An efficient memetic, permutation-based evolutionary algorithm for real-world train timetabling

Train timetabling is a difficult and very tightly constrained combinatorial problem that deals with the construction of train schedules. We focus on the particular problem of local reconstruction of the schedule following a small perturbation, seeking minimisation of the total accumulated delay by adapting times of departure and arrival for each train and allocation of resources (tracks, routing nodes, etc.). We describe a permutation-based evolutionary algorithm that relies on a semi-greedy heuristic to gradually reconstruct the schedule by inserting trains one after the other following the permutation. This algorithm can be hybridised with ILOG commercial MIP programming tool CPLEX in a coarse-grained manner: the evolutionary part is used to quickly obtain a good but suboptimal solution and this intermediate solution is refined using CPLEX. Experimental results are presented on a large real-world case involving more than one million variables and 2 million constraints. Results are surprisingly good as the evolutionary algorithm, alone or hybridised, produces excellent solutions much faster than CPLEX alone

On the Benefits of Inoculation, an Example in Train Scheduling

The local reconstruction of a railway schedule following a small perturbation of the traffic, seeking minimization of the total accumulated delay, is a very difficult and tightly constrained combinatorial problem. Notoriously enough, the railway company's public image degrades proportionally to the amount of daily delays, and the same goes for its profit! This paper describes an inoculation procedure which greatly enhances an evolutionary algorithm for train re-scheduling. The procedure consists in building the initial population around a pre-computed solution based on problem-related information available beforehand. The optimization is performed by adapting times of departure and arrival, as well as allocation of tracks, for each train at each station. This is achieved by a permutation-based evolutionary algorithm that relies on a semi-greedy heuristic scheduler to gradually reconstruct the schedule by inserting trains one after another. Experimental results are presented on various instances of a large real-world case involving around 500 trains and more than 1 million constraints. In terms of competition with commercial math ematical programming tool ILOG CPLEX, it appears that within a large class of instances, excluding trivial instances as well as too difficult ones, and with very few exceptions, a clever initialization turns an encouraging failure into a clear-cut success auguring of substantial financial savings

Artificial Agents and Speculative Bubbles

Pertaining to Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE), this work presents two models for the rise and downfall of speculative bubbles through an exchange price fixing based on double auction mechanisms. The first model is based on a finite time horizon context, where the expected dividends decrease along time. The second model follows the {\em greater fool} hypothesis; the agent behaviour depends on the comparison of the estimated risk with the greater fool's. Simulations shed some light on the influent parameters and the necessary conditions for the apparition of speculative bubbles in an asset market within the considered framework

Specialized Trial Courts in Patent Litigation: A Review of the Patent Pilot Program\u27s Impact on Appellate Reversal Rates at the Five-Year Mark

Do specialized trial court judges make more accurate decisions in patent law cases? In 2011, Congress passed a law setting up a ten-year patent law pilot program to enhance expertise in patent litigation by funneling more trial court decisions to fourteen selected district courts. Now that the five-year mark has passed, has the program had its intended effect of increasing accuracy, as measured by less reversal by the appellate court? In this Article, I analyze over 20,000 trial-court patent cases filed from late 2011 to 2016, focusing specifically on whether cases heard by district court judges participating in the patent law pilot program differ from those before non-pilot judges. I find that the types of cases heard before pilot judges differ. Pilot judges are less likely to rule in favor of the patentee and they are more likely to take cases to trial. Pilot judges also make different kinds of “mistakes” than non-pilot judges. Of the near three-hundred cases where the Federal Circuit rules on the substantive patent law issues on appeal, my results indicate that even controlling for other factors, judges that are part of the pilot program are not less likely to be overturned on appeal by the Federal Circuit. After discussing the empirical results, the Article proposes suggestions for reform. Patent law is unique in that it is one of the only areas of law where Congress delegates policymaking to the courts. The current piecemeal approach to patent reform by changing institutions in isolation to solve specific problems is misplaced. Multi-institutional reform of the patent system — focused on giving policymaking power to the bureaucracy to allow for less biased and more expert decision making — is needed in order to properly position courts as interpreters of the law rather than as being the vehicle primarily responsible for fashioning policy on an ad hoc basis

Specialized Trial Courts in Patent Litigation: A Review of the Patent Pilot Program\u27s Impact on Appellate Reversal Rates at the Five-Year Mark

