How Much Do They Know? An Examination of Student Perceptions of University Cutbacks

Before the reality of COVID 19 surfaced, many universities faced economic uncertainties due to decreased revenues. Small, private, nonprofit universities are tuition-dependent and must lower costs to remain financially viable. This study investigates how much students understand about the financial situation of their University and how the decrease in university spending impacted student experience. We surveyed a sample (n=30) of recent graduates from the business department of a small, private, nonprofit university to gain a better understanding of how recent graduates perceived the financial decisions made by the administration and the outcomes of those decisions on their experiences. Questions asking about program cuts and other substantial decreases showed that these actions were widely recognized by students, even as the administration worked hard to limit their effects on the overall student experience. The findings indicate that most students are aware of the University's financial state, so leaders must develop communication strategies for current students and alumni built on trust and transparency as part of an overall strategy for long-term financial sustainability

Quantum Bayesian implementation

Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incomplete information. This paper proposes that the traditional sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum Bayesian mechanism. In addition, by using an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism, this amendment holds in the macro world.Comment: 14 pages, 3 figure

Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria

Several conceptual points are made concerning communication in games of asymmetric information. Equilibrium refinements of Sender-Receiver cheap-talk games that are based on he concept of a putative equilibrium, and which rely on the presence of a rich language with literal meanings, are discussed. Three nested criteria are proposed: strong announcement-proofness, announcement-proofness, and weak announcement-proofness.

A Top Dog Tale with Preference Complementarities

The emergence of a winner-take-all (top dog) outcome is generally due to political or institutional constraints or to specific technological features which favour the performance of just one individual. In this paper we provide a different explanation for the occurrence of a top-dog equilibrium in exchange economies. We show that once heterogeneous complementarities (i.e. Scarf’s preferences) are analysed with general endowment distributions, a variety of equilibria different from the well-known symmetric outcome with full utilisation of resources can emerge. Specifically, we show that stable corner equilibria with a winner-take-all (top dog) individual arise that are Pareto optima although the remaining individuals are no better off than with zero consumption and resources can be unused. Because of heterogenous complementarities, market mechanisms are weak and cannot overcome the top dog’s power. Voting mechanisms or taxation policies can reduce the top dog’s privileged position