Northern Mali: the things we assume

Events have developed quickly these last days and weeks in Mali, as fast as an all terrain vehicle can drive in the sand, basically. And although electronic media can go faster than four wheel drives, they can only go as fast as the rumours they feed on. Elsewhere, I have argued that in following events in the Sahara, everything is shrouded in a haze of dust. Nothing is known with certainty, all depends on rumour and a form of hearsay known as ‘the Tuareg telegraph’ that can only be interpreted with deep inside knowledge of the Saharan world.[1] I shall be honest, I can no longer rightly claim to have that deep inside knowledge, it is too long ago since I was last in the Azawad.[2] But the same goes for the vast majority of journalists and Sahara watchers now active, which leads me to plead here for extreme prudence in the analysis of the current situation in Northern Mali, a prudence that is often ignored in favour of tempting speculations. Here I would like to address a few of these pieces of speculative analysis with the single goal of asking for more prudence because precipitous judgements can have grave consequences for the future denouement of the conflict

Mali: how bad can it get?

From dusk till late evening, you can find small groups of young people sitting on street corners, in front of houses, or in courtyards across West Africa. There will inevitably be a little radio, playing music and broadcasting news. The ‘junior’ of the group is busy brewing and passing round small glasses of tea, while the others hang out, play cards, and discuss the news they hear, whether it comes from Radio France Internationale or sidewalk radio. In Mali, such a group is called a grin. Below, a virtual grin, a group chat among five researchers discussing the news on Mali, from wherever it comes

The Tuareg: between armed uprising and drought

he recent Tuareg uprising in Mali under the banner of the MNLA has raised concerns over stability and safety in the region, with much attention focussed on the Libya and AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) ‘connections’. The framing of the conflict in terms of international security and political (in)stability elsewhere obscures the causes, considerations and implications on a local level. Here we will try to discuss the conflict from a Tuareg perspective, estimating the impact of local, international and national concerns on the chances for peace or lasting conflict

Will the Kyoto Protocol affect growth in Russia?

In light of the recent argument that rapid economic growth in Russia over the next decade, might result in emissions higher than the Kyoto target, thereby putting much-needed growth at risk, the authors revisit the discussion on the costs and benefits of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by Russia. They conclude that even under a very high economic growth assumption, and even under very conservative assumptions about the decoupling between carbon dioxide emissions, and economic growth, Russia still benefits from a net surplus of emissions allowances, and thus will not see its growth adversely affected by the Kyoto target. In addition, a review of the possible costs, and benefits of the Kyoto Protocol suggests that the potential sale of excess allowances, far outweighs the other costs.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Global Environment Facility,Climate Change,Montreal Protocol,Climate Change,Energy and Environment,Environmental Economics&Policies,Montreal Protocol,Carbon Policy and Trading

Climate change and the economics of targeted mitigation in sectors with long-lived capital stock

Mitigation investments in long-lived capital stock (LLKS) differ from other types of mitigation investments in that, once established, LLKS can lock-in a stream of emissions for extended periods of time. Moreover, historical examples from industrial countries suggest that investments in LLKS projects or networks tend to be lumpy, and tend to generate significant indirect and induced emissions besides direct emissions. Looking forward, urbanization and rapid economic growth suggest that similar decisions about LLKS are being or will soon be made in many developing countries. In their current form, carbon markets do not provide correct incentives for mitigation investments in LLKS because the constraint on carbon extends only to 2012, and does not extend to many developing countries. Targeted mitigation programs in regions and sectors in which LLKS is being built at rapid rate are thus necessary to avoid getting locked into highly carbon-intensive LLKS. Even if the carbon markets were extended (geographically, sectorally, and over time), public intervention would still be required, for three main reasons. First, to ensure that indirect and induced emissions associated with LLKS are taken into account in investor’s financial cost-benefit analysis. Second, to facilitate project or network financing to bridge the gap between carbon revenues that accrue over time as the project/network unfolds and the capital needed upfront to finance lumpy investments. Third, to internalize other non-carbon externalities (e.g., local pollution) and/or to lift barriers (e.g., lack of capacity to handle new technologies) that penalize the low-carbon alternatives relative to the high-carbon ones.Transport Economics Policy&Planning,Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases,Climate Change Economics,Energy Production and Transportation,Energy and Environment

How might climate change affect economic growth in developing countries ? a review of the growth literature with a climate lens