Do specialized trial court judges make more accurate decisions in patent law cases? In 2011, Congress passed a law setting up a ten-year patent law pilot program to enhance expertise in patent litigation by funneling more trial court decisions to fourteen selected district courts. Now that the five-year mark has passed, has the program had its intended effect of increasing accuracy, as measured by less reversal by the appellate court? In this Article, I analyze over 20,000 trial-court patent cases filed from late 2011 to 2016, focusing specifically on whether cases heard by district court judges participating in the patent law pilot program differ from those before non-pilot judges. I find that the types of cases heard before pilot judges differ. Pilot judges are less likely to rule in favor of the patentee and they are more likely to take cases to trial. Pilot judges also make different kinds of “mistakes” than non-pilot judges. Of the near three-hundred cases where the Federal Circuit rules on the substantive patent law issues on appeal, my results indicate that even controlling for other factors, judges that are part of the pilot program are not less likely to be overturned on appeal by the Federal Circuit. After discussing the empirical results, the Article proposes suggestions for reform. Patent law is unique in that it is one of the only areas of law where Congress delegates policymaking to the courts. The current piecemeal approach to patent reform by changing institutions in isolation to solve specific problems is misplaced. Multi-institutional reform of the patent system — focused on giving policymaking power to the bureaucracy to allow for less biased and more expert decision making — is needed in order to properly position courts as interpreters of the law rather than as being the vehicle primarily responsible for fashioning policy on an ad hoc basis

PROSES PENYIDIKAN TERHADAP PELANGGARAN DALAM PEMBUATAN AKTA OLEH NOTARIS

Tujuan dilakukannya penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui bagaimana penyidikan terhadap pelanggaran Notaris dalam pembuatan akta oleh Notaris dan bagaimana pertanggunjawaban Notaris terhadap pelanggaran dalam pembuatan akta. Dengan menggunakan metode penelitian yuridis normatif, maka dapat disimpulkan: 1. Penyidikan terhadap pelanggaran pembuatan akta oleh Notaris dilakukan oleh kepolisian apabila sebelumnya telah mendapat persetujuan dari Majelis Kehormatan Notaris setelah menjalani pemeriksaan oleh internal INI. Penyidik melakukan pemanggilan untuk pemeriksaan dengan meminta keterangan kepada Notaris. 2. Pertanggungjawaban Notaris terhadap pelangaran pembuatan akta. Pertama, mengenai pertanggungjawaban perdata yaitu mengenai ganti rugi dalam Pasal 1365 tentang PMH dan Pasal 1366. Kedua, pertanggungjawaban pidana yaitu: Pasal 264 ayat (1), Pemalsuan surat diancam dengan pidana penjara paling lama delapan tahun dan denda, jika dilakukan terhadap akta-akta otentik. serta admintrasinya adalah dalam Pasal 6 Sanksi yang dikenakan terhadap anggota yang melakukan pelanggaran Kode  Etik dapat berupa: Teguran; Peringatan; Schorsing (pemecatan sementara) dari keanggotaan Perkumpulan; Onzetting (pemecatan) dari keanggotaan Perkumpulan. Kata kunci: Penyidikan, pelanggaran, akta, notari

The study of magnetic properties of the bilayer Ising model in an external magnetic field

Bu çalışmada, en düşük dereceli kümesel değişim metodunu kullanarak ferromagnetik A ve B tek tabakalarında aynı ve farklı spin durumlarını ve tabakalar arasında farklı bir etkileşme ile çiftlenimli iki katmanlı Ising modelinin magnetik özellikleri en düşük dereceli kümesel değişim metodunun kullanılmasıyla incelendi. Tabaka ve toplam magnetizasyonun termal değişimleri kapsamlıca incelendi ve durumunda sadece ikinci derece faz dönüşümü elde edildi. Diğer taraftan, tek tabakalardaki spin değerleri için hem birinci derece hem de ikinci derece faz dönüşümü elde edilir. Tek iyon anizotropisinin sadece B tek tabakası üzerideki etkisi incelendi. Tek tabaka magnetizasyonlarının sıcaklık değişimleri incelendi ve sistemi faz diyagramları farklı düzlemlerde verildi. Ayrıca toplam magnetizasyonun sıcaklığa göre davranışı ve dış magnetik alanın tüm sistem üzerindeki etkisi incelendi. Sistemde komşu tabakalar arası etkileşme ve tek iyon anizotropi parametresi arasındaki etkileşmeye bağlı olarak üçlü kritik nokta ve kompansasyon davranışı gibi ilginç magnetik özellikler bulundu.In this study, we study magnetic properties of a ferromagnetic bilayer Ising system consisting of two monolayers (A and B) with different spins and different interaction constants coupled together with an interlayer interaction by using the lowest approximation of the cluster variation method. The thermal variations of the layer and total magnetizations are investigated extensively and obtained only second order phase transition in the case of . On the other hand, both the first and second order phase transitions are observed for the spin values on the monolayers. The effect of single-ion anisotropy on the only B monolayer is also studied. The phase transitions of monolayer magnetizations are studied and the phase diagrams of the system are given in different planes. The temperatures dependence of the total magnetization and the influence of the external magnetic field on the all system is also examined. We find interesting magnetic properties in the system, such as tricritical point and compensation behavior, depending on the competition between the interlayer interaction and single-ion anisotropy parameter

