Tax Collection Costs, Tax Evasion and Optimal Interest Rates

In this paper, I investigate to what extent the cross-country variation in nominal interest rates can be explained as being due to governments' optimal response to economic conditions such as tax collection costs, tax evasion and government consumption needs. In particular, I study the effects of costly income taxes in the presence of an informal sector on the solution to a Ramsey problem in a general equilibrium framework. Unlike most of the previous analyses of optimal inflationary finance, the model postulates that conventional taxes carry collection costs whereas fiat money can be printed costlessly. For some countries, I measure tax collection costs, use the tax evasion estimates reported in the literature, and then calculate the optimal interest rate based on the model. Comparison of the actual and optimal interest rates demonstrates that the model can in fact partly explain the observed deviations from the Friedman Rule. I also show that allowing cross-country differences in the elasticity of substitution between formal and informal sectors can increase the model's explanatory power.

Financing Government Expenditures Optimally

In a simple cash-credit model, I study the effects of the combination of costly tax collection and tax evasion on fiscal and monetary policy for optimal resource allocation. Allowing the informal sector to use cash more intensively than the formal sector, I compute the optimal interest and tax rates for eleven OECD countries to finance their exogeneously given government spending. A comparison of the actual and optimal interest rates reveals that tax collection costs and tax evasion together can partly explain the cross-country differences in monetary policy, also rationalizing deviations from the Friedman Rule in the long-run.

Foreign Currency Borrowing by Small Firms

We examine the firm- and country-level determinants of the currency denomination of small business loans. We first model the choice of loan currency in a framework which features a trade-off between lower cost of debt and the risk of firm-level distress costs, and also examines the impact of information asymmetry between banks and firms. When foreign currency funds come at a lower interest rate, all foreign currency earners as well as those local currency earners with high revenues and low distress costs choose foreign currency loans. When the banks have imperfect information on the currency and level of firms revenues, even more local earners switch to foreign currency loans, as they do not bear the full cost of the corresponding credit risk. We then test the implications of our model by using a 2005 survey with responses from 9,655 firms in 26 transition countries. The survey contains details on 3,105 recent bank loans. At the firm level, our findings suggest that firms with foreign currency income and assets are more likely to borrow in a foreign currency. In contrast, firm-level distress costs and financial transparency affect the currency denomination only weakly. At the country level, the interest rate advantages of foreign currency funds and the exchange rate volatility do not explain the foreign currency borrowing in our sample. However, foreign bank presence, weak corporate governance and the absence of capital controls encourage foreign currency borrowing. All in all, we cannot confirm that "carry-trade behavior" is the key driver of foreign currency borrowing by small firms in transition economies. Our results do, however, support the conjecture that banking-sector structures and institutions that aggravate information asymmetries may facilitate foreign currency borrowing.foreign currency borrowing, competition, banking sector, market structure

Information Asymmetry and Foreign Currency Borrowing by Small Firms

We model the choice of loan currency in a framework which features a trade-off between lower cost of debt and the risk of firm-level distress costs. Under perfect information foreign currency funds come at a lower interest rate, all foreign currency earners as well as those local currency earners with high revenues and/or low distress costs choose foreign currency loans. When the banks have imperfect information on the currency and level of firm revenues, even more local earners switch to foreign currency loans, as they do not bear the full cost of the corresponding credit risk.foreign currency borrowing;competition;banking sector;market structure

Who Needs Credit and Who Gets Credit in Eastern Europe?

Based on survey data covering 8,387 firms in 20 countries we compare credit demand and credit supply for firms in Eastern Europe to those for firms in selected Western European countries.Credit Constraints;Banking sector;Transition economies

Who Needs Credit and Who Gets Credit in Eastern Europe?

