10 research outputs found

    1933-41λ…„ 미ꡭ의 'μ„  독일 ν›„ 일본' μ›μΉ™μ˜ 사둀

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    ν•™μœ„λ…Όλ¬Έ (석사)-- μ„œμšΈλŒ€ν•™κ΅ λŒ€ν•™μ› : 외ꡐ학과, 2012. 2. μ‹ μš±ν¬.λ³Έ μ—°κ΅¬λŠ” 미ꡭ의 2μ°¨ 세계 λŒ€μ „ μ „μŸ μ „λž΅μ΄μ—ˆλ˜μ„  독일 ν›„ 일본 μ›μΉ™μ˜ μˆ˜λ¦½μ›μΈμ„ λΆ„μ„ν•˜λŠ” 사둀연ꡬ닀.μ„  독일 ν›„ μΌλ³Έμ›μΉ™μ΄λž€ μ˜κ΅­μ„ λŒ€ν‘œλ‘œ ν•˜λŠ” μ—°ν•©κ΅­κ³Ό ν•¨κ»˜ λ…μΌμ˜ 곡격에 λ¨Όμ € λŒ€μ‘ν•˜κ³  이후에 μžμ›μ„ μ§‘μ€‘ν•˜μ—¬ 일본과의 μ „μŸμ— μ§‘μ€‘ν•˜κ² λ‹€λŠ” μ „λž΅μ΄μ—ˆλ‹€. λ‹Ήμ‹œ 미ꡭ의 μ „λ ₯은 λŒ€κ³΅ν™©μ˜ 피해와 κ΅°μΆ• ν˜‘μ • λ“±μœΌλ‘œ 인해 μœ„ν˜‘ κ΅­κ°€λ“€κ³Ό 압도적인 κ΅­λ ₯의 차이가 μžˆμ§€ μ•Šλ˜ μƒνƒœμ˜€κ³  독일과 일본을 μƒλŒ€λ‘œ λ™μ‹œμ— μ „μŸμ„ μΉ˜λ£¨λŠ” 것이 사싀상 λΆˆκ°€λŠ₯ν•˜μ˜€λ‹€. λ”°λΌμ„œ 미ꡭ은 μ΄λŸ¬ν•œ 원칙을 μˆ˜ν–‰ν•˜κΈ° μœ„ν•΄μ„œ λ…μΌκ³Όμ˜ μ „μŸμ„ μ€€λΉ„ν•˜λ©΄μ„œ 일본과의 μ „μŸμ€ μ΅œλŒ€ν•œ μ§€μ—°μ‹œν‚€κ³ μž ν–ˆλŠ”λ° λ³Έ μ—°κ΅¬λŠ” μ™œ 미ꡭ이 일본이 μ•„λ‹ˆλΌ 독일을 λ¨Όμ € μƒλŒ€ν•˜κ³ μž ν–ˆλŠ”μ§€, λ‹€μ‹œ λ§ν•΄μ„œμ„  독일 ν›„ 일본원칙 μˆ˜λ¦½μ— 영ν–₯을 미친 μš”μΈμ΄ λ¬΄μ—‡μ΄μ—ˆλŠ”μ§€λ₯Ό μ‘°λͺ…ν•œλ‹€. ν›„μˆ ν•˜κ² μ§€λ§Œ μƒλ‹Ήμˆ˜μ˜ 역사 연ꡬ듀은 1930λ…„λŒ€ μ€‘ν›„λ°˜ 이후뢀터 2μ°¨ λŒ€μ „ μ§μ „κΉŒμ§€ λ…μΌμ˜ μœ„ν˜‘μ΄ 일본의 μœ„ν˜‘λ³΄λ‹€ μ••λ„μ μœΌλ‘œ λ†’μ•˜μŒμ„ μ•”λ¬΅μ μœΌλ‘œ μ „μ œν•˜κ³  μžˆλ‹€. λ°”λ‘œ κ·Έλ ‡κΈ° λ•Œλ¬Έμ—μ„  독일 ν›„ 일본' μ›μΉ™μ˜ μˆ˜λ¦½μ— κ°€μž₯ 큰 영ν–₯을 미친 것은 μ™ΈλΆ€ μœ„ν˜‘κ΅­κ°€μ˜ ꡰ사λ ₯ μˆ˜μ€€μ—μ„œλ§Œ μ΄ν•΄λ˜κ³  μžˆλŠ” 것이닀. μ΄λŸ¬ν•œ μ£Όμž₯은 독일, 일본 μ–‘κ΅­μ˜ 객관적인 κ΅­λ ₯만 λΉ„κ΅ν–ˆμ„ λ•Œ 일정뢀뢄 μ„€λͺ…λ ₯을 μ œκ³΅ν•΄ 쀄 수 μžˆλ‹€. ν•˜μ§€λ§Œ 이것은 μ •μ±…κ²°μ • κ³Όμ • 내면을 λΆ„μ„ν•˜μ§€ μ•Šμ€ ν‘œλ©΄μ μΈ 비ꡐ일 뿐이며 μžμ„Έν•œ ν˜„μ‹€μ˜ λͺ¨μŠ΅μ„ 그렀내지 λͺ»ν•˜λŠ” ν•œκ³„λ₯Ό μ§€λ‹Œλ‹€. 이에 λ³Έ μ—°κ΅¬λŠ” μ™ΈλΆ€ μœ„ν˜‘ κ΅­κ°€λ“€μ˜ μœ„ν˜‘μˆ˜μ€€ κ·Έ μžμ²΄λ³΄λ‹€λŠ” λ°©μ–΄ν•΄μ•Ό ν•˜λŠ” μ§€μ—­μ˜ μ€‘μš”λ„ 차이, 그리고 λ”μš± μ€‘μš”ν•˜κ²ŒλŠ” 관념적인 μ°¨μ›μ—μ„œ μ •μ±…κ²°μ •μžλ“€μ˜ μœ„ν˜‘μΈμ‹, 특히 μ΅œμ’… κ²°μ •κΆŒμžμΈ 루즈벨트 λŒ€ν†΅λ Ήμ„ μ€‘μ‹¬μœΌλ‘œ μ΄λ“€μ˜ 인식이 정책결정에 영ν–₯을 λ―Έμ³€μŒμ„ λΆ„μ„ν•˜κ³  이λ₯Ό 증λͺ…ν•˜κ³ μž ν•œλ‹€. λ‹Ήμ‹œ 미ꡭ의 μ •μ±…κ²°μ •μžλ“€μ—κ²Œ μ•„μ‹œμ•„ 지역은 ν•˜λ‚˜μ˜ κ±°λŒ€ν•œ μ‹œμž₯으둜 μΈμ‹λ˜μ—ˆλ‹€λŠ” 점은 κ°„κ³Όν•  수 μ—†λ‹€. ν•˜μ§€λ§Œ μ•„μ‹œμ•„ κ΅­κ°€λ“€, 특히 쀑ꡭ을 μƒλŒ€λ‘œ ν•œ 미ꡭ의 무역, 투자 규λͺ¨μ™€ 유럽 κ΅­κ°€λ“€κ³Όμ˜ 무역, 투자 규λͺ¨λ₯Ό 비ꡐ해보면 ν›„μžκ°€ 훨씬 더 높은 비쀑을 μ°¨μ§€ν–ˆμŒμ„ μ•Œ 수 μžˆλŠ”λ° μ΄λŠ” μ‹œμž₯μœΌλ‘œμ„œ μ•„μ‹œμ•„ 지역이 μ§€λ‹ˆλŠ” 경제적 κ°€μΉ˜κ°€ μ€‘μš”ν•˜κΈ΄ ν–ˆμœΌλ‚˜ 미ꡭ의 ꡭ가이읡에 μ ˆλŒ€μ μ΄μ§€λŠ” μ•Šμ•˜μŒμ„ μ˜λ―Έν•œλ‹€. 반면 유럽 μ§€μ—­μ˜ 경우 경제적 이해관계 뿐 μ•„λ‹ˆλΌ μ•ˆλ³΄μ  츑면이 μ€‘μš”ν•˜κ²Œ κ³ λ €λ˜μ—ˆλŠ”λ° μ΄λŠ” 미ꡭ이 방어라인을 μžμ‹ μ˜ 본토에 μ œν•œν•˜μ§€ μ•Šκ³  μ„œλ°˜κ΅¬μ™€ λŒ€μ„œμ–‘μœΌλ‘œκΉŒμ§€ ν™•μž₯μ‹œμΌ°κΈ° λ•Œλ¬Έμ΄λ‹€. 