he recent Tuareg uprising in Mali under the banner of the MNLA has raised concerns over stability and safety in the region, with much attention focussed on the Libya and AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) ‘connections’. The framing of the conflict in terms of international security and political (in)stability elsewhere obscures the causes, considerations and implications on a local level. Here we will try to discuss the conflict from a Tuareg perspective, estimating the impact of local, international and national concerns on the chances for peace or lasting conflict

Belalimat, Nadia

Lecocq, Baz

English

Ghent University Academic Bibliography

03-03-12 17:46The Tuareg: between armed uprising and drought – Baz Lecocq and Nadia Belalimat | African ArgumentsPagina 1 van 17http://africanarguments.org/2012/02/28/the-tuareg-between-armed-uprising-and-drought-baz-lecocq-and-nadia-belalimat/37tweetsretweetHomeABOUT AFRICAN ARGUMENTS »The SSRCThe RASBlogs » »Contact usThe Tuareg: between armeduprising and drought – BazLecocq and Nadia BelalimatFebruary 28, 2012Tuareg rebels in Northern Mali - themilitary element of a nationalistresponse to the region's problems.The recent Tuareg uprising in Mali under the banner of the MNLA has28Share03-03-12 17:46The Tuareg: between armed uprising and drought – Baz Lecocq and Nadia Belalimat | African ArgumentsPagina 2 van 17http://africanarguments.org/2012/02/28/the-tuareg-between-armed-uprising-and-drought-baz-lecocq-and-nadia-belalimat/raised concerns over stability and safety in the region, with muchattention focussed on the Libya and AQIM (Al Qaeda in the IslamicMaghreb) ‘connections’. The framing of the conflict in terms ofinternational security and political (in)stability elsewhere obscures thecauses, considerations and implications on a local level. Here we will try todiscuss the conflict from a Tuareg perspective, estimating the impact oflocal, international and national concerns on the chances for peace orlasting conflict.The Tuareg fighters are the masters of high-speed long-distancemotorised guerrilla warfare, a tactic with which they have repeatedlydefeated the Malian Armed Forces and which was subsequently adopted byAQIM. To regain the advantage, the U.S. employed aerial combat unitsagainst AQIM, while the Malian Army has invested in areal combatprecisely to better deal with Tuareg insurgency. The possible introductionof ground-to-air missiles, brought into Mali by Tuareg fighters returningfrom the Libyan conflict, would mean a loss of the tactical advantage forboth the U.S. and Malian armed forces. The return of Malian Tuaregfighters from Libya, and the concern over these missiles, explains therapid militarization of northern Mali in the past months, which enhancedchances of renewed military conflict.To properly understand the shifting dynamics of this conflict, it isnecessary to understand the different positions taken by Tuareg factions inNorthern Mali: the Tuareg and Arab fighters who were integrated into theMalian Armed Forces as the outcome of previous peace processes, as wellas the fighters who returned from Libya in late 2011. Part of the last grouphas been voluntarily integrated in to the Malian army, while others havejoined the MNLA. A number of high ranking Tuareg officers in the Malianarmy and their Tuareg rank and file however remain loyal Malian soldiers.Regardless of its claims, the MNLA does not represent a politically unitedTuareg people. While some Tuareg make use of Malian state support onlyfor pragmatic purposes, others have always felt fully part of Mali. Thereare many Malian civil servants and politicians of Tuareg origin. But therecent sacking of prominent Tuareg politicians’ residences in Bamako,(mostly former government members), and their subsequent flightabroad, are further proof to most Tuareg that they are not seen as fullMalian citizens.The recent fighting in Northern Mali thus positions Tuareg forces of theMNLA against Tuareg and Arabs in the Malian Army. These positions03-03-12 17:46The Tuareg: between armed uprising and drought – Baz Lecocq and Nadia Belalimat | African ArgumentsPagina 3 van 17http://africanarguments.org/2012/02/28/the-tuareg-between-armed-uprising-and-drought-baz-lecocq-and-nadia-belalimat/reflect power relations internal to Northern Mali that must be taken intoperspective. The current inter-community violence will complicate theconflict in ways the Malian Government will undoubtedly be able to exploit,just as it has done in the past. Since the outbreak of the latest round ofconflict in 2006, the Malian government has changed its strategic alliancesin the north toward a coalition of Tuareg and Arab tribes, making use ofinternal struggles for political dominance within Tuareg society. This willinevitably prolong the conflict and raise the death toll.As for the presence of missiles in the region: while Tuareg rebels avoidedurban combat in the past, the MNLA now targets cities