Bypassing the Chain of Command: The Political Origins of the RCN’s Equipment Crisis of 1943

At the behest of Angus L. Macdonald, the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, John Joseph Connolly conducted a secret investigation in October 1943 into the state of equipment on Canadian warships. Connolly, who was Macdonald’s executive assistant, traveled to St. John’s, Londonderry and London where he discovered that the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) was far behind its allies in the modernization of its escort fleet. Canadian ships lacked gyroscopic compasses, hedgehog, effective radar and asdic, as well as other technical gear that was essential in the Battle of the Atlantic. These deficiencies should not have come as a surprise. Inadequate equipment on RCN ships had already become obvious during the intense convoy battles of 1941, and had been confirmed yet again by those of 1942. Insufficient training and manning policies also played their part in Canadian problems at sea. However, it was to be the technical aspects that Macdonald focused upon once Connolly returned from overseas, leading not only to a disruptive feud with the naval staff, but also, in their way, to the eventual replacement of Vice Admiral Percy W. Nelles as the Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) in January 1944

Best practice, best teaching

Keynote address discussing examples from my own, colleagues, and attendees practice. Conference participants worked in groups to share and build upon their existing teaching and learning strategies

Practical application of e-Learning

A 3 hour presentation to a group of 20 hairdressing tutors. Examples of technology used in hairdressing education from colleagues and my own practice were given. Participants discussed how they could incorporate technology into their own practice

The Great Naval Battle of North Point: Myth or Reality?

Hollywood itself could hardly have scripted a better battle. According to eyewitnesses, a German U-boat lurking off the shores of North Point, Prince Edward Island, laid a trap for an unsuspecting convoy transitting the Northumberland Strait. On 7 May 1943, the trap was sprung, Canadian naval escorts and aircraft did their best to defend the beleaguered convoy from a brazen and unorthodox attack that was unlike any other. There could only be one conclusion: the German commander was half-mad. Just like the fictional Captain Ahab, he was willing to take unwarranted risks with his boat and men to destroy his white whale that came in the form of a troop ship at the centre of the convoy. His obsession led to a stunning three hour engagement that was brought to a dramatic end as the Canadians scored a direct hit forcing the U-boat’s bow to rise sharply out of the water before sinking. The problem is that there is no evidence that this battle ever took place

Building an evaluative culture for effective evaluation and results management

A weak evaluative culture undermines many attempts at building an effective evaluation and results management regime. This brief outlines practical actions that an organization can take to build and support an evaluative culture, where information on performance is deliberately sought in order to learn how to better manage and deliver programmes and services. Such an organization values empirical evidence on the results it is seeking to achieve.evaluation, culture, Agricultural and Food Policy, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,