Does Mole’s Argument That Cognitive Processes Fail to Suffice for Attention Fail?

Is attention a cognitive process? I reconstruct and critically assess an argument first proposed by Christopher Mole that it cannot be so. Mole’s argument is influential because it creates theoretical space for a unifying analysis of attention at the subject level (though it does not entail it). Prominent philosophers working on attention such as Wayne Wu and Philipp Koralus explicitly endorse it, while Sebastian Watzl endorses a related version, this despite their differing theoretical commitments. I show that Mole’s argument is invalid, amend it to secure its validity, but argue that it still fails. I consider the extent to which the failure of Mole’s argument spreads to the versions offered by Wu, Koralus and Watlz. Mole’s argument fails because it equivocates between the set of conditions that suffice for constituting attention and the subset of those conditions which are salient, but insufficient, for constituting it. Reflection on this distinction has consequences for the individuation not just of attentional processes but all cognitive processes

The Maximal Domain for the Revelation Principle when Preferences are Menu Dependent

We extend the domain of preferences to include menu-dependent preferences and characterize the maximal subset of this domain in which the revelation principle holds. Minimax-regret preference is shown to be outside this subset.microeconomics ;

Bargaining with Behavioral Players: Strategic Deception and More Trade

Previous literature proved the existence of an upper bound on the probability of trade in a bilateral trading problem when the valuations are distributed uniformly on [0,1]. This upper bound is achieved in the ½-double auction when the players play the Chatterjee-Samuelson strategies. We introduce behavioral-type players in a ½-double auction preceded by cheap talk. The behavioral-type players always declare a keenness to trade in the cheap-talk stage and play the Chatterjee-Samuelson strategies if they hear the “Keen” message. In equilibrium, the probability of trade between the strategic types increases monotonically as the probability of the behavioral types increases. If the probability of the behavioral types is high enough, the probability of trade between the strategic types is greater than the upper bound.microeconomics ;

How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining: Reconciling Theory with Evidence

Previous theoretical literature proved the existence of an upper bound on efficiency in bilateral bargaining. In contrast, experiments consistently find players obtaining higher efficiency than the upper bound if they are allowed to communicate before the 1/2-double auction. We bridge this gap between theory and experiments by introducing an epsilon proportion of behavioral-type players who always truthfully reveal their valuations and declare a keenness to trade before bidding in the 1/2-double auction. Preplay communication is used by the strategic types to communicate their "tougher'''' bargaining position, forcing the behavioral types to adopt a "weaker'''' position. This further induces the strategic types to decrease the shading/exaggeration in the announcement of their valuations lest they miss the chance to trade with the "weaker'''' behavioral types. As a result, for any epsilon>0, the efficiency in equilibrium is greater than the upper bound.microeconomics ;

CFTs in rotating black hole backgrounds

We use AdS/CFT to construct the gravitational dual of a 5D CFT in the background of a non-extremal rotating black hole. Our boundary conditions are such that the vacuum state of the dual CFT corresponds to the Unruh state. We extract the expectation value of the stress tensor of the dual CFT using holographic renormalisation and show that it is stationary and regular on both the future and the past event horizons. The energy density of the CFT is found to be negative everywhere in our domain and we argue that this can be understood as a vacuum polarisation effect. We construct the solutions by numerically solving the elliptic Einstein--DeTurck equation for stationary Lorentzian spacetimes with Killing horizons.Comment: 20 + 13 pages, 3 appendices. (Updated to match the content of published version. One extra appendix added.

Ex-Post Regret Learning in Games with Fixed and Random Matching: The Case of Private Values

In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning pro- cess based on ex-post regret as a guide to understand how to play games of incomplete information under private values. The conclusions depend on whether players interact within a fixed set (fixed matching) or they are ran- domly matched to play the game (random matching). The relevant long run predictions are minimal sets that are closed under “the same or better reply” operations. Under additional assumptions in each case, the prediction boils down to pure Nash equilibria, pure ex-post equilibria or pure minimax regret equilibria. These three paradigms exhibit nice robustness properties in the sense that they are independent of beliefs about the exogenous uncertainty of type spaces. The results are illustrated in second-price auctions, first-price auctions and Bertrand duopolies.Fixed and Random Matching; Incomplete Information; Ex-Post Regret Learning; Nash Equilibrium; Ex-Post Equilibrium; Minimax Regret

Whose Opinion Counts? Political Processes and the Implementation Problem

The mechanism used in Nash implementation is a form of direct democracy, taking everyone''s opinion into account. We augment this mechanism with a political process that selects the opinions of a subset of the individuals. We study three such processes -- oligarchy, oligarchic democracy and random sampling -- and compare the social choice rules (SCRs) that can be implemented using each of these processes with those that can be Nash implemented. In oligarchy, only the opinions of a fixed subset of the individuals -- the oligarchs -- determine the implemented alternative. We obtain a negative result for oligarchies: there exist Nash implementable SCRs that cannot be implemented by any oligarchy. Oligarchic democracy is a perturbation of oligarchy, in which the opinions of the oligarchs “almost always” determine the implemented alternative but sometimes, everyone''s opinions are considered. In a sharp contrast to the negative result for oligarchies, we show that in economic environments, every Nash implementable SCR can be implemented by an oligarchic democracy in which any three individuals act as oligarchs. In random sampling, opinions of a fixed number of individuals are selected randomly, which then determine the implemented alternative. We show that in economic environments, every Nash implementable SCR can be implemented by randomly sampling opinions of four individuals.microeconomics ;

Analysis of Spatial Cointegration amongst Major Wholesale Egg Markets in India

The performance of egg market has been studied through measurement of oneness in the egg markets. For this purpose, the Engle-Granger Cointegration test procedure has been applied to egg price series for major wholesale egg markets in the country, viz. Nammakal (Tamil Nadu), Calcutta, Chennai, Bangalore, Delhi and Hyderabad for the period 1982 to 2000. The study has indicated that the six major wholesale egg markets in the country are cointegrated apparently due to performance of market intelligence functions by the National Egg Coordination Committee (NECC) which helps in transmitting price signals across the length and breadth of the country through print media on day-to-day basis. The high degree of cointegration amongst various markets indicates that these markets are competitive and efficient at the wholesale levels. However, it still remains to be examined whether the poultry farmers and traders at the grass-root level are able to realize the prices declared by the NECC.Agribusiness, Marketing,