특히 영ꡭ과 ν”„λž‘μŠ€μ˜ 함락은 μ΄λ“€μ˜ ν•΄κ΅°λ ₯이 λ…μΌμ—κ²Œ λ„˜μ–΄κ°€λŠ” 것을 μ˜λ―Έν•˜λŠ” κ²ƒμœΌλ‘œμ¨ λ―Έκ΅­μ—κ²Œ μ‹€μ§ˆμ μΈ μ•ˆλ³΄μœ„ν˜‘μœΌλ‘œ λ‹€κ°€μ™”λ˜ 것이닀. 이와 λ”λΆˆμ–΄ λ³Έ μ—°κ΅¬μ—μ„œλŠ” κ΅­κ°€μ΄λ―Έμ§€μ˜ λ…Όμ˜μ— μ°©μ•ˆν•˜μ—¬ μœ„ν˜‘μΈμ‹μ„ λΆ„μ„ν•œλ‹€. λ£¨μ¦ˆλ²¨νŠΈμ™€ μ£Όμš” μ •μ±…κ²°μ •μžλ“€μ—κ²Œ 독일과 일본은 μ–‘μž λͺ¨λ‘ μžμœ μ™€ 민주주의의 κ°€μΉ˜λ₯Ό μœ„ν˜‘ν•˜λŠ” κ΅­κ°€λ“€μ΄μ—ˆμŒμ€ λΆ„λͺ…ν•˜λ‹€. ν•˜μ§€λ§Œ 인쒅적 μ„ μž…κ΄€μœΌλ‘œ 인해 μΌλ³Έλ³΄λ‹€λŠ” 독일이 더 μš°μˆ˜ν•œ 인쒅, κ΅­κ°€λ‘œ μΈμ‹λ˜μ—ˆλ‹€λŠ” 사싀이 μ€‘μš”ν•˜λ‹€. κ·Έλ ‡κΈ° λ•Œλ¬Έμ— ν•œλ•Œ μžμœ μ™€ 민주주의의 κ°€μΉ˜λ₯Ό κ³΅μœ ν–ˆλ˜ 독일이 μž μ‹œ 잘λͺ»λœ 길을 κ°€κ³  μžˆλŠ” 것이라고 인식될 수 μžˆμ—ˆκ³  독일에 λ‹€μ‹œκΈˆ μžμœ μ™€ 민주주의λ₯Ό νšŒλ³΅μ‹œν‚¬ 수 μžˆλ‹€λŠ” 희망이 μžˆμ—ˆλ˜ 것이닀. λ°˜λ©΄μ— 일본은 μ „ν†΅μ μœΌλ‘œ μ‹ λ’°ν•  수 μ—†λŠ” κ΅­κ°€, ꡰꡭ주의, 제ꡭ주의의 κΏˆμ— μ –μ–΄ μžˆλŠ” νƒ€λ½ν•œ κ΅­κ°€λ‘œ μΈμ‹λ˜μ—ˆκ³  여기에 μ—΄λ“±ν•œ μ•„μ‹œμ•„μΈμ΄λΌλŠ” 인쒅적 μ„ μž…κ΄€μ΄ 더해져 일본의 μ‹€μ§ˆμ  μœ„ν˜‘μ„ κ³Όμ†Œν‰κ°€ν•˜κ²Œ 된 μ›μΈμœΌλ‘œ μž‘μš©ν•˜μ˜€λ‹€. λ”°λΌμ„œ λ³Έ λ…Όλ¬Έμ˜ μ£Όμž₯은 λ‹€μŒκ³Ό κ°™λ‹€. 독일과 μΌλ³Έμ΄λΌλŠ” μ–‘μžνƒμΌμ˜ μƒν™©μ—μ„œ λ…μΌκ³Όμ˜ μ „μŸμ„ λ¨Όμ € κ²°μ‹¬ν•œ μ •μ±…μ˜ λ°°κ²½μ—λŠ” 첫째, λ°©μ–΄ν•΄μ•Ό ν•˜λŠ” μ§€μ—­μ˜ μ€‘μš”λ„μ— μžˆμ–΄μ„œ 일본의 μœ„ν˜‘μ— μ§λ©΄ν•œ μ•„μ‹œμ•„ μ§€μ—­λ³΄λ‹€λŠ” 독일에 μœ„ν˜‘μ— μ§λ©΄ν•œ 유럽 μ§€μ—­μ˜ λ°©μ–΄κ°€ 훨씬 더 μ€‘μš”ν–ˆκ³  λ‘˜μ§Έ, 독일과 일본의 μ‹€μ§ˆμ μΈ ꡰ사적 μœ„ν˜‘λ³΄λ‹€λŠ” μžμœ μ™€ λ―Όμ£Όμ£Όμ˜λΌλŠ” κ°€μΉ˜κΈ°μ€€μ— μžˆμ–΄μ„œ 이λ₯Ό νšŒλ³΅μ‹œν‚¬ 수 μžˆλŠ” 독일이 μš°μ„ μˆœμœ„μ— λ†“μ΄κ²Œ 된 것이며 μ…‹μ§Έ, λ…μΌκ³Όμ˜ μ „μŸμ„ 끝마칠 λ•ŒκΉŒμ§€ 일본이 μž μžμ½” κΈ°λ‹€λ € 쀄 κ²ƒμ΄λΌλŠ” 희망적 μ‚¬κ³ λŠ” 일본의 μœ„ν˜‘μ„ κ³Όμ†Œν‰κ°€ν–ˆκΈ° λ•Œλ¬Έμ— κ°€λŠ₯ν–ˆλ˜ 것이닀. 끝으둜 λ‹¨μΌμ‚¬λ‘€μ—°κ΅¬μ˜ ν•œκ³„μ—λ„ λΆˆκ΅¬ν•˜κ³  λ³Έ 연ꡬλ₯Ό ν†΅ν•΄μ„œ μ •μ±…κ²°μ •μžλ“€μ˜ 신념과 세계관, 그리고 인쒅적 μ„ μž…κ΄€ λ“±μœΌλ‘œ κ΅¬μ„±λœ 인식이 μ€‘μš”ν•œ λ³€μˆ˜λ‘œ μž‘μš©ν•  수 μžˆλ‹€λŠ” 것을 κ²€μ¦ν•¨μœΌλ‘œμ¨ μœ„ν˜‘μΈμ‹ 연ꡬ에 κΈ°μ—¬ν•  수 μžˆλ‹€.This research is a case study that analyses the determining causes of 'Germany First' strategy of the U. S which was the major war plan during the Second World War. As stated in the title, 'Germany First' strategy refers to a war plan that, with a cooperation of the allied powers which Great Britain was a representative figure, prioritized Germany as a first enemy to defeat, and to deal with Japanese threat later with fully concentrated military strength. Due to the internal and external damage made from the Great Depression