"International Trade and Global Warming"

In a non-cooperative strategic environmental regulation, unilateral regulation may yield the so-called "carbon-leakage" and the government choice over the emission taxes and quotas play an important role. Furthermore, the trade and industrial structure of a country critically hinges on the government's policy tools. The paper shows that emission taxes makes the competitive production equilibrium unstable, while emission standards work as "hidden production subsidy" towards emission-intensive industries.

Environmental Management Policy under International Carbon Leakage

This paper studies environmental management policy when two fossil-fuel-consuming countries non-cooperatively regulate greenhouse-gas emissions through emission taxes or quotas. The presence of carbon leakage caused by fuel-price changes affects the tax-quota equivalence. We explore each country's incentive to choose an environment regulation instrument within a framework of a two-stage policy choice game and find subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. This sheds a new light on the question of why adopted policy instruments could be different among countries. We also analyze the welfare effect of creating an international market for emission permits. International trade in emission permits may not benefit the fuel-consuming countries.Global Warming, Carbon Leakage, Emission Tax, Emission Quota, Tax-quota Equivalence, Emission Trading

Mixture of Expert/Imitator Networks: Scalable Semi-supervised Learning Framework

The current success of deep neural networks (DNNs) in an increasingly broad range of tasks involving artificial intelligence strongly depends on the quality and quantity of labeled training data. In general, the scarcity of labeled data, which is often observed in many natural language processing tasks, is one of the most important issues to be addressed. Semi-supervised learning (SSL) is a promising approach to overcoming this issue by incorporating a large amount of unlabeled data. In this paper, we propose a novel scalable method of SSL for text classification tasks. The unique property of our method, Mixture of Expert/Imitator Networks, is that imitator networks learn to "imitate" the estimated label distribution of the expert network over the unlabeled data, which potentially contributes a set of features for the classification. Our experiments demonstrate that the proposed method consistently improves the performance of several types of baseline DNNs. We also demonstrate that our method has the more data, better performance property with promising scalability to the amount of unlabeled data.Comment: Accepted by AAAI 201

Environmental Management Policy under International Carbon Leakage

This paper studies environmental management policy when two fossil-fuel-consuming countries non-cooperatively regulate greenhouse- gas emissions through emission taxes or quotas. The presence of carbon leakage caused by fuel-price changes a.ects the tax-quota equivalence. We explore each country.s incentive to choose an environment regula- tion instrument within a framework of a two-stage policy choice game and .nd subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. This sheds a new light on the question of why adopted policy instruments could be di.erent among countries. We also analyze the welfare e.ect of creating an interna- tional market for emission permits. International trade in emission permits may not bene.t the fuel-consuming countries.global warming, carbon leakage, emission tax, emission quota, tax-quota equivalence, emission trading

Is Emission Trading Beneficial?

We develop a two-country (North and South), two-good, general equilibrium model of international trade in goods and explore the effects of domestic and international emission trading under free trade in goods. Whereas domestic emission trading in North may result in carbon leakage by expanding South’s production of the emission-intensive good, international emission trading may induce North to expand the production of the emission-intensive good by importing emission permits. Emission trading may deteriorate global environment. North’s (South’s) emission trading may not benefit South (North). International emission trading improves global efficiency but may not benefit both countries.global warming, emission quota, emission trading, carbon leakage, Kyoto Protocol

Incentives towards Economic Integration as the Second-Best Tariff Policy

Economic integratin such as free trade areas (FTA) and customs uions (CU) allows importing countries to circumvent the constraint of non-discriminatory tariffis posed by the most favorened nation clause in GATT and to employ (incomplete) tariff discrimina-tion. Thus the second-best choice for the importing country, if it does regional integration, is to choose as the partner the exporting country which would have been subject to the lower tariff under the full tariff discrimination. Regardless of the mode of competition, we will find that such a partner tends to be less efficient than other exporting countries, which implies that voluntary regional integration leads the world economy to less efficient resource allocations

On the Electric Field due to Tides III

In this paper the author will discuss briefly some results of theoretical work carried out by Dr. Longuet-Higgins, Dr. Malkus and others (Section 2). The theory of field due to streams of elliptical cross-sction will also be described (Section 3), and a method of generalization of this theory will be discussed (Section 4). In Section 5 the results of numerical computation concerning the streams of elliptical cross-section will be shown, and in Section 6 the approximate relation between the mean velocity and potential difference will be discussed for two types of streams