Towards a Hybrid Account of Luck

The concept of luck is important in various areas of philosophy. In this paper, I argue that two prominent accounts of luck, the modal and the probabilistic account of luck, need to be combined to accommodate the various ways in which luck comes in degrees. I briefly sketch such a hybrid account of luck, distinguish it from two similar accounts recently proposed, and consider some objections

Epistemic Benefits of the Material Theory of Induction

C. D. Broad famously labelled the problem of providing our inductive practices with a proper justification “the scandal of philosophy” (Broad, 1952). Recently, John Norton has provided a dissolution of this problem (2014). According to Norton, inductive inference is grounded in particular facts obtaining within particular domains (J. Norton, 2003b, 2010, 2014). Because the material theory does not involve a universal schema of induction, Norton claims it dissolves the problem of induction (which implies that such universal schemas cannot be justified). In this paper, I critically evaluate Norton's dissolution. In particular, I argue that the problem of induction is an epistemological problem, that Norton's material theory entails an externalist epistemology, and that it is a common feature of such epistemologies that they dissolve the problem of induction. The upshot is that the material theory is not unique in its ability to reap the specifically epistemic benefits of dissolving the problem of induction, and thus that the epistemic advantages of the material theory over extant alternatives in this regard are fewer than it may appear at first sight

A Modal Criterion for Epistemic Argumentation

In this paper, I spell out and argue for a new epistemic theory of argumentation. Contrary to extant views, this theory is compatible with a pluralistic framework on argumentation, where the norms governing argumentation depend on the aim with which we engage in the practice. A domain of specifically epistemic argumentation is singled out, and I argue based on recent findings in modal epistemology that this domain is governed by the modal norm of safety; where a belief is safe just in case it is produced by a method that would not easily produce a false belief. While this criterion is well-known and uncontroversial in epistemology, it has hitherto not been applied to epistemic theories of argumentation. I show that the norm allows for a novel and superior perspective of the relevance of the persistent interlocutor in argumentation theory, and on the relation between dialectical and epistemic norms more generally.Dans cet article, j'adopte un cadre pluraliste sur l'argumentation, où les normes qui dirigent la construction et l’évaluation de l’argumentation dépendent du but de notre engagement dans cette pratique. Un domaine d'argumentation spécifiquement épistémique est distingué, et je soutiens, sur la base de découvertes récentes en épistémologie modale, que ce domaine est dirigé par la norme modale de sécurité, selon laquelle une croyance est sûre juste au cas où elle serait produite par une méthode qui ne produirait pas facilement une fausse croyance. Bien que ce critère soit bien connu et non controversé en épistémologie, il n'a jusqu'à présent pas été appliqué aux théories épistémiques de l'argumentation. Je montre la fécondité d'introduire cette norme modale dans notre théorie de l'argumentation en soutenant que cela permet une perspective nouvelle et supérieure sur la pertinence de l'interlocuteur persistant dans la théorie de l'argumentation, et plus généralement sur la relation entre les norms dialectiques et épistémiques.  

The causal theory of knowledge revisited:An interventionist approach

Goldman proposed that a subject (Formula presented.) knows (Formula presented.) if and only if (Formula presented.) is appropriately causally connected to (Formula presented.) 's believing (Formula presented.). He later on abandoned this theory. The main objection to the theory is that the causal connection required by Goldman is compatible with certain problematic forms of luck. In this paper we argue that Goldman's causal theory of knowledge can overcome the luck problem if causation is understood along interventionist lines. We also show that the modified theory leads to the correct results in contexts involving other prominent forms of epistemic luck and compare it with other accounts on the market