Why Legislators are Protectionists: the Role of Majoritarian Voting in Setting Tariffs

Based on the observation that industries are often geographically concentrated, this paper proposes a new political economy model of trade protection. We associate the sectors of a specific factors model with electoral districts populated by continua of heterogeneous voters who differ in their relative factor endowments. We show how strategic delegation leads each district to elect a representative who is more protectionist than the median voter. The legislature formed by these representatives then sets tariffs that are strictly positive. Introducing additional policy instruments reveals a trade-off between efficiency and regional targetability. --trade policy,political economy,representative democracy

Diffusion coefficient for reptation of polymers with kinematic disorder

We give a lower bound on the diffusion coefficient of a polymer chain in an entanglement network with kinematic disorder, which is obtained from an exact calculation in a modified Rubinstein-Duke lattice gas model with periodic boundary conditions. In the limit of infinite chain length we show the diffusive motion of the polymer to be slowed down by kinematic disorder by the same factor as for a single particle in a random barrier model.Comment: 8 pages, 2 figures, revised text, journal ref. adde

Universal scaling behavior of directed percolation around the upper critical dimension

In this work we consider the steady state scaling behavior of directed percolation around the upper critical dimension. In particular we determine numerically the order parameter, its fluctuations as well as the susceptibility as a function of the control parameter and the conjugated field. Additionally to the universal scaling functions, several universal amplitude combinations are considered. We compare our results with those of a renormalization group approach.Comment: 19 pages, 8 figures, accepted for publication in J. Stat. Phy

Enlargement versus deepening: the trade-off facing economic unions.

This paper analyzes the relationship between the size of an economic union and the degree of policy centralization. We consider a political economy setting in which elected representatives bargain over the degree of centralization within the union. In our model strategic delegation affects the identity of the representatives and hence the equilibrium policy outcome. We show that the relationship between the size of the union and centralization may be non-monotonic: Up to a certain size enlargement leads to deeper integration, whereas beyond that size further enlargement implies less centralization. We also show that freezing the level of centralization and associate memberships can mitigate the trade-off.

The Economics of a Multilateral Investment Agreement

This paper models a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) as a coordination device. Multinational enterprises can invest in any number of countries. Without a multilateral investment agreement, expropriation triggers an investment stop by the single MNE. Under a multilateral agreement, expropriation leads to a joint reaction by all MNEs. Switching to such a regime increases worldwide FDI and raises the world interest rate. Distinguishing three groups of countries, we show that industrialized countries experience an outflow of capital but benefit overall due to an increase in repatriated profits. Middle income countries are likely to gain from increased inward FDI, whereas least developed countries lose because they receive less FDI. Our results explain the stylized fact that a multilateral investment agreement was opposed by least developed nations and certain groups in rich countries.multilateral investment agreement, FDI, trade policy

Lifetime determination of the 5d2^{2}~3^{3}F2_{2} state in barium using trapped atoms

Magneto-optically trapped atoms enable the determination of lifetimes of metastable states and higher lying excited states like the $\rm{5d^{2}~^{3}F_{2}}$ state in barium. The state is efficiently populated by driving strong transitions from metastable states within the cooling cycle of the barium MOT. The lifetime is inferred from the increase of MOT fluorescence after the transfer of up to $30\,\%$ of the trapped atoms to this state. The radiative decay of the $\rm{5d^{2}~^{3}F_{2}}$ state cascades to the cooling cycle of the MOT with a probability of $96.0(7)\,\%$ corresponding to a trap loss of $4.0(7)\,\%$ and its lifetime is determined to $\rm{160(10)~\mu s}$. This is in good agreement with the theoretically calculated lifetime of $\rm{190~\mu s}$ [J. Phys. B, {\bf 40}, 227 (2007)]. The determined loss of $4.0(7)\,\%$ from the cooling cycle is compared with the theoretically calculated branching ratios. This measurement extends the efficacy of trapped atoms to measure lifetimes of higher, long-lived states and validate the atomic structure calculations of heavy multi-electron systems.Comment: 5 pages, accepted for publication in Physical Review

Adaptive evolution of transcription factor binding sites

The regulation of a gene depends on the binding of transcription factors to specific sites located in the regulatory region of the gene. The generation of these binding sites and of cooperativity between them are essential building blocks in the evolution of complex regulatory networks. We study a theoretical model for the sequence evolution of binding sites by point mutations. The approach is based on biophysical models for the binding of transcription factors to DNA. Hence we derive empirically grounded fitness landscapes, which enter a population genetics model including mutations, genetic drift, and selection. We show that the selection for factor binding generically leads to specific correlations between nucleotide frequencies at different positions of a binding site. We demonstrate the possibility of rapid adaptive evolution generating a new binding site for a given transcription factor by point mutations. The evolutionary time required is estimated in terms of the neutral (background) mutation rate, the selection coefficient, and the effective population size. The efficiency of binding site formation is seen to depend on two joint conditions: the binding site motif must be short enough and the promoter region must be long enough. These constraints on promoter architecture are indeed seen in eukaryotic systems. Furthermore, we analyse the adaptive evolution of genetic switches and of signal integration through binding cooperativity between different sites. Experimental tests of this picture involving the statistics of polymorphisms and phylogenies of sites are discussed.Comment: published versio

Political Stasis or Protectionist Rut? Policy Mechanisms for Trade Reform in a Democracy

This paper analyzes the dynamics of trade policy reform under democracy. In an overlapping generations model, heterogeneous agents may acquire skills when young, thereby determining the skill composition of their cohort. Current and anticipated trade policies influence education decisions, and thus the identity of the median voter. We show that there may exist two political steady states: one protectionist and one liberal. Transition from the former to the latter can be achieved by government announcements, temporary educational subsidies, or (exogenous) tariff liberalization by trading partners, but not, in general, by transfer payments to adversely affected workers. We find additionally that reform is politically feasible only if the proposed liberalization is sufficiently large, suggesting that radical reform may be necessary for escaping a “protectionist rut.”dynamic political economy, trade policy, skill acquisition, politically stable policy paths, referenda

The economics of a multilateral investment agreement.

This paper models a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) as a coordination device. Multinational enterprises can invest in any number of countries. Without a multilateral investment agreement, expropriation triggers an investment stop by the single MNE. Under a multilateral agreement, expropriation leads to a joint reaction by all MNEs. Switching to such a regime increases worldwide FDI and raises the world interest rate. Distinguishing three groups of countries, we show that industrialized countries experience an outflow of capital but benefit overall due to an increase in repatriated profits. Middle income countries are likely to gain from increased inward FDI, whereas least developed countries lose because they receive less FDI. Our results explain the stylized fact that a multilateral investment agreement was opposed by least developed nations and certain groups in rich countries.

The economics of a multilateral investment agreement

This paper models a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) as a coordination device. Multinational enterprises can invest in any number of countries. Without a multilateral investment agreement, expropriation triggers an investment stop by the single MNE. Under a multilateral agreement, expropriation leads to a joint reaction by all MNEs. Switching to such a regime increases worldwide FDI and raises the world interest rate. Distinguishing three groups of countries, we show that industrialized countries experience an outflow of capital but benefit overall due to an increase in repatriated profits. Middle income countries are likely to gain from increased inward FDI, whereas least developed countries lose because they receive less FDI. Our results explain the stylized fact that a multilateral investment agreement was opposed by least developed nations and certain groups in rich countries.multilateral investment agreement, FDI, trade policy.