and disarmament agreement, there was no overwhelming gap of military strength between the U. S and threatening nations: fighting a war on two fronts, that is against Germany and Japan, was therefore virtually impossible. Under constraint of the situation, the U. S prepared for the war against Germany while she went all lengths to avoid and delay the war against Japan. The research question begins from this part; why did the U. S determine to deal with the threat of Germany instead of Japan? What were the determining causes that made the U. S establish the strategy? Majority of earlier studies tacitly agree that from mid-1930s and on the verge of the Second World war, the threat of Germany was overwhelmingly higher than that of Japan. Therefore there is no question to 'Germany First' strategy and the establishment of it has been understood only from the level of military power of threatening nations. This understanding can offer a certain degree of explanation, considering the objective gap of military power between Germany and Japan. Yet, without the internal decision making process, this still remains as a superficial explanation which fails to make a detailed account of reality. Thus, from the ideational perspective, the research analyses and attempts to prove that the perceptions of decision makers had a decisive effect on decision making process instead of the level of military power of threatening nations: among the decision makers, perceptions held by Franklin D. Roosevelt will be intensively highlighted considering his position as a final approving authority. The fact that Asia was regarded as a great market to policy maker in the U. S cannot be overlooked. However, in terms of trading volume, European nations captured far higher weight than Asian countries. This tells that though economic value in Asian region was important, the U. S did not regard it as a vital national interest. On the other hand, in terms of European region, the U. S had a matter of life and death since she expanded her border line to western hemisphere and the Atlantic, not to mention the economic importance in the region. In particular, a fall of Great Britain and France meant the loss of naval power to Germany which would then become a serious security threat to the U. S. Along with this, the research analyses threat perception based on the study of