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Exposition of two forms of semantic skepticism: Wittgenstein’s paradox of rule following and Kripke’s semantic paradox
Despite persistent attempts to defend Kripke’s argument (Kripke 1982),
analyses of this argument seem to be reaching a consensus that it is
characterized by fatal flaws in both its interpretation of Wittgenstein and
its argument of meaning independent of interpretation. Most scholars who do
not agree with Kripke’s view have directly contrasted his understanding of
Wittgenstein (KW) with Wittgenstein’s own perspective (LW) in or after
Philosophical Investigations (PI). However, I believe that those who have
closely read both PI and Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language without
any preconceptions have a different impression from the one that is generally
accepted: that KW does not directly oppose LW. Indeed, KW seems to present
one aspect of LW with precision, although the impression that KW deviates
from LW in some respects remains unavoidable. In this paper, I will attempt
to elucidate the underpinnings of this impression by formulating the
paradoxes presented by Wittgenstein and Kripke and revealing the complicated
relation between the two forms of semantic paradoxes. I will then not only
propose a new interpretation of the argument about meaning contained in PI
but also suggest a schema or condition for semantics that I think holds by
itself, independent from exegetical matters
ON LAUNCHING ZAIRAICHI
MNGD Special issue 02: Making Networks for Glocal Developmen
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