in the north, in thehope that the Malian army will not deploy its attack helicopters and thusavoid civilian casualties. The fighting in Ménaka has proven this tacticpartly successful, the bloody assault on Aguelhoc had disastrous effects.The consequences for MNLA support remain to be seen. The continued useof areal combat units by the Malian armed forces, with no news of thesebeing taken down by the MNLA, sheds doubt on the actual presence ofground-to-air missiles in the area.More important than military tactical explanations however are politicalones. The MNLA, (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), is anationalist movement. It is the most recent incarnation of the Tuareg wishfor national independence, built on a centuries old awareness of Tuaregsocio-political coherence as a people. This had first been formallyexpressed in demands for independence during decolonisation in the late1950s, then again in violent rebellion in the 1960s. It was politicallyreformulated in the 1970s and 1980s, and reshaped into a new militaryuprising and political negotiation in the 1990s and 2000!s. Now it resurgesin ever more clearly nationalist terms.The media focus on AQIM and former Libyan military in the MNLA hidesthe far more important participation of a large group of young mediasavvy Tuareg, some of whom are educated in Libya or The Gulf states.These founded the National Movement of the Azawad (MNA) in late 2010,to address the various crises facing Northern Mali. The arrest of theirleadership after the founding meeting in Timbuktu, the violent policerepression of their demonstrations, and the lack of recognition of themovement from Bamako, has led them to connect with other elements toform the MNLA. Undoubtedly inspired by the independence of South Sudanlast year, they use the language of international human rights andindigenous people’s rights to formulate the MNLA’s demands for nationalindependence to be decided by referendum. Their participation means that03-03-12 17:46The Tuareg: between armed uprising and drought – Baz Lecocq and Nadia Belalimat | African ArgumentsPagina 4 van 17http://africanarguments.org/2012/02/28/the-tuareg-between-armed-uprising-and-drought-baz-lecocq-and-nadia-belalimat/Tuareg nationalist aspirations have firmly taken root in a new generation,proving the viability of the idea.To those who believe in it, and the members of the MNLA do, nationalindependence is the rational answer to the complex problems besettingthe Tuareg. Some form of recognition of the national aspirations of theTuareg needs to be made for peace negotiations to have a chance.Decades of intermittent fighting, renegotiations, reopening of hostilitiesand resultant insecurity have proved this already. However, the outcomeof the proposed referendum will most likely show only minority support forindependence as Northern Mali is a mosaic of cultures and populationswith very different relations to the Malian state. A reformulation of theindependence question to one of limited autonomy, in line with previousagreements between government and Tuareg separatists, might form thebasis of a more realistic political debate.AQIM is highly unpopular among the population of Northern Mali. Primarilyit raises feelings of insecurity (if only through the presence of Malian andU.S. armed forces) and disapproval of their ideology is still widespread.AQIM has become the object of accusatory propaganda for all sides in theconflict without there being any way to know its real impact or connectionsin the operational theatre.However, in the past years some Malian Tuareg and Arabs have joinedAQIM. Recently, former rebel leader and official Malian diplomat Iyad agGhaly created the Ansar ud-Din: a salafist movement aiming at theinstitution of an independent and Islamic Azawad state. Ansar ud-Dinattracted Tuareg previously integrated in AQIM. So far, Ansar ud-Din hasbeen denied all support by other Tuareg political factions, including theMNLA, but there are likely to be links between AQIM and Ansar ud-Din.This movement presents a radically different vision of Tuareg nationalismand a new form of opposition to the Malian state. This will certainlycomplicate the internal political struggles that accompany all Tuaregrebellions so far and hamper the peace process. Moreover, while the MNLAclaims the attack on Aguelhoc of January 24 as theirs, a number ofeyewitness accounts indicate that the attack was coordinated and carriedout mostly by Ansar ud-Din, possibly allied with former AQIM elements.Furthermore, the Mauritanian press agency ANI announced the death oftwo former AQIM leaders during the Aguelhoc attack. Confusion about thevarious actors in the conflict and their positions are enhanced by thestrong media presence of the MNLA, while Ansar ud-Din, despite itspresence in the field, remains silent.03-03-12 17:46The Tuareg: between armed uprising and drought – Baz Lecocq and Nadia Belalimat | African ArgumentsPagina 5 