Time to Raise the Bar: The Real Corporate Social Responsibility Report for the Hershey Company

This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, Cornell University, pertaining to the effects of globalization on the workplace worldwide. Special emphasis is placed on labor rights, working conditions, labor market changes, and union organizing.ILRF_Time_to_Raise_the_Bar_Hershey.pdf: 2396 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020

Kajian pendahuluan Biotransformasi α-mangostin oleh jamur Penicillium sp Isolasi Metabolit Sekunder dari kultivar Serta Uji Aktivitas Antibakteri

Telah dilakukan penelitian pendahuluan biotransformasi α-mangostin oleh jamur endofitik Penicillium sp. yang diperoleh dari lichen Stereocaulon halei yang tumbuh pada bebatuan Gunung Singgalang yang dikultivasi pada media beras selama 21 hari, selanjutnya diekstrak berturut-turut dengan etil asetat dan metanol. Dengan menggunakan metoda kromatografi fasa normal silika gel dan dilanjutkan dengan metoda rekristalisasi dari fraksi etil asetat ini diperoleh senyawa Y1 berupa padatan amorf tidak bewarna 22.6 mg (0,001% dari berat kultivar), memberikan nilai Rf 0,58 dengan toluen:etil asetat:asam format (70:25:5) dan jarak leleh 129,9-133,1oC. Spektrum UV-VIS senyawa Y1 memperlihatkan maksimum (λ max) 282 nm. Dari data spektroskopi 1H dan 13C NMR, diperkirakan senyawa Y1 merupakan golongan diterpenoid. Uji daya hambat terhadap pertumbuhan bakteri senyawa Y1 dengan menggunakan metode difusi agar terlihat aktif menghambat pertumbuham empat bakteri patogen manusia Staphylococcus aureus ATCC, Pseudomonas aureginosa ATCC, Escherichia coli ATCC dan MRSA dengan aktivitas sedang dengan diameter hambat 5-10 mm pada semua konsentrasi (0,5%, 0,25% ; 0,1% ; dan 0,075%) Kata kunci : Biotransformasi, α-mangostin, Penicillium sp., antibakter

Leaders’ Foreign Travel and Foreign Investment Inflows

This paper examines the effect of foreign travel by the leader or the head of state on the ability of the country to attract foreign capital, as reflected by foreign direct investment inflows. The key difficulty in determining a causal effect is the issue of endogeneity. As much as the leader’s trips abroad may attract foreign capital inflows, it is also possible that leaders are tempted to visit countries known to have a high level of investment out of their borders. To deal with potential endogeneity, we introduce a novel instrumental variable. The instrument used is urban distance which is defined as the gap between the level of urban development in the country of the leader relative to that of the United States. The 2SLS shows that the leader’s trips variable, instrumented by urban distance, has a statistically significant negative coefficient. This is the case even after the inclusion of other control variables and after using alternative samples. This result implies that these costly trips by the leaders can crowd out spending on the infrastructure needed for foreign investment, and can signal lack of seriousness by the leaders in spending on the implementation of reforms needed to attract foreign capital

Leaders’ Foreign Travel and Foreign Debt

This paper examines the effect of foreign travel by the leader or the head of state to the United States on the ability of the country to attract foreign loans. The key difficulty in determining a causal effect is the issue of endogeneity. As much as the leader’s trips abroad may attract foreign loans, it is also possible that leaders are tempted to visit countries known to be major creditors. To deal with potential endogeneity, we introduce a novel instrumental variable for the number of leader’s trips. The instrument is urban distance defined as the gap between the level of urban development in the country of the leader relative to that in the United States. We conduct a 2SLS where the urban distance serves as a source of exogenous variation in leader’s trips. The estimation provides evidence of a statistically significant positive coefficient of leader’s trips. This result implies that these trips by the leaders signal to the creditors their commitment to use the borrowed funds properly and to repay these funds in due time. Our results are robust even after the inclusion of other control variable, using alternative samples, and accounting for the potential of instrument weakness

Leaders’ Foreign Travel and Democracy

This paper investigates whether the number of trips by a country's leader to the United States allows the country to adopt a more democratic system of governance and to embrace better democratic practices. To achieve its objective, the paper uses a novel variable that indicates the number of trips by a leader or a head of a government to the United States of America from 1960-2015. The baseline results show that the number of leaders’ trips to the United States has a statistically significant positive coefficient, which provides evidence that these foreign trips are positively associated with democratic governance. These results are robust even after the inclusion of several control variables identified by the literature as confounding factors of democracy, and after controlling for outliers

