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    GPS ์žฌ๋ฐ ํ™˜๊ฒฝ์—์„œ ๋ฐฐ์—ด ์•ˆํ…Œ๋‚˜๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•œ GPS ์ˆ˜์‹ ๊ธฐ์— ๊ด€ํ•œ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ

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    ํ•™์œ„๋…ผ๋ฌธ (์„์‚ฌ)-- ์„œ์šธ๋Œ€ํ•™๊ต ๋Œ€ํ•™์› : ๊ธฐ๊ณ„ํ•ญ๊ณต๊ณตํ•™๋ถ€, 2013. 8. ๊ธฐ์ฐฝ๋ˆ.๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์€ ๋‹ค์ค‘์˜ GPS ์‹ ํ˜ธ ํ™˜๊ฒฝ์—์„œ 1๊ฐœ์˜ CW ์žฌ๋ฐ ์‹ ํ˜ธ๊ฐ€ ๋ฐฐ์—ด ์•ˆํ…Œ๋‚˜๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•œ GPS ์ˆ˜์‹ ๊ธฐ์— ์ž…์‚ฌํ•˜์˜€์„ ๋•Œ Beamforming/Nulling ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜์œผ๋กœ C/N0๋ฅผ ์œ ์ง€ํ•˜๋ฉด์„œ ์žฌ๋ฐ ์‹ ํ˜ธ์˜ ๋„๋ž˜ ๋ฐฉํ–ฅ์„ ์ถ”์ •ํ•˜๊ณ  ๋ฐฐ์—ด ์•ˆํ…Œ๋‚˜ GPS ์ˆ˜์‹ ๊ธฐ์— ํšจ๊ณผ์ ์ธ Beamforming/Nulling ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜ ์„ ํƒ์— ๊ด€ํ•œ ์—ฐ๊ตฌ์ด๋‹ค. ๋‹ค์ค‘์˜ GPS ์‹ ํ˜ธ๋งŒ ์กด์žฌํ•˜๋Š” ํ™˜๊ฒฝ์—์„œ ์žฌ๋ฐ ์‹ ํ˜ธ๊ฐ€ ๋‹จ์ผ ์•ˆํ…Œ๋‚˜ GPS ์ˆ˜์‹ ๊ธฐ์— ์ž…์‚ฌํ•˜๋ฉด C/N0์˜ ๊ฐ’์ด ๋–จ์–ด์ง€๋ฉด์„œ GPS ์ˆ˜์‹ ๊ธฐ๊ฐ€ tracking ์ค‘์ธ ์‹ ํ˜ธ๋ฅผ ์žƒ๊ฒŒ ๋˜๊ณ  ํฐ ์‚ฌ๊ณ ๊ฐ€ ๋ฐœ์ƒํ•  ์ˆ˜ ์žˆ๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์—์„œ๋Š”, ์ด๋ฅผ ๊ฐœ์„ ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•˜์—ฌ ๋ฐฐ์—ด ์•ˆํ…Œ๋‚˜๋ฅผ ์‚ฌ์šฉํ•˜๋Š” GPS ์ˆ˜์‹ ๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ์ œ์•ˆํ•œ๋‹ค. ๋ฐฐ์—ด ์•ˆํ…Œ๋‚˜ GPS ์ˆ˜์‹ ๊ธฐ๋Š” beamforming/nulling์„ ํ†ตํ•˜์—ฌ ์žฌ๋ฐ ํ™˜๊ฒฝ์—์„œ๋„ ์ˆ˜์‹ ๊ธฐ๊ฐ€ tracking ์ค‘์ธ GPS ์‹ ํ˜ธ๋ฅผ ์žƒ์ง€ ์•Š๋„๋ก C/N0๋ฅผ ์œ ์ง€์‹œ์ผœ์ฃผ๋ฉฐ ์žฌ๋ฐ ์‹ ํ˜ธ์˜ ๋„๋ž˜ ๋ฐฉํ–ฅ์˜ ์ถ”์ •์ด ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•˜์—ฌ ์žฌ๋จธ์˜ ์œ„์น˜ ์ถ”์ •์ด ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•ด์ง„๋‹ค. ์ด๋Ÿฌํ•œ ๋ฐฐ์—ด ์•ˆํ…Œ๋‚˜ GPS ์ˆ˜์‹ ๊ธฐ์—์„œ beamforming/nulling๊ณผ ์žฌ๋ฐ ์‹ ํ˜ธ์˜ ์œ„์น˜ ์ถ”์ • ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์„ฑ์„ ์ฆ๋ช…ํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•˜์—ฌ, ๋ฐฐ์—ด ์•ˆํ…Œ๋‚˜ GPS ์ˆ˜์‹ ๊ธฐ์˜ ์•ˆํ…Œ๋‚˜ ๋‹จ๊ณผ ์ƒ๊ด€๊ธฐ ํ›„์˜ GPS ์‹ ํ˜ธ, ์žฌ๋ฐ ์‹ ํ˜ธ, ์žก์Œ์˜ ์„ธ๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ๊ณ„์‚ฐํ•˜์—ฌ ์‹œ๋ฎฌ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜ ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ์ด ๋•Œ, ์žฌ๋ฐ ์‹ ํ˜ธ์˜ ์„ธ๊ธฐ๋Š” ๋‹จ์ผ ์•ˆํ…Œ๋‚˜ GPS ์ˆ˜์‹ ๊ธฐ๊ฐ€ GPS ์‹ ํ˜ธ์˜ tracking lock์„ ์žƒ๋Š” ์žฌ๋ฐ์˜ ์„ธ๊ธฐ์ด๋‹ค. conventional ๋น”ํ˜•์„ฑ๊ณผ MVDR ๊ธฐ๋ฒ•์„ ์ด์šฉํ•˜์˜€์œผ๋ฉฐ ๋‘ ๊ธฐ๋ฒ• ๋ชจ๋‘ beamforming/nulling๊ณผ ์žฌ๋ฐ ์‹ ํ˜ธ์˜ ์œ„์น˜ ์ถ”์ •์ด ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋‘ ๊ธฐ๋ฒ• ์ค‘์—์„œ ๋ฐฐ์—ด ์•ˆํ…Œ๋‚˜ GPS ์ˆ˜์‹ ๊ธฐ์— ํšจ๊ณผ์ ์ธ ๊ธฐ๋ฒ•์„ ์„ ํƒํ•˜๊ธฐ ์œ„ํ•ด์„œ ์ •ํ™•๋„์™€ C/N0 ์ธก๋ฉด์—์„œ ๋น„๊ต, ๋ถ„์„ํ•˜์˜€๋‹ค. ๋‘ ๊ธฐ๋ฒ• ๋ชจ๋‘ ์ •ํ™•๋„๋Š” ๋น„์Šทํ•˜๋‚˜, MVDR ๊ธฐ๋ฒ•์ด ์žฌ๋ฐ ์‹ ํ˜ธ์˜ ๋ฐฉํ–ฅ๊ณผ ๋ฌด๊ด€ํ•˜๊ฒŒ C/N0๋ฅผ ์œ ์ง€ํ•˜๋Š”๋ฐ ํšจ๊ณผ์ ์ด์—ˆ๋‹ค. ๋ณธ ๋…ผ๋ฌธ์˜ ๋‚ด์šฉ์€ ๋ฐฐ์—ด ์•ˆํ…Œ๋‚˜ GPS ์ˆ˜์‹ ๊ธฐ ์‚ฌ์šฉ์‹œ GPS ์žฌ๋ฐ ์‹ ํ˜ธ์— ๊ฐ•๊ฑดํ•˜๊ฒŒ ํ•ด์ฃผ๋ฉฐ, 2๊ฐœ์˜ ๋ฐฐ์—ด ์•ˆํ…Œ๋‚˜ ์ˆ˜์‹ ๊ธฐ๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•˜์˜€์„ ๊ฒฝ์šฐ ์žฌ๋จธ์˜ ์œ„์น˜ ์ถ”์ •์ด ๊ฐ€๋Šฅํ•ด์ง€๊ณ  ๊ตฐ ๋˜๋Š” ํ•ญ๊ณต์ด๋‚˜ ํ•ด์–‘์„ ์œ„ํ˜‘ํ•˜๋Š” ์žฌ๋ฐ ํ™œ๋™์— ๋Œ€ํ•œ ๊ฐ์‹œ์ฒด๊ณ„ ๊ตฌ์ถ•์‹œ ์œ ์šฉํ•˜๊ฒŒ ์‚ฌ์šฉ๋  ๊ฒƒ์œผ๋กœ ๊ธฐ๋Œ€ํ•œ๋‹ค.This Paper is a study on maintaining the C/N0 and estimation of jamming signals DOA(Direction of Arrival) using Beam-forming/Nulling and selection of effective algorithm for array antenna GPS receiver when array antenna receive one CW jamming signal under multiple GPS signals environment. If the GPS receiver receive the jamming signal under multiple GPS signals environment, the C/N0 falls and the GPS receiver loses the tracking lock of the GPS signals. In this paper, I proposed the GPS receiver using array antenna for improving the problem. The GPS receiver using array antenna maintains the C/N0 for tracking lock of the GPS signals and estimates the jamming signals DOA through the beamforming/nulling algorithm under the jamming environment. For verifying the capability of beamforming/nulling and the possibility of jamming signals DOA Estimation using array antenna GPS receiver, I calculated the GPS, jamming and noise power of the antenna and the rear end of correlator and simulated. jamming signals power is same the power of losing the tracking lock of the GPS signals in the GPS receiver. I used the conventional beamforming