van 17http://africanarguments.org/2012/02/28/the-tuareg-between-armed-uprising-and-drought-baz-lecocq-and-nadia-belalimat/Most important to this conflict, however, are the economic and ecologicalcrises The North currently faces. The murder and kidnapping of foreignersby AQIM has resulted in the collapse of the tourist industry, and a neartotal retreat of international NGOs, drying up two important sources oflegal income. The NGO retreat also meant a decrease in supportinfrastructure for relief aid serving to mitigate the effects of the droughtwhich has affected the region since 2009. Although the famine earlywarning system indicates small improvements for northern Mali, there isno accurate data on the actual consequences, which might be worse thanpreviously predicted.In the past, the Tuareg nationalist movement gained its momentum andmass support from the famines of the 1970s and 1980s. The collapse oftheir pastoral way of life and mass starvation left many Tuareg with theidea that if they wanted to survive, they had to be politically independent.The current drought and shortages of food, pasture and the lack ofeffective national and international responses, will certainly strengthennationalist sentiments among the population, enhancing support for theMNLA. At present the conflict has generated almost 120,000 refuges andinternally displaced persons. The combined humanitarian consequences ofthe conflict and the drought lead us to fear the worst for a dry season thathas already begun months earlier than normal, in a period of militaryconflict that risks degenerating into full-scale war.Last year’s announcement by President Touré of the Special Programmefor Peace, Security and Development in North Mali (PSPSDN) was metwith scepticism. Most development programmes promised after therebellion of the 1990s have either never materialized, or the funds havebeen allocated to, or embezzled by, a Tuareg elite or politicians elsewherein the country. For the local economy, the sole positive side is that someof this money has been invested in international smuggling, but thetrickle-down effects of these investments are small and slow to come,while they raise further international concerns about regional security.What assistance did arrive has mostly been employed in direct relief aid orprogrammes with high visibility in the local ‘traditional economy’(cemented wells and the like), which prove little use in uplifting thepastoral economy when the next drought hits.The money used in micro credits to start small shops is futile in its attemptto kick start the local economy and this is well-sensed by most inhabitantsof the north who nevertheless take aid money but without much hope oflasting effects. The MNLA’s negative stance toward the president’s03-03-12 17:46The Tuareg: between armed uprising and drought – Baz Lecocq and Nadia Belalimat | African ArgumentsPagina 6 van 17http://africanarguments.org/2012/02/28/the-tuareg-between-armed-uprising-and-drought-baz-lecocq-and-nadia-belalimat/programme has not been helpful either. The argument that most of Mali isnot very prosperous makes no sense from a Tuareg perspective. Whyshould they compare themselves to a country they do not feel part of?They prefer to look towards South Algeria, Libya Saudi Arabia and Qatar:prosperous desert countries. The continued failure to generate economicdevelopment musters further support for national independence. At thesame time it remains questionable whether economic prosperity wouldmake the Tuareg forget their desire for independence. However, unlessthe economic development of northern Mali is geared towards lastingviability, lasting peace will not be possible.So far no peace talks have been announced, but it is of vital importancethat they are brought about in the near future. These, in our opinion,should include all parties, but especially civil society in the North, whilethe MNA should be recognized as the political branch of the MNLA. Thewounds of the inter-ethnic conflicts of the 1990s in Northern Mali are notyet healed. Manipulation of these wounds by any of the involved parties isnot unlikely. This would inevitably lead to spirals of increasing violence inNorthern Mali.Baz Lecocq Lectures African History at Ghent University, NadiaBelalimat is Ingénieur d’études au CIRED (International ResearchCenter on Environment and Development) and PhD candidate atEHESS Paris.37tweetsretweetIf you enjoyed this post, please consider leaving a comment orsubscribing to the RSS feed to have future articles delivered to yourfeed reader.Posted in African Politics Now, Mali. Bookmark.« What’s Diaspora got to do with it? Three home truths – By Chukwu-Emeka ChikezieIntercommunal violence in Jonglei State: from restitution to revenge – ByAdam Hyde »Leave a ReplyYour email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *Name *28Share

The Tuareg: between armed uprising and drought

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