national image. It is certain that, to Roosevelt and key decision makers, both Germany and Japan were regarded as nations threatening the value of liberty and democracy. However, due to the racial preconception, Germany was perceived as a superior race and nation than Japan. Thus, though Germany is temporarily on the wrong track, there was a hope to restore who once shared those values. Japan, on the other hand, was perceived as a traditionally untrustworthy nation obsessed with the delusion of militarism and imperialism; in addition, racial preconception as an inferior Asian made underestimate the actual level of the threat. Therefore, under the situation where the U. S was forced to select one of the alternative enemies, the research made the following conclusions. First, in terms of the importance of region to defend, Europe being threatened by Germany was far more significant than Asia facing threat from Japan. Second, Germany was prioritized regarding values of liberty and democracy than Japan. Third, due to the underestimation of Japanese threat, there was a wishful thinking that Japan would wait until the U. S and allies end the war against Germany. Finally, the research can contribute to the study of threat perception with the verification of how perceptions, world-views and racial preconceptions held by decision makers can act as a key variable in explaining the political phenomenon.Maste

    Study of Threat Perception in Decision Making Process: A Case of 'Germany First' Strategy

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    This research is a case study that analyses the determining causes of Germany First strategy of the U. S which was the major war plan during the Second World War. As stated in the title, Germany First strategy refers to a war plan that, with a cooperation of the allied powers which Great Britain was a representative figure, prioritized Germany as a first enemy to defeat, and to deal with Japanese threat later with fully concentrated military strength. The research analyses and attempts to prove that the perceptions of decision makers had a decisive effect on decision making process instead of the level ofmilitary power of threatening nations. Along with this, the research analyses threat perception based on the study of national image. It is certain that, to Roosevelt and key decision makers, both Germany and Japan were regarded as nations threatening the value of liberty and democracy. However, due to the racial preconception, Japan was perceived as a traditionally untrustworthy nation obsessed with the delusion of militarism and imperialism; in addition, racial preconception as an inferior Asian made underestimate the actual level of the threat. Because Japanese threat is underestimated, a wishful thinking that Japan would wait until the war with Germany is over prevailed among the decision makers and thereby allowed to established Germany First strategy

    ν•œκ΅­ 일뢀 μ²­μ†Œλ…„μ˜ 지역별 μ‹μƒν™œ 평가

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    ν•™μœ„λ…Όλ¬Έ(석사)--μ„œμšΈλŒ€ν•™κ΅ λŒ€ν•™μ› :μ‹ν’ˆμ˜μ–‘ν•™κ³Ό,2002.Maste

    Analysis on the Characteristics of Water Qualiy in Prearranged Saemangeum Are

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    Hourly monitoring data from Saemangeum estuary, which is expected to become freshwater, was analyzed to evaluate the water quality characteristics. Higher algal growth at spring season than winter influenced the high ratio of organic nitrogen to total nitrogen and concentration of chemical oxygen demand (COD). About 87.9% and 59.7% of organic nitrogen was observed at winter season and spring season, respectively. Daily salinity analysis at the mouth of two main rivers demonstrated that the Dongjin river was more influenced by tidal effect and showed higher variation than the Mankyung river. The ratio of nitrogen to phosphorus (N/P ratio) was different with site (estuary versus sea area) and season (winter versus spring) remarkably. The N/P ratio was highest (32.74 ~ 43.93) at estuary in winter and was lowest (1.78 ~ 3.06) at sea in spring. The high N/P ratio at estuary area implies that phosphorus can be the limiting nutrient factor for algal growth as in general freshwater river, therefore, water quality management practice considering river characteristics rather might be needed in the Saemangeum estuary. The Saemangeum project is nationally recognized for its environmental issues, and especially water quality concern is a critical factor to make policy decision and further assessment with continued monitoring is strongly recommended.N

    [Republished study] Assessing Nutritional Status in Outpatients after Gastric Cancer Surgery: A Comparative Study of Five Nutritional Screening Tools