Based on survey data covering 8,387 firms in 20 countries we compare credit demand and credit supply for firms in Eastern Europe to those for firms in selected Western European countries. We find that, while 30% of firms do not need credit in Eastern Europe, their need for credit is higher than in Western Europe. The firm-level determinants of credit needs in Eastern Europe are quite similar to that in Western Europe: Firms with alternative financings sources, i.e. government-owned, foreign-owned and internally financed firms, are less likely to need credit. Small firms are also less likely to demand credit than larger firms, suggesting that they may have limited investment opportunities. We find that a higher share of firms is discouraged from applying for a loan in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. Firms in Eastern Europe seem particularly discouraged by high interest rates compared to firms in Western Europe, with collateral conditions and loan application procedures also more discouraging. The higher rate of discouraged firms in Eastern Europe is related to a stronger reluctance of small and financially opaque firms to apply for a loan compared to Western Europe. While many discouraged firms correctly anticipate that their loan applications would be rejected, a large majority of discouraged firms seem to be creditworthy. At the country-level we find that the higher rate of discouraged firms in Eastern Europe is driven more by the presence of foreign banks than by the macroeconomic environment or the lack of creditor protection. We find no evidence that foreign bank presence leads to stricter loan approval decisions. Our findings suggest to policy makers that the low incidence of bank credit among firms in Eastern Europe, compared to Western Europe, is not driven by less need for credit or banks' reluctance to extend loans. The main driver seems to be that many (creditworthy) firms are discouraged from applying for a loan, due to high interest rates, collateral conditions and cumbersome lending procedures. As discouragement is particularly high among small and opaque firms, as well as in countries with a strong presence of foreign banks, it seems that firms perceive lending standards to have become more reliant on "hard information" with the entry of foreign banks. However, as loan rejection rates are not related to foreign bank presence, it seems that firms' perceptions of the likely lending conditions may be too pessimistic. Thus more transparency about credit eligibility and conditions may improve credit access, particularly in countries with a high presence of foreign banks.Banking, Credit, Transition economies

A Dynamical Analogue of a Question of Fermat

Given a quadratic polynomial with rational coefficients, we investigate the existence of consecutive squares in the orbit of a rational point under the iteration of the polynomial. We display three different constructions of $1$-parameter quadratic polynomials with orbits containing three consecutive squares. In addition, we show that there exists at least one polynomial of the form $x^2+c$ with a rational point whose orbit under this map contains four consecutive squares. This can be viewed as a dynamical analogue of a question of Fermat on rational squares in arithmetic progression. Finally, assuming a standard conjecture on exact periods of periodic points of quadratic polynomials over the rational field, we give necessary and sufficient conditions under which the orbit of a periodic point contains only rational squares

Currency Denomination of Bank Loans:Evidence from Small Firms in Transition Countries

We examine the firm-level and country-level determinants of the currency denomination of small business loans. We introduce an information asymmetry between banks and firms in a model that also features the trade-off between the cost of debt and firm-level distress costs. Banks in our model don’t know the currency in which firms have contracted their sales. When foreign currency funds come at a lower interest rate, all foreign currency earners and those local currency earners with low distress costs choose foreign currency loans. With imperfect information in the model concerning the currency in which the firms receive their earnings, even more local earners switch to foreign currency loans as they do not bear the full cost of the corresponding credit risk. We test these implications of our model by using a 2005 survey with responses from 9,655 firms in 26 transition countries that contains reports on 3,105 recent bank loans. We find that firms with foreign currency earnings and lower distress costs borrow more in foreign currency, while opaque firms do not. Interest rate advantages on foreign currency funds do explain differences in loan dollarization across countries, but not within countries over time. The presence of foreign banks and reforms related to corporate governance also contribute to differences in foreign currency borrowing across countries. However, stronger foreign bank presence or corporate governance do not lead more local currency earners to choose foreign currency loans. Our results suggest that while the cost and risk of debt do affect the propensity of small firms to take unhedged foreign currency loans, firm opaqueness does not. Hence, we cannot confirm that information asymmetries are a key driving force of the recently observed increase in loan dollarization in Eastern European transition countries.