This paper reviews the empirical and theoretical literature on economic growth to examine how the four components of the climate change bill, namely mitigation, proactive (ex ante) adaptation, reactive (ex post) adaptation, and ultimate damages of climate change affect growth, especially in developing countries. The authors consider successivelythe Cass-Koopmans growth model and three major strands of the subsequent literature on growth: with multiple sectors, with rigidities, and with increasing returns. The paper finds that although the growth literature rarely addresses climate change per se, some issues discussed in the growth literature are directly relevant for climate change analysis. Notably, destruction of production factors, or decrease in factor productivity may strongly affect long-run equilibrium growth even in one-sector neoclassical growth models; climatic shocks have had large impacts on growth in developing countries because of rigidities; and the introducing increasing returns has a major impact on growth dynamics, in particular through induced technical change, poverty traps, or lock-ins. Among the most important gaps identified in the literature are lack of understanding of the channels by which shocks affect economic growth, lack of understanding of lock-ins, heavy reliance of numerical models assessing climate policies on neoclassical-type growth frameworks, and frequent use of an inappropriate"without climate change"counterfactual.Economic Growth,Economic Theory&Research,Climate Change,Achieving Shared Growth,Population Policies

Optimal use of carbon sequestration in a global climate change strategy : is there a wooden bridge to a clean energy future ?

s. Whether it should be part of a global climate mitigation strategy, however, remains controversial. One of the key issues is that, contrary to emission abatement, carbon sequestration might not be permanent. But some argue that even temporary sequestration is beneficial as it delays climate change impacts and"buys"time for technical change in the energy sector. To rigorously assess these arguments, the authors build an international optimization model in which both sequestration and abatement can be used to mitigate climate change. They confirm that permanent sequestration, if feasible, can be overall part of a climate mitigation strategy. When permanence can be guaranteed, sequestration is equivalent to fossil-fuel emissions abatement. The optimal use of temporary sequestration, on the other hand, depends mostly on marginal damages of climate change. Temporary sequestration projects starting now, in particular, are not attractive if marginal damages of climate change at current concentration levels are assumed to be low.Montreal Protocol,Environmental Economics&Policies,Climate Change,Economic Theory&Research,Global Environment Facility,Energy and Environment,Environmental Economics&Policies,Montreal Protocol,Carbon Policy and Trading,Climate Change

Balancing expenditures on mitigation of and adaptation to climate change : an exploration of Issues relevant to developing countries

Although climate policies have been so far mostly focused on mitigation, adaptation to climate change is a growing concern in developed and developing countries. This paper discusses how adaptation fits into the global climate strategy, at the global and national levels. To do so, a partial equilibrium optimization model of climate policies-which includes mitigation, proactive adaptation (ex ante), and reactive adaptation (ex post)-is solved without and with uncertainty. Mitigation, proactive adaptation, and reactive adaptation are found to be generally jointly determined. Uncertainty on the location of damages reduces the benefits of"targeted"proactive adaptation with regard to mitigation and reactive adaptation. However, no single country controls global mitigation policies, and budget constraints might make it difficult for developing countries to finance reactive adaptation, especially if climate shocks affect the fiscal base. Rainy-day funds are identified as a supplemental instrument that can alleviate future budget constraints while avoiding the risk of misallocating resources when the location of damages is uncertain.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Educational Sciences,Disability,Social Inclusion&Institutions

International climate regime beyond 2012 - are quota allocation rules robust to uncertainty?

Bringing the United States and major developing countries to control their greenhouse gas emissions will be the key challenge for the international climate regime beyond the Kyoto Protocol. But in the current quantity-based coordination, large uncertainties surrounding future emissions and future abatement opportunities make the costs of any commitment very difficult to assess ex ante, hence a strong risk that the negotiation will be stalled. The authors use a partial equilibrium model of the international allowance market to quantify the economic consequences of the main post-Kyoto quota allocation rules proposed in the literature and to assess how robust these consequences are to uncertainty on future population, economic, and emissions growth. They confirm that, regardless of the rule selected, the prices of allowances and the net costs of climate mitigation for all parties are very sensitive to uncertainty, and in some scenarios very large. This constitutes a strong barrier against adopting any of these schemes if no additional mechanism is introduced to limit the uncertainty on costs. On the other hand, parties'preferred (least-cost) rules are essentially robust to uncertainty. And although these preferences differ across countries, the authors'analysis suggest some bargaining is possible if developing countries make a commitment and join the allowance market earlier in exchange for tighter quotas in the North. This underscores the importance of the rules governing the entry of new parties into the coordination. But the magnitude of the win-win potential strongly depends on how different abatement costs are assumed to be between industrial and developing countries, and on how long that gap is assumed to persist.Montreal Protocol,Climate Change,Global Environment Facility,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Climate Change,Energy and Environment,Carbon Policy and Trading,Montreal Protocol