The Strongly Symmetric Elements and Solutions of Yang-Baxter Equation

It is shown that all strongly symmetric elements are solutions of constant classical Yang-Baxter equation in Lie algebra, or of quantum Yang-Baxter equation in algebra. Otherwise, all solutions of constant classical Yang-Baxter equation (CYBE) in Lie algebra $L$ with dim $L \le 3$ over field $k$ of characteristic 2 are obtainedComment: 15page

Classical Yang-Baxter Equation and Low Dimensional Triangular Lie Bialgebras

All solutions of constant classical Yang-Baxter equation (CYBE) in Lie algebra $L$ with dim $L \le 3$ are obtained and the sufficient and necessary conditions which $(L, \hbox {[ ]}, \Delta_r, r)$ is a coboundary (or triangular) Lie bialgebra are given. The strongly symmetric elements in $L\otimes L$ are found and they all are solutions of CYBE in $L$ with $dim L \le 3$.Comment: 17page

Adjusting to Austrian Life

While still in the midst of their study abroad experiences, students at Linfield College write reflective essays. Their essays address issues of cultural similarity and difference, compare lifestyles, mores, norms, and habits between their host countries and home, and examine changes in perceptions about their host countries and the United States. In this essay, Natalie Michaelis describes her observations during her study abroad program at the Austro-American Institute of Education in Vienna, Austria

The economics of greenhouse gas accumulation: A simulation approach

This article investigates efficient policies against global warming in the case of multiple greenhouse gases. In a dynamic optimization model conditions for an efficient combination of greenhouse gases are derived. The model is empirically specified and adapted to a simulation approach. By various simulation runs, the economics of greenhouse gas accumulation are illuminated; and in particular, it is shown that a CO2-policy alone would most likely lead to an allocation far from efficiency. These results indicate, that policy measures against global warming should allow for substituting between different greenhouse gases. Such a policy would mainly affect the agricultural sector because livestock and intensive farming techniques contribute significantly to the emission of greenhouse gases.

Stabilising the global greenhouse: A simulation model

This paper investigates the economic implications of a comprehensive approach to greenhouse policies that strives to stabilise the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases at an ecologicaliy determined threshold level. In a theoretical optimisation model conditions for an efficient allocation of abatement effort among pollutants and over time are derived. The model is empirically speeified and adapted to a dynamic GAMS-algorithm. By various Simulation runs for the period of 1990 to 2110, the economics of greenhouse gas aecumulation are explored. In particular, the long-run cost associated with the above stabilisation target are evaluated for three different policy scenarios: i) a comprehensive approach that covers all major greenhouse gases simultaneously, ii) a piecemeal approach that is limited to reducing CO2 emissions, and iii) a tenyear moratorium that postpones abatcment effort until new scientific cvidence on the greenhouse effect will become available. Comparing the Simulation results suggests that a piecemeal approach would considerably increase total cost, whercas a ten-year moratorium might be reasonable even if the probability of 'good news' is comparatively small.

Regulate us, please!: On strategic lobbying in cournot-nash oligopoly

Empirical studies on industry lobbying sometimes reveal that certain firms within an industry behave atypically in that they promote cost driving regulations like, e.g., environmental standards. For analysing this phenomenon of 'strategic lobbying1, the present paper combines a heterogeneous Cournot-Nash oligopoly with a model of endogenous policy making where two parties compete for campaign contributions spent by the regulated industry. It is shown that the existence of potential regulation gains (and consequently the incentive for strategic lobbying activities) depends on the relationship between possible cost differentials and the market structure of the industry under consideration. Based on these results, the paper examines the effects of strategic lobbying for two different scenarios. The first scenario assumes that only one firm is engaged in lobbying, whereas the second scenario looks at simultaneous (competing) lobbying activities by several firms.

Optimal Monetary Policy in a Currency Union: The Role of the Cost Channel

In this paper we introduce the cost channel of monetary policy (e.g., Ravenna and Walsh, 2006) into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model of a two-country monetary union, which is being hit by aggregate, asymmetric and idiosyncratic shocks. The single central bank implements the optimal discretionary monetary policy by setting the union interest rate. The cost channel makes monetary policy less effective in combating in?action, but it is shown that the optimal response to the decline in effectiveness is a stronger use of the instrument. Moreover, we show how the sign of the spillover effects of idiosyncratic shocks depends on the strength of the cost channel. If the cost channel exceeds a well-defined threshold, then the interest rate turns into a supply-side instrument.cost channel; optimal monetary policy; monetary union; open economy macroeconomics

Incentives for Innovation in Pollution Control: Emission Standards Revisited

Conventional analysis of the economics of environmental policy usually claims that emission taxes induce a stronger incentive for an improvement in pollution abatement technologies compared to emission standards. In contrast, recent empirical studies reveal that there is no systematic relationship between improvements in pollution abatement technologies and the policy instrument chosen. The present paper tries to clarify this contradiction. In the first step the paper shows that the conventional model of innovation in pollution control under different policy regimes is deficient in at least two ways: It neglects policy impacts on the firms’ output level and it assumes a rather unrealistic type of emission standard. In the second step the paper presents a more elaborated model which tries to overcome these shortcomings. Using this model it is shown that the impact on innovation in pollution control caused by taxes and standards strongly depends on the scale of technical progress as well as on the cost structure of the firm under consideration such that there is no unique ranking of the two policies. Finally, the paper discusses the policy implications of these findings.emission standards, emission taxes, incentives to innovate

Managing waste exports when closure risks are endogenous

This paper provides a rationale for taxing waste exports when closure risks are endogenous in that they depend on the importing country's accumulated stock of waste. The paper shows that the optimal time path of waste exports requires a progressively increasing tax rate which even surmounts a Hotelling tax which tackles the problem by evaluating the expected closure stock.