and MVDR(Minimum Variance Distortionless Responses) algorithm. It is possible to strengthen the GPS signals C/N0 and estimate the jamming signals DOA by using two algorithms. For selecting the effective algorithm of the two for array antenna GPS receiver, I analyzed the accuracy and C/N0. Two algorithms have similar accuracy. but, MVDR algorithm more effective than conventional beamforming about maintaining the C/N0 irrelevant to jamming signals DOA. When we use the array antenna GPS receiver, it is robust to the GPS jamming signal. if we use two array antenna GPS receivers, we find the jammers location. when we construct the surveillance system for anti GPS jamming, I expect that the contents of this paper are used usefully.I. ์„œ๋ก  1 I.1 ์—ฐ๊ตฌ ๋™๊ธฐ ๋ฐ ๋ฐฐ๊ฒฝ 1 I.2 ์—ฐ๊ตฌ ๋™ํ–ฅ 3 I.3 ์—ฐ๊ตฌ ๋‚ด์šฉ๊ณผ ๋ฐฉ๋ฒ• 4 I.4 ์—ฐ๊ตฌ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ์˜ ๊ธฐ์—ฌ๋„ 6 II. GPS 7 II.1 GPS ์ผ๋ฐ˜ 7 II.2 GPS ์‹ ํ˜ธ 8 II.2.1 ๋Œ€์—ญ ํ™•์‚ฐ(Spread Spectrum) ์‹ ํ˜ธ 8 II.2.2 GPS ์‹ ํ˜ธ ๊ตฌ์กฐ 12 II.2.3 GPS ์‹ ํ˜ธ ํŒŒ์›Œ 15 II.2.4 ์ˆ˜์‹ ๊ธฐ ์žก์Œ ์„ธ๊ธฐ ๋ฐ€๋„(Noise Power Density) 17 II.2.5 ๋ฐ˜์†กํŒŒ ๋Œ€ ์žก์Œ ๋ฐ€๋„๋น„(C/N0) 19 III. GPS ๊ต๋ž€ ์‹ ํ˜ธ 20 III.1 GPS ์žฌ๋ฐ ์‹ ํ˜ธ์˜ ์ข…๋ฅ˜ 20 III.1.1 ํ˜‘๋Œ€์—ญ ์žฌ๋ฐ(Narrowband Jamming) 21 III.1.2 ๊ด‘๋Œ€์—ญ ์žฌ๋ฐ(Broadband Jamming) 21 III.1.3 ํŽ„์Šค ์žฌ๋ฐ(Pulsed Jamming) 22 III.1.4 ์ฃผํŒŒ์ˆ˜/์ง„ํญ ๋ณ€์กฐ ์žฌ๋ฐ(Frequency/Amplitude Modulation) 22 III.2 ๋น„์˜๋„์  ๊ต๋ž€ ์‹ ํ˜ธ์˜ ์ข…๋ฅ˜ 23 III.3 GPS ์‹ ํ˜ธ์˜ Tracking Lock์„ ์žƒ๋Š” ์žฌ๋ฐ ์„ธ๊ธฐ 25 IV. ๋ฐฐ์—ด ์•ˆํ…Œ๋‚˜ ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜ 29 IV.1 ์ˆ˜์‹  ์‹ ํ˜ธ ๋ชจ๋ธ๋ง 29 IV.2 ๋ฐฐ์—ด ์•ˆํ…Œ๋‚˜ ๋ชจ๋ธ๋ง 34 IV.2.1 ๋“ฑ๊ฐ„๊ฒฉ ์„ ํ˜• ๋ฐฐ์—ด ์•ˆํ…Œ๋‚˜ 35 IV.2.2 ๋“ฑ๊ฐ„๊ฒฉ ์›ํ˜• ๋ฐฐ์—ด ์•ˆํ…Œ๋‚˜ 36 IV.3 ํ˜‘๋Œ€์—ญ ์‹ ํ˜ธ ์ž…์‚ฌ๊ฐ ์ถ”์ • ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜ 37 IV.3.1 ๋น”ํ˜•์„ฑ ๊ธฐ๋ฒ• ๊ฐœ์š” 38 IV.3.2 Conventional ๋น”ํ˜•์„ฑ ๊ธฐ๋ฒ•(Bartlett Method) 40 IV.3.3 MVDR ๊ธฐ๋ฒ• 42 IV.4 GPS ์žฌ๋ฐ ํ™˜๊ฒฝํ•˜ ์ ์šฉ ์•Œ๊ณ ๋ฆฌ์ฆ˜ 43 V. ์‹œ๋ฎฌ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ 45 V.1 ์‹œ๋ฎฌ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜ ํ™˜๊ฒฝ 45 V.1.1 ์ˆ˜์‹ ๊ธฐ Block Diagram 45 V.1.2 ์‹œ๋ฎฌ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜ ์„ค์ • 46 V.2 Beamforming/Nulling ์‹œ๋ฎฌ๋ ˆ์ด์…˜ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ 47 V.2.1 Conventional ๋น”ํ˜•์„ฑ ๊ธฐ๋ฒ•(Bartlett Method) ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ 47 V.2.2 MVDR ๊ธฐ๋ฒ• ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ 52 V.2.3 Conventional ๋น”ํ˜•์„ฑ ๋ฐ MVDR ๊ธฐ๋ฒ• ๋น„๊ตยท๋ถ„์„ 58 V.2.3.1 ์ •ํ™•๋„ 58 V.2.3.2 ๋ฐ˜์†กํŒŒ ๋Œ€ ์žก์Œ ๋ฐ€๋„๋น„(C/N0) 64 VI. ๊ฒฐ๋ก  ๋ฐ ํ–ฅํ›„ ๊ณผ์ œ 66 VII. ์ฐธ๊ณ ๋ฌธํ—Œ 68Maste

    Adaptive Arrays๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•œ GNSS ๊ต๋ž€ ์‹ ํ˜ธ DOA ์ถ”์ • ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์„ฑ ๋ถ„์„

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    GNSS(Global Navigation Satellite System) is used in a variety of fields such as aviation, ocean, cars and dependence of GNSS is increasing in our life. However, As dependence of GNSS is increasing, GNSSs vulnerabilities are appeared. One of them is GNSS Jamming. Damages of GNSS Jamming were occurred in foreign countries and Korea was also damaged by North Korean activities of GNSS Jamming.[1] There are many studies including estimation of jamming signals DOA(Direction of Arrival) for counteracting from intended jamming. The methods for estimating jamming signals DOA are largely classified two ways. One is Spectral Estimation. The other is Parametric Estimation.[2] In this paper, We calculated Tracking Threshold power to unlock L1 signal(C/A Code) and analyzed estimation possibility of DOA of CW Jamming signal having more than Tracking Threshold power using Conventional Beamforming (Bartlett Method) and MVDR (Minimum Variance Distortionless Responses) algorithms under the Beamforming/Nulling methods.OAIID:oai:osos.snu.ac.kr:snu2012-01/104/0000003405/20SEQ:20PERF_CD:SNU2012-01EVAL_ITEM_CD:104USER_ID:0000003405ADJUST_YN:NEMP_ID:A000360DEPT_CD:446CITE_RATE:0FILENAME:๋…ผ๋ฌธ_์†กํ™๊ธฐ(Adaptive Arrays๋ฅผ ์ด์šฉํ•œ GNSS ๊ต๋ž€์‹ ํ˜ธ DOA ์ถ”์ • ๊ฐ€๋Šฅ์„ฑ ๋ถ„์„).pdfDEPT_NM:๊ธฐ๊ณ„ํ•ญ๊ณต๊ณตํ•™๋ถ€EMAIL:[email protected]:
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