Statutory Interpretation and Chevron Deference in the Appellate Courts: An Empirical Analysis

What statutory methods does an appellate court use in reviewing decisions of an administrative agency? Further, in doing this review, are appellate judges more likely to use certain statutory methods when they expressly cite the Chevron two-step framework than if they do not? This Article explores the answers to these questions using an original database of over 200 statutory interpretation cases culled from more than 2,500 cases decided in appellate courts reviewing National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) adjudications from 1994 through 2020. In particular, the study examined the use of text, language canons, substantive canons, legislative history, precedent, policy, and practical considerations. It then compared how use of those methods varied depending on whether or not the appeals court expressly cited or applied Chevron. Most notable was how appellate courts used precedent and policy in contrasting ways when ruling on Board statutory interpretation cases. While precedent was used more when courts reversed the Board’s pro-employee interpretation to reach an anti-employee outcome, courts referenced policy more to uphold Board rulings that were pro-employee in orientation. Both Democrat- and Republican-majority courts exhibited different tendencies in their choice of methods as well. When ruling on anti-employee interpretations, Democrat-majority courts often cited and relied on text more than Republican-majority courts. In addition, Republican-majority courts disproportionately used substantive canons to uphold anti-employee interpretations while Democrat-majority courts favored language canons when reversing such appeals. The study also yielded interesting observations about Chevron deference. Courts citing and applying Chevron had much higher agency-win rates than when Chevron was not used. Courts overwhelmingly cited Chevron or employed a Chevron-like “reasonableness” standard more when they upheld the agency’s statutory interpretation than when they reversed the agency, thus suggesting that courts may use Chevron to cabin judges’ ideological proclivities. The study also revealed a divergence in statutory methods depending on how a court employed Chevron. Courts expressly citing the Chevron two-step framework cited and relied on the statutory text and employed language canons more in the writing of the opinion than when they did not specifically cite Chevron. In addition, Republican-majority courts upholding Board interpretations often employed substantive canons more when citing Chevron than when not. Chevron-citing courts also disproportionately invoked policy considerations compared to non-Chevron-citing courts when upholding the Board’s interpretation. Courts declining to cite or apply Chevron at all had different tendencies. Those that declined to cite Chevron, or employ even a similar Chevron-like “reasonableness” standard, were more likely to cite precedent. Substantive canons were also employed to reverse the Board’s interpretation more by courts that declined to apply Chevron than courts that applied Chevron or a Chevron-like reasonableness standard. Although the study is limited to one area of law and to the workings of a single agency—and one of the most politically charged agencies at that—it offers fresh insight into how empirical analysis can be used to look beyond the black box of federal court statutory interpretation and Chevron deference to see what shapes judicial opinions in their review of agency statutory interpretations

Political Decision-Making at the National Labor Relations Board: An Empirical Examination of the Board\u27s Unfair Labor Practice Disputes through the Clinton and Bush II Years

Does partisan ideology influence the voting of members of multi-member adjudicatory bodies at “independent agencies”? In studying the federal circuit courts of appeals, scholars have found that results of cases vary depending upon the partisan composition of the particular panel hearing a case. Few scholars to date, however, have systematically studied whether partisan panel effects occur in administrative adjudication. In this Article, I explore the impact that partisan ideology and panel composition have on the vote choices of an administrative agency rumored to be one of the most partisan: the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”). Employing an original dataset of close to 3,000 NLRB decisions from the William Jefferson Clinton and the George W. Bush (“Bush II”) administrations (1993-2007), this Article presents one of the few recent studies of voting patterns at the NLRB on unfair labor practice disputes. I find that the propensity of a panel to reach a decision favoring labor increases monotonically with each additional Democrat added to the panel. I also find that the partisanship effect is generally asymmetric, meaning that the addition of a single Democrat to an otherwise Republican panel increases the propensity to vote in labor’s favor more so than the addition of a Republican to an otherwise Democratic panel. Homogenous Republican panels behave in especially partisan ways. I further find that political actors—such as Congress, the President, and the appellate courts—fail to have a direct impact on NLRB unfair labor practice decisions; rather, the decision of the lower court Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and the partisan ideology of the Board have the most impact in influencing whether the NLRB rules for or against labor. These findings have significant implications for a number of controversies, including debates about agency independence as well as questions concerning political diversity on agencies that have multi-member adjudicatory bodies who do all or primarily all of their work through adjudication as opposed to rulemaking