Description of tool clamping interface at milling machines

Táto práca sa zaoberá spôsobmi upínania nástrojov vo frézovacích strojoch. Je v nej obsiahnuté základné rozdelenie nástrojových upínačov a sú v nej popísané možné spôsoby upínania nástrojových upínačov vo vretene obrábacieho stroja. V nadväznosti na to sa zaoberá aj spôsobmi upínania malých frézovacích nástrojov.This thesis discusses the ways of clamping tools into milling machines. It is contained basic toolholders and discribes possible types of clamping toolholders into tool spindle, as well as dealing with the options of clamping small milling tools.

The transcriptional architecture of phenotypic dimorphism

The profound differences between the sexes in gene expression are increasingly used to study the molecular basis of sexual dimorphism, sexual selection and sexual conflict . Studies of transcriptional architecture, based on comparisons of gene expression, have been implemented on a wide variety of other intra - specific variation. These efforts are based on key assumptions regarding the relationship between transcriptional architecture, phenotypic variation and the target of selection. Some of these assumptions are better supported by available evidence than others. In all cases, the evidence is largely circumstantial, leaving considerable gaps in our understanding of the relationship between transcriptional and phenotypic dimorphism

Implementing Rapanos - Will Justice Kennedy\u27s Significant Nexus Test Provide a Workable Standard for Lower Courts, Regulators and Developers?

In 2001, the Supreme Court in SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers held that the Corps lacked authority under the 1972 Clean Water Act to regulate wetlands isolated from navigable waters. The Court held that the CWA\u27s jurisdiction is limited to non-navigable waters that have a significant nexus to navigable waters. SWANCC did not address the Corps\u27 regulation of wetlands near non-navigable tributaries. The courts of appeals are divided over if the Corps may regulate tributary wetlands. Mank, The Murky Future of the Clean Water Act After SWANCC, 30 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY 811-891 (2003). In 2006, the Supreme Court in United States v. Rapanos addressed the question of jurisdiction over tributary wetlands. The Court fractured into a four to one to four blocs, although a majority of five agreed to vacate and remand the two cases. Justice Scalia wrote a plurality opinion that would have sharply restricted CWA jurisdiction to only those waters that are relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing or to wetlands that have a physical surface water connection to these waters. The plurality opinion relied heavily on dictionary definitions, but ignored scientific evidence about the importance of intermittent waters. The plurality harshly criticizes the expense of Corps regulations without giving any weight to the value of the wetland resources they protect. Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion would have upheld the Corps\u27 broad jurisdiction over tributary wetlands because of their ecological significance and in deference to the Corps\u27 30-year-old regulations. The dissent failed, however, to acknowledge SWANCC\u27s underlying philosophy that a connection to navigable waters still has some importance in defining the Act\u27s jurisdiction. The key opinion was Justice Kennedy\u27s lone opinion concurring in the judgment. He concluded that the CWA\u27s jurisdiction reached waters and wetlands with a significant nexus to actually navigable waters. Justice Kennedy had to remain true to SWANCC\u27s underlying principle that the Act is limited to waters that have some meaningful connection to navigable waters, but he took the broad view that ecological connections may be significant, not just actual hydrological connections. His choice of the significant nexus language as the basis for his new jurisdictional test is reasonable because commentators and several lower courts had recognized that it provided the best test for applying the Court\u27s precedent in Riverside Bayview and SWANCC to cases involving tributary wetlands. Justice Kennedy appropriately took a middle position that was closer to the purposivist dissenting opinion than the textualist plurality opinion. There is disagreement about which opinions in Rapanos are binding on lower courts. Some argue the holding is where the plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy agree and that lower courts may not consider the dissenting opinion. Others argue lower courts may consider the numerous points upon which the dissenting opinion and Justice Kennedy\u27s opinion form a five vote majority. The Department of Justice (DOJ) agrees with Justice Stevens\u27 dissent that the government should have jurisdiction over wetlands if the wetlands at issue meet either the plurality\u27s test or Justice Kennedy\u27s significant nexus standard. This article argues that at least six circuits will follow Justice Kennedy\u27s significant nexus standard, although the Fifth Circuit is likely to adopt an approach closer to Justice Scalia\u27s test. The Corps and EPA (the agencies) have promised to issue new joint guidance in the near future to address the scope of the Act in the wake of Rapanos, but it is unclear whether the agencies will issue detailed regulations in this area. After SWANCC, the agencies tried to develop new regulations, but were unable to reach consensus. Because of strong public pressure, the agencies will likely produce new guidance addressing Rapanos. Under the significant nexus test, the agencies will likely retain jurisdiction over most, but not all, tributary wetlands. It is less likely that Congress will be able to achieve sufficient consensus to pass legislation defining the Act\u27s jurisdiction

Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the Endangered Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause

After the Supreme Court decided Lopez, a number of commentators speculated about its impact on the Endangered Species Act. This Article reexamines the issue in light of Morrison and SWANCC. Part V demonstrates that, even after Lopez, Morrison, and SWANCC, the Commerce Clause reaches federal regulation of intrastate endangered or threatened species because conservation of such species has traditionally been a shared federal and state function that recognizes the legitimacy of federal regulation whenever the need for preservation is great and states have failed to address important conservation issues. Additionally, Part V shows federal regulation of endangered or threatened species does not undermine states\u27 traditional role in regulating non-threatened species. Finally, Part VI establishes that the preservation of endangered or threatened species serves long-range national economic interests in preserving biodiversity and potentially valuable genetic material that deserve deference from courts even though their exact value is unascertainable at present. Applying a rational basis test, Part VI concludes that courts should defer to Congress\u27 goal of preserving our genetic and biological heritage as a reasonable policy substantially advancing America\u27s long-term commercial goals. In light of their concurring opinion in Lopez and support for protection of endangered species on private lands in Sweet Home, Justices O\u27Connor and Kennedy may provide key swing votes if the Court is to take a more deferential approach to federal regulation of intrastate endangered species under the Commerce Clause

Book Review, David R. Boyd, The Right to a Healthy Environment, Revitalizing Canada\u27s Constitution

Boyd’s new book, The Right to a Healthy Environment, attempts to prove that Canadians would benefit if they amended their constitution to recognize the right to a healthy environment. Throughout this work, he emphasizes the general benefits of recognizing environmental rights as human rights and the positive impact recognizing these rights in the Canadian constitution would have on the lives of Canadian citizens. He examines the gradual domestic emergence of environmental rights both in Canadian law and from a global perspective. By including both viewpoints, Boyd attempts to identify the complexities and intricate questions that arise regarding various environmental issues both at local and global levels. He asserts that the environmental rights of today will affect future generations and encourages Canadians to think of what they will be passing on to their children

Prudential Standing Doctrine Abolished or Waiting for a Comeback?: Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.

In the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., Justice Scalia writing for a unanimous Court partially achieved his goal of abolishing the prudential standing doctrine. First, the Court concluded that the zone of interests test concerns whether Congress has authorized a particular plaintiff to sue and is not a prudential standing question despite several Court decisions classifying it as such. However, there is a continuing controversy in the D.C. Circuit about applying the test to suits by competitors, especially in environmental cases. The better approach is to allow competitor standing in at least some environmental cases because even self-interested suits may advance the environmental purposes of the applicable statutes. Second, the Court held that its limitations on “generalized grievances” suits is based on constitutional Article III standing requirements and not the prudential standing principles relied in some of the Court’s previous cases. Yet it is not clear that treating limitations on “generalized grievances” as Article III standing requirements will preclude taxpayer suits, voting rights cases or climate change litigation, especially if the Court’s composition changes. Finally, the Court did not resolve the issue of whether limitations on third-party standing are based on prudential standing or other grounds. If the Court precludes third-party suits, however, it should recognize that some challengers have a sufficient personal Article III injury in protecting the various constitutional rights at issue in those cases, although the differing circumstances in various third-party standing cases likely preclude a single easy rule. Justice Scalia in theory eliminated two of the three major prongs of prudential standing endorsed by the Court in a 2004 decision. However, a more liberal future Supreme Court might be able to revive prudential standing in practice, if not name, without overruling Lexmark

The Supreme Court Acknowledges Congress’ Authority to Confer Informational Standing in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins

The Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins does not fully resolve when an intangible injury such as a defendant’s misreporting of a plaintiff’s personal information is sufficient to constitute a “concrete injury” for Article III standing. However, the Spokeo decision makes clear that Congress has a significant role in defining intangible injuries for Article III standing beyond what was considered an injury under the American or English common law. Some commentators had thought Spokeo might overrule the Court’s prior decisions in Akins and Public Citizen, which both held that a plaintiff may have standing based solely upon his statutory right to information. Instead, the Court in Spokeo reaffirmed its informational standing decisions in Akins and Public Citizen

Data Breaches, Identity Theft and Article III Standing: Will the Supreme Court Resolve the Split in the Circuits

In data breach cases, the lower federal courts have split on the question of whether the plaintiffs meet Article III standing requirements for injury and causation. In its 2013 decision Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Supreme Court, in a case involving alleged electronic surveillance by the U.S. government’s National Security Agency, declared that a plaintiff alleging that it will suffer future injuries from a defendant’s allegedly improper conduct must show that such injuries are “certainly impending.” Since the Clapper decision, a majority of the lower federal courts addressing “lost data” or potential identity theft cases in which there is no proof of actual misuse or fraud have held that plaintiffs lack standing to sue the party who failed to protect their data. But a significant minority of lower court decisions have disagreed that the Clapper decision requires denial of standing in data breach cases in which there is no proof of present harm because a footnote in Clapper acknowledged that the Court had sometimes used a less strict “substantial risk” test when plaintiffs allege that a defendant’s actions increase their risk of future harm. Demonstrating its concern for digital privacy, the Court in Riley v. California recently required police to obtain a Fourth Amendment warrant before examining the digital data on the cell phones of arrested suspects. It would be easy for courts to distinguish the government’s seizure of digital data from arrestee’s in Riley from a third party’s hacking of data from a retailer or employer. The Riley decision involves Fourth Amendment warrant issues that are not relevant to private data breach cases. Yet in both cell phone seizure cases and data breach cases, there is the common concern that vast amounts of personal data are often at stake. The new privacy concerns in a digital age should lead the Supreme Court to take a broader view of standing in data breach cases. It is also possible that the Court will follow the Seventh Circuit’s Remijas decision to distinguish between cases where there is only a possible risk of theft from those where actual harm has occurred to some plaintiffs

