issues which warrant further monitoring and research. This includes the link between capital and the cost and probability of crises, accounting for the effects of liquidity regulations, resolution regimes and counter-cyclical capital buffers, and the impact of regulation on loan quantities