Gambling in Contests

This paper presents a strategic model of risk-taking behavior in contests. Formally, we analyze an n-player winner-take-all contest in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian Motion with drift. A player whose process reaches zero has to stop. The player with the highest stopping point wins. Contrary to the explicit cost for a higher stopping time in a war of attrition, here, higher stopping times are riskier, because players can go bankrupt. We derive a closed-form solution of the unique Nash equilibrium outcome of the game. In equilibrium, the trade-off between risk and reward causes a non-monotonicity: highest expected losses occur if the process decreases only slightly in expectation

A note on the Bethe ansatz solution of the supersymmetric t-J model

The three different sets of Bethe ansatz equations describing the Bethe ansatz solution of the supersymmetric t-J model are known to be equivalent. Here we give a new, simplified proof of this fact which relies on the properties of certain polynomials. We also show that the corresponding transfer matrix eigenvalues agree.Comment: 6 pages, Latex, contributed to the 12th Int. Colloquium on Quantum Groups and Integrable Systems, Prague, 200

Continuois Time Contests

This paper introduces a contest model in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift and incurs costs depending on his stopping time. The player who stops his process at the highest value wins a prize. Applications of the model include procurement contests and competitions for grants. We prove existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium outcome, even if players have to choose bounded stopping times. We derive the equilibrium distribution in closed form. If the noise vanishes, the equilibrium outcome converges to - and thus selects - the symmetric equilibrium outcome of an all-pay auction. For two players and constant costs, each player’s profits increase if costs for both players increase, variance increases, or drift decreases. Intuitively, patience becomes a more important factor for contest success, which reduces informational rents

Distributed Bio-inspired Humanoid Posture Control

This paper presents an innovative distributed bio-inspired posture control strategy for a humanoid, employing a balance control system DEC (Disturbance Estimation and Compensation). Its inherently modular structure could potentially lead to conflicts among modules, as already shown in literature. A distributed control strategy is presented here, whose underlying idea is to let only one module at a time perform balancing, whilst the other joints are controlled to be at a fixed position. Modules agree, in a distributed fashion, on which module to enable, by iterating a max-consensus protocol. Simulations performed with a triple inverted pendulum model show that this approach limits the conflicts among modules while achieving the desired posture and allows for saving energy while performing the task. This comes at the cost of a higher rise time.Comment: 2019 41st Annual International Conference of the IEEE Engineering in Medicine & Biology Society (EMBC

Integral representation of the density matrix of the XXZ chain at finite temperatures

We present an integral formula for the density matrix of a finite segment of the infinitely long spin-1/2 XXZ chain. This formula is valid for any temperature and any longitudinal magnetic field.Comment: 12 pages, Late

Benchmarking Utility-Scale PV Operational Expenses and Project Lifetimes: Results from a Survey of U.S. Solar Industry Professionals

This paper draws on a survey of solar industry professionals and other sources to clarify trends in the expected useful life and operational expenditure (OpEx) of utility-scale photovoltaic (PV) plants in the United States. Solar project developers, sponsors, long-term owners, and consultants have increased project-life assumptions over time, from an average of ~21.5 years in 2007 to ~32.5 years in 2019. Current assumptions range from 25 years to more than 35 years depending on the organization; 17 out of 19 organizations surveyed or reviewed use 30 years or more. Levelized, lifetime OpEx estimates have declined from an average of ~$35/kWDC-yr for projects built in 2007 to an average of ~$17/kWDC-yr in 2019. Across 13 sources, the range in average lifetime OpEx for projects built in 2019 is broad, from $13 to$25/kWDC-yr. Operations and maintenance (O&M) costs—one component of OpEx—have declined precipitously in recent years, to $5-8/kWDC-yr in many cases. Property taxes and land lease costs are highly variable across sites, but on average are—together—of similar magnitude. Other OpEx line items include security, insurance, and asset management. Given 2007-2009 values for not only project life and OpEx but also other drivers of the levelized cost of energy (LCOE, excluding the investment tax credit), the LCOE for utility-scale PV projects built from 2007 through 2009 averaged$305/MWh. Using 2019 values for all parameters yields an average LCOE of $51/MWh. The decline in LCOE from$305/MWh to $51/MWh was predominantly caused by reductions in up-front expenditures (and, to a much lesser extent, by changes in capacity factors, financing costs, and tax rates), but 9$22/MWh) of the overall decline is due to improvements in project life and OpEx. Project life extensions and OpEx reductions have had similarly sized impacts on LCOE over this period, at $11/MWh each. Had project life and OpEx not improved over the last decade, LCOE in 2019 would have instead been$73/MWh—43% higher. Given the limited quantity and comparability of previously available data on these cost drivers, the data and trends presented here may inform assumptions used by electric system planners, modelers, and analysts. The results may also provide useful benchmarks to the solar industry, helping developers and assets owners compare their expectations for project life and OpEx with those of their peers