Asset Ownership and Contractability of Interaction

In a property-rights framework, I study how organizational form and quantity contracts interact in generating investment incentives. The model nests standard property-rights and hold-up models as special cases. I admit general message-dependent contracts, but provide conditions under which non-contingent contracts are optimal. First, I contribute to the foundation of the property-rights theory: I characterize under which circumstances its predictions are correct when trade is contractible. Second, I study how the optimal use of the incentive instruments depends on the environment. This is in the spirit of the multitasking literature. Finally, the model produces implications of the property-rights theory that are empirically testable.Property Rights, Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments

Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract

The present paper aims to contribute to the literature on the foundations of incomplete contracts by providing conditions under which simple delegation of authority is the solution to the complete-contracting problem of the parties. We consider a hold-up framework where both parties profit from an investment that raises the value of an asset. Delegation turns out to be optimal if (i) the decision-dependent parts of the payoffs of the parties are linear in the asset value, and (ii) decisions have no investment-independent effect. If overinvestment might be an issue, delegation, however, with restricted competencies is optimal if some additional continuity requirements are met.delegation, decentralization, authority, incomplete contracts, holdup, property rights

Black Sheep and Walls of Silence

In this paper we analyze the frequently observed phenomenon that (i) some members of a team (“black sheep”) exhibit behavior disliked by other (honest) team members, who (ii) nevertheless refrain from reporting such misbehavior to the authorities (they set up a “wall of silence”). Much cited examples include hospitals and police departments. In this paper, these features arise in equilibrium. An important ingredient of our model are benefits that agents receive when cooperating with each other in a team. Our results suggest that teams in which the importance of these benefits varies across team members are especially prone to the above mentioned phenomenon

Black Sheep and Walls of Silence

In this paper we analyze the frequently observed phenomenon that (i) some members of a team ("black sheep") exhibit behavior disliked by other (honest) team members, who (ii) nevertheless refrain from reporting such misbehavior to the authorities (they set up a "wall of silence"). Much cited examples include hospitals and police departments. In this paper, these features arise in equilibrium. An important ingredient of our model are benefits that agents receive when cooperating with each other in a team. Our results suggest that teams in which the importance of these benefits varies across team members are especially prone to the above mentioned phenomenonteams; misbehavior; wall of silence; asymmetric information

Black Sheep and Walls of Silence

In this paper we analyze the frequently observed phenomenon that (i) some members of a team (“black sheep”) exhibit behavior disliked by other (honest) team members, who (ii) nevertheless refrain from reporting such misbehavior to the authorities (they set up a “wall of silence”). Much cited examples include hospitals and police departments. In this paper, these features arise in equilibrium. An important ingredient of our model are benefits that agents receive when cooperating with each other in a team. Our results suggest that teams in which the importance of these benefits varies across team members are especially prone to the above mentioned phenomenon.teams, misbehavior, wall of silence, asymmetric information

A biophysical approach to large-scale protein-DNA binding data

About this book * Cutting-edge genome analysis methods from leading bioinformaticians An accurate description of current scientific developments in the field of bioinformatics and computational implementation is presented by research of the BioSapiens Network of Excellence. Bioinformatics is essential for annotating the structure and function of genes, proteins and the analysis of complete genomes and to molecular biology and biochemistry. Included is an overview of bioinformatics, the full spectrum of genome annotation approaches including; genome analysis and gene prediction, gene regulation analysis and expression, genome variation and QTL analysis, large scale protein annotation of function and structure, annotation and prediction of protein interactions, and the organization and annotation of molecular networks and biochemical pathways. Also covered is a technical framework to organize and represent genome data using the DAS technology and work in the annotation of two large genomic sets: HIV/HCV viral genomes and splicing alternatives potentially encoded in 1% of the human genome

Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal contracts may entail properties such as inducing first-best effort and surplus, or non-responsiveness with respect to changes in verifiable parameters. Moreover, while always socially inefficient, separation might occur in equilibrium. Except for the latter, these findings are robust to renegotiation. When the outside option is exogenous instead, the standard results obtain

Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal contracts may entail properties such as inducing first-best effort and surplus, or non-responsiveness with respect to changes in verifiable parameters. Moreover, while always socially inefficient, separation might occur in equilibrium. Except for the latter, these findings are robust to renegotiation. When the outside option is exogenous instead, the standard results obtain.moral hazard; limited commitment; ex-post outside option; limited liability

Herding with and without Payoff Externalities - An Internet Experiment

Most real world situations which are susceptible to herding are also characterized by direct payoff externalities. Yet, the bulk of the theoretical and experimental literature focuses on pure informational externalities. In this paper we study several different forms of payoff externalities that interact with a standard herding model. More than 6000 subjects, including a subsample of 267 consultants from an international consulting firm, participated in an internet experiment. We also replicate and review earlier cascade experiments. Finally, we study reputation effects in the context of herding.information cascades, herding, network effects, experiment, internet

Herding and Contrarian Behavior in Financial Markets - An Internet Experiment

We report results of an internet experiment designed to test the theory of informational cascades in financial markets. More than 6000 subjects, including a subsample of 267 consultants from an international consulting firm, participated in the experiment. As predicted by theory, we find that the presence of a flexible market price prevents herding. However, the presence of contrarian behavior, which can (partly) be rationalized via error models, distorts prices, and even after 20 decisions convergence to the fundamental value is rare. We also study the effects of transaction costs and the expectations of subjects with respect to future prices. Finally, we look at the behavior of various subsamples of our heterogeneous subject pool.herd behavior, informational cascades, contrarian investors, market efficiency, internet experiment