Leaders’ Foreign Travel and Democracy

This paper investigates whether the number of trips by a country's leader to the United States allows the country to adopt a more democratic system of governance and to embrace better democratic practices. To achieve its objective, the paper uses a novel variable that indicates the number of trips by a leader or a head of a government to the United States of America from 1960-2015. The baseline results show that the number of leaders’ trips to the United States has a statistically significant positive coefficient, which provides evidence that these foreign trips are positively associated with democratic governance. These results are robust even after the inclusion of several control variables identified by the literature as confounding factors of democracy, and after controlling for outliers

State History and State Fragility: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa

This paper examines the association between the length of experience with statehood, or state history, on the likelihood of state fragility. The argument is that the accumulation of knowledge by state personnel, and the build up of experience within state institutions, allows the state to avoid the exposure to recurrent crises, which is considered a symptom of weakness. The paper focuses on sub-Saharan African countries and uses Probit estimation techniques. The analysis shows that state history has a negative and statistically significant effect on the state fragility index. This result is robust after the inclusion of a variety of economic, political, institutional and historical variables. We also use extreme fragility as our dependent variable. The Probit and Relogit estimations also show a statistically significant negative effect of state history on extreme fragility. This is the case even after the inclusion of control variable

The Effect of U.S. Officials’ Visits on Conflict

This paper examines the effect of the number of visits by U.S. Presidents and Secretaries of State to the country on civil conflict. To achieve our objective, we compile novel variables that indicate the number of official visits from 1960-2017 derived from the historical archives of the U.S. State Department. To deal with potential endogeneity, we introduce novel instrumental variables for the number of official visits variables, namely aviation safety and capital distance. The 2SLS estimations provide evidence that the visits by U.S. officials to the country have a statistically significant positive effect on the onset of conflict. This indicates that the visits by U.S. officials induce the insurgents to engage in armed conflict with the incumbent government that is perceived as a stooge of the United States

The Effect of Leader’s Visits on Foreign Aid

This paper examines the effect of the number of visits by U.S. officials to a country, and the number of visits of the country’s leaders to the United States, on foreign aid. To achieve our objective, we compile novel variables that indicate the number of official visits from 1960-2015 from the historical archives of the U.S. State Department. To deal with potential endogeneity, we introduce novel instrumental variables for the official visits variables, namely aviation safety, capital distance, and urban distance. The 2SLS estimations provide evidence that the visits by the U.S. leaders to the country, and the visits of the country’s leaders to the United States, have a statistically significant negative effect on multilateral aid, but an insignificant effect on bilateral aid flows from the United States. This indicates that other donors take the visits by U.S. Presidents as a signal that the country does not need aid either due to the costly reception of the American dignitary or because they assume that the country will be able to secure aid from the U.S. and will be less in need of their assistance. This also indicates that the costly official visits by the country’s leadership to the United States cause the donors to become reluctant to provide aid as these types of expenditure send a negative signal that the country is not administering its finances adequately to avoid the need for aid

The Effect of Leader’s Visits on Foreign Aid

This paper examines the effect of the number of visits by U.S. officials to a country, and the number of visits of the country’s leaders to the United States, on foreign aid. To achieve our objective, we compile novel variables that indicate the number of official visits from 1960-2015 from the historical archives of the U.S. State Department. To deal with potential endogeneity, we introduce novel instrumental variables for the official visits variables, namely aviation safety, capital distance, and urban distance. The 2SLS estimations provide evidence that the visits by the U.S. leaders to the country, and the visits of the country’s leaders to the United States, have a statistically significant negative effect on multilateral aid, but an insignificant effect on bilateral aid flows from the United States. This indicates that other donors take the visits by U.S. Presidents as a signal that the country does not need aid either due to the costly reception of the American dignitary or because they assume that the country will be able to secure aid from the U.S. and will be less in need of their assistance. This also indicates that the costly official visits by the country’s leadership to the United States cause the donors to become reluctant to provide aid as these types of expenditure send a negative signal that the country is not administering its finances adequately to avoid the need for aid