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    Objectives: This study examined the characteristics of patients according to nutritional status assessed by five nutritional screening tools: Patient-Generated Subjective Global Assessment (PG-SGA), NUTRISCORE, Nutritional Risk Index (NRI), Prognostic Nutritional Index (PNI), and Controlling Nutritional Status (CONUT) and to compare the agreement, sensitivity, and specificity of these tools. Methods: A total of 952 gastric cancer patients who underwent gastrectomy and chemotherapy from January 2009 to December 2012 were included. The patients were categorized into malnutrition and normal status according to five nutritional screening tools one month after surgery. The Spearman partial correlation, Cohens Kappa coefficient, the area under the curve (AUC), sensitivity, and specificity of each two screening tools were calculated. Results: Malnutrition was observed in 86.24% of patients based on the PG-SGA and 85.82% based on the NUTRISCORE. When NRI or CONUT were applied, the proportions of malnutrition were < 30%. Patients with malnutrition had lower intakes of energy and protein than normal patients when assessed using the PG-SGA, NUTRISCORE, or NRI. Lower levels of albumin, hemoglobin, total lymphocyte count, and total cholesterol and longer postoperative hospital stays were observed among patients with malnutrition compared to normal patients when NRI, PNI, or CONUT were applied. Relatively high agreement for NUTRISCORE relative to PG-SGA was found; the sensitivity was 90.86%, and the AUC was 0.78. When NRI, PNI, and CONUT were compared, the sensitivities were 23.72% for PNI relative to NRI, 44.53% for CONUT relative to NRI, and 90.91% for CONUT relative to PNI. The AUCs were 0.95 for NRI relative to PNI and 0.91 for CONUT relative to PNI. Conclusions: NUTRISCORE had a high sensitivity compared to PG-SGA, and CONUT had a high sensitivity compared to PNI. NRI had a high specificity compared to PNI. This relatively high sensitivity and specificity resulted in 77.00% agreement between PNI and CONUT and 77.94% agreement between NRI and PNI. Further cohort studies will be needed to determine if the nutritional status assessed by PG-SGA, NUTRISCORE, NRI, PNI, and CONUT predicts the gastric cancer prognosis.Y
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