Industrialization and technological progress with many countries under a non-homothetic preference.

This paper examines industrialization in each country by using a model with a continuum of countries. Our model is mainly based on Yanagawa’s (1996) model. However, unlike Yanagawa’s model, our model adopts the Stone-Geary utility function of a non-homothetic preference. The main results are as follows. First, we find that an increase in agricultural productivity leads to industrialization under the nonhomothetic preference, whereas it leads to deindustrialization under the homothetic preference. Second, the widening disparity of manufacturing productivity among countries leads to an increase in the number of agricultural countries in the world, even if it is under the non-homothetic preference.Industrialization, multi-countries, Stone-Geary utility function

An asynchronous message-passing distributed algorithm for the global critical section problem

This paper considers the global $(l,k)$-CS problem which is the problem of controlling the system in such a way that, at least $l$ and at most $k$ processes must be in the CS at a time in the network. In this paper, a distributed solution is proposed in the asynchronous message-passing model. Our solution is a versatile composition method of algorithms for $l$-mutual inclusion and $k$-mutual exclusion. Its message complexity is $O(|Q|)$, where $|Q|$ is the maximum size for the quorum of a coterie used by the algorithm, which is typically $|Q| = \sqrt{n}$.Comment: This is a modified version of the conference paper in PDAA201

Gathering on Rings for Myopic Asynchronous Robots With Lights

We investigate gathering algorithms for asynchronous autonomous mobile robots moving in uniform ring-shaped networks. Different from most work using the Look-Compute-Move (LCM) model, we assume that robots have limited visibility and lights. That is, robots can observe nodes only within a certain fixed distance, and emit a color from a set of constant number of colors. We consider gathering algorithms depending on two parameters related to the initial configuration: M_{init}, which denotes the number of nodes between two border nodes, and O_{init}, which denotes the number of nodes hosting robots between two border nodes. In both cases, a border node is a node hosting one or more robots that cannot see other robots on at least one side. Our main contribution is to prove that, if M_{init} or O_{init} is odd, gathering is always feasible with three or four colors. The proposed algorithms do not require additional assumptions, such as knowledge of the number of robots, multiplicity detection capabilities, or the assumption of towerless initial configurations. These results demonstrate the power of lights to achieve gathering of robots with limited visibility

State or Nature? Formal vs. Informal Sanctioning in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

The sanctioning of norm-violating behavior by an effective formal authority is an efficient solution for social dilemmas. It is in the self-interest of voters and is often favorably contrasted with letting citizens take punishment into their own hands. Allowing informal sanctions, by contrast, not only comes with a danger that punishments will be misapplied, but also should have no efficiency benefit under standard assumptions of self-interested agents. We experimentally investigate the relative effectiveness of formal vs. informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods. Unsurprisingly, we find that effective formal sanctions are popular and efficient when they are free to impose. Surprisingly, we find that informal sanctions are often more popular and more efficient when effective formal sanctions entail a modest cost. The reason is that informal sanctions achieve more efficient outcomes than theory predicts, especially when the mechanism is chosen by voting.sanction; social dilemma; public goods; voluntary contribution mechanism; punishment; experiment

Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment

The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. But despite uniform money payoffs implying common interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes, and of gender and intelligence.Public good; voluntary contribution; formal sanction; experiment; penalty; voting

State or Nature? Formal vs. Informal Sanctioning in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

The sanctioning of norm-violating behavior by an effective formal authority is an efficient solution for social dilemmas. It is in the self-interest of voters and is often favorably contrasted with letting citizens take punishment into their own hands. Allowing informal sanctions, by contrast, not only comes with a danger that punishments will be misapplied, but also should have no efficiency benefit under standard assumptions of self-interested agents. We experimentally investigate the relative effectiveness of formal vs. informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods. Unsurprisingly, we find that effective formal sanctions are popular and efficient when they are free to impose. Surprisingly, we find that informal sanctions are often more popular and more efficient when effective formal sanctions entail a modest cost. The reason is that informal sanctions achieve more efficient outcomes than theory predicts, especially when the mechanism is chosen by voting.Sanction, social dilemma, public goods, voluntary contribution mechanism, punishment, experiment

Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment

The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. But despite uniform money payoffs implying common interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes, and of gender and intelligence.public good; voluntary contribution; formal sanction; experiment; penalty; voting