What Comes after Technology: Using an Exceptions Process to Improve Residual Risk Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants

Section 112 of the Clean Air Act (the Act) governs the regulation of hazardous air pollutants. From 1970 to 1990, the statute required the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate hazardous air pollutants on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis. Environmental policy analysts generally acknowledge that this approach failed due to scientific uncertainties and unclear direction from Congress on how the EPA should balance the competing concerns of cost and safety. In an effort to improve the Act\u27s effectiveness, Congress passed the 1990 Amendments (the Amendments) to the Act, which established a two-phased approach to regulation. First, subsection 112(d) requires the EPA to promulgate technology-based emission standards for categories and subcategories of industries that are major or area sources of 189 specified hazardous air pollutants. Because Congress was concerned that these controls would not eliminate all emissions posing unacceptable health risks to exposed populations, subsection 112(f) then requires the EPA to determine for each category or subcategory of industries whether more stringent emission standards should be promulgated to control residual risks. Given the previously slow pace of regulation, Congress was probably right to emphasize speed and scope, rather than stringency and health, in requiring the EPA to promulgate national, uniform technology-based regulations for categories and subcategories of industries. The residual risk provisions in subsection 112 (f), however, provide only vague guidelines for the EPA to follow in establishing health-based standards after the technologybased approach is in place. In fact, the residual risk provisions adopt essentially the same approach to health-based regulation that failed in the pre-1990 version of the statute. Subsection 112(f) requires the EPA to examine the cancer risk of individual facilities in determining whether the agency must promulgate residual risk standards, but then requires the agency to issue such standards for a category or subcategory of industry rather than for the individual facilities. This Article proposes establishing an exceptions process to exempt individual facilities from both the categorical technologybased standards in subsection 112(d) and the residual risk standards in subsection 112 (f). Under this approach, a firm could apply for a variance from either type of standard following a sitespecific risk assessment that demonstrates that (a) the costs of the standard are disproportionate to the benefits, and that (b) there is not an unacceptable risk to surrounding residents. At the same time, this approach would enable citizens to request a more stringent standard for an individual facility upon proof that the existing standards inadequately control the health risks presented by the facility

Should States Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA\u27s New Standing Test for States

In Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007), the Supreme Court held that carbon dioxide (CO²) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) are air pollutants within the meaning of the Clean Air Act (CAA). Although its decision on the merits is important, the Court\u27s conclusion that Massachusetts had standing to file suit because states are entitled to more lenient standing criteria may have a greater impact in the long-term on legal doctrine. In Massachusetts, the Supreme Court for the first time clearly gave greater standing rights to states than ordinary citizens. The Court, however, failed to explain to what extent or when states are entitled to more lenient standing. This Article proposes that courts relax the immediacy and redressability prongs of the standing test when states bring parens patriae suits to protect their quasi-sovereign interest in the health, welfare and natural resources of their citizens. This proposed standing test would be similar to the relaxed standing test for procedural rights plaintiffs but is based on the Court\u27s historic parens patriae decisions. The Court stated that [i]t is of considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a sovereign State and not...a private individual. The Court contended that the Court in its 1907 decision in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. had recognized that States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction. In Tennessee Copper and several other cases, the court had recognized a special standing doctrine of parens patriae standing to allow states to protect certain quasi-sovereign interests including the health, welfare or natural resources of its citizens. The Court concluded that Massachusetts\u27 well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory today gave it standing to invoke federal jurisdiction Justice Stevens concluded that the Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis. This Article concludes that the Court has historically given states preferential status in federal courts when a state files a parens patriae suit based on the state\u27s quasi-sovereign interest in the health and welfare of its citizens or the natural resources of its inhabitants and territory. There are sound reasons to apply lesser standing requirements to enable states to protect their quasi-sovereign interest in the health and welfare of their citizens or the natural resources of its inhabitants and territory. Chief Justice Roberts\u27 dissenting opinion is correct on many details, but fails to understand that the theoretical grounds for parens patriae standing also support a more relaxed standing test for states. A quasi-sovereign interest is inherently less concrete and particularized than the type of injuries that individual citizens need for standing, yet the Court has allowed states standing to protect their general interest in their citizens\u27 health and welfare. Although it is not technically a standing case, Tennessee Copper is based on the fundamental distinction that states have different and greater rights than individual citizens. Thus, the Massachusetts majority correctly used the Court\u27s parens patriae decisions as the basis for giving states preferential access to federal courts even though none of the parens patriae cases had explicitly applied a lower standing threshold for states. The Tennessee Copper decision and other parens patriae cases justify a similar relaxation of the immediacy and redressability requirements for states filing parens patriae suits. By using and refining the Court\u27s procedural rights standing test as a model, this Article proposes a workable standing test for states