Patterns of Work Across the OECD

Market work per person of working age differs widely across the OECD countries and there have been some significant changes in the last forty years. How to explain this pattern? Taxes are part of the story but much remains to be explained. If we include all the elements of the social security systems like early retirement benefits, sickness and disability benefits and unemployment benefits, then we can capture some aspects of the overall pattern but still a lot remains unexplained. The story favoured by Alesina et al. (CEPR DP.5140, 2005) is that the nexus of strong unions, generous welfare and social democracy implies both high taxes and pressure in favour of work-sharing in response to adverse shocks. This story, however, falls foul of the simple fact that most Scandinavian countries now do much more work than the French and Germans despite having stronger unions, more generous welfare, higher taxes and more social democracy. Ultimately, we are forced into the position that there is no simple story. Some of the broad patterns can be explained but there remain country specific factors which are hard to identify but lead to substantial differences from one country to another.work, working hours, employment

Gross job flows in transition countries: Results from Bulgaria, Estonia and Romania.

Country; Flows; Job;

Gross job flows and firm growth in transition countries : evidence using firm level data.

In this paper we analyse job flows in five transition countries, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. Using comparable firm level data over the years 1993-1997, we find that in early transition job destruction dominates job creation, while the latter is picking up as the country enters into a mature stage of transition. Gross job reallocation rates in the more advanced transition countries are comparable to those of Western economies. We show that the restructuring process is a very heterogeneous one in terms of job creation and destruction: Even in transition countries, hit by very large negative shocks, we find that within narrowly defined sectors, regions and firm types simultaneous creation and destruction of jobs occur. In addition, we find that most of the job reallocation occurs within sectors and regions, rather than across sectors and regions. We suggest that a measure for restructuring is the excess job reallocation rate and show that the excess job reallocation rate is positively correlated with the net employment growth rate at the sector and regional level. Finally, we find that ownership and firm size are the most relevant characteristics for understanding the dynamics of job flows. Foreign firms have higher job creation and higher excess job reallocation rates, while small businesses are the most dynamic in terms of job reallocation. We investigate the job reallocation process at the firm level and test for trade orientation, ownership and size effects. The results show that firm growth depends on ownership and initial size. Trade orientation effects are important for countries in early transition but not for countries in a more mature stage of the transition process.Job creation; Job destruction; transition economies;

Transport Infrastructure Investment and Demand Uncertainty

In this paper we analyse job flows in five transition countries, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania. Using comparable firm level data over the years 1993-1997, we find that in early transition job destruction dominates job creation, while the latter is picking up as the country enters into a mature stage of transition. Gross job reallocation rates in the more advanced transition countries are comparable to those of Western economies. We show that the restructuring process is a very heterogeneous one in terms of job creation and destruction: Even in transition countries, hit by very large negative shocks, we find that within narrowly defined sectors, regions and firm types simultaneous creation and destruction of jobs occur. In addition, we find that most of the job reallocation occurs within sectors and regions, rather than across sectors and regions. We suggest that a measure for restructuring is the excess job reallocation rate and show that the excess job reallocation rate is positively correlated with the net employment growth rate at the sector and regional level. Finally, we find that ownership and firm size are the most relevant characteristics for understanding the dynamics of job flows. Foreign firms have higher job creation and higher excess job reallocation rates, while small businesses are the most dynamic in terms of job reallocation. We investigate the job reallocation process at the firm level and test for trade orientation, ownership and size effects. The results show that firm growth depends on ownership and initial size. Trade orientation effects are important for countries in early transition but not for countries in a more mature stage of the transition process.job creation, job destruction, transition economies;

The evolution of inequality in productivity and wages: panel data evidence

There has been a remarkable increase in wage inequality in the US, UK and many other countries over the past three decades. A significant part of this appears to be within observable groups (such as age-gender-skill cells). A generally untested implication of many theories rationalizing the growth of within-group inequality is that firm-level productivity dispersion should also have increased. Since the relevant data do not exist in the US we utilize a UK longitudinal panel dataset covering the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors since the early 1980s. We find evidence that productivity inequality has increased. Existing studies have underestimated this increased dispersion because they use data from the manufacturing sector which has been in rapid decline. Most of the increase in individual wage inequality has occurred because of an increase in inequality between firms (and within industries). Increased productivity dispersion appears to be linked with new technologies as suggested by models such as Caselli (1999) and is not primarily due to an increase in transitory shocks, greater sorting or entry/exit dynamics

The Evolution of Inequality in Productivity and Wages: Panel Data Evidence

There has been a remarkable increase in wage inequality in the US, UK and many other countries over the past three decades. A significant part of this appears to be within observable groups (such as age-gender-skill cells). A generally untested implication of many theories rationalizing the growth of within-group inequality is that firm-level productivity dispersion should also have increased. The relevant data for the US is problematic, so we utilize a UK panel dataset covering the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors since the early 1980s. We find evidence that productivity inequality has increased. Existing studies have underestimated this increased dispersion because they use data from the manufacturing sector which has been in rapid decline. Most of the increase in individual wage inequality has occurred because of an increase in inequality between firms (and within industries). Increased productivity dispersion appears to be linked with new technologies as suggested by models such as Caselli (1999) and is not primarily due to an increase in transitory shocks, greater sorting or entry/exit dynamics.

Relocation of Public Sector Workers: Evaluating a place-based policy

This paper investigates the local labor market impact of a UK relocation initiative, the 2004 Lyons Review. The review resulted in the dispersal of about 25,000 civil service jobs out of London and the South East towards other UK destinations. The paper aims to detect whether inflows of public sector jobs have crowded out private sector activity or stimulated the local provision of jobs in the private sector. Focusing on short-term effects, I find that the relocation programme raised private sector employment in the receiving areas and changed the sectoral distribution of local employment towards services and away from manufacturing

Inequality of individual wages and the dispersion of firm productivity.

Many blame globalisation for growing wage inequality in the UK. But according to research by Giulia Faggio, Kjell Salvanes and John Van Reenen, the rise in inequality is better explained by increasing dispersion in the productivity of firms related to their use of new technology. Their study finds that much of the rise in wage inequality is driven by increasing differences in wages among firms in the same industry. A major driver of such differences is firms’ varying ability to make use of new technology. This is particularly felt in the service sector.

The Evolution of Inequality in Productivity and Wages: Panel Data Evidence

There has been a remarkable increase in wage inequality in the US, UK and many other countries over the past three decades. A significant part of this appears to be within observable groups (such as age-gender-skill cells). A generally untested implication of many theories rationalizing the growth of within-group inequality is that firm-level productivity dispersion should also have increased. Since the relevant data do not exist in the US we utilize a UK longitudinal panel dataset covering the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors since the early 1980s. We find evidence that productivity inequality has increased. Existing studies have underestimated this increased dispersion because they use data from the manufacturing sector which has been in rapid decline. Most of the increase in individual wage inequality has occurred because of an increase in inequality between firms (and within industries). Increased productivity dispersion appears to be linked with new technologies as suggested by models such as Caselli (1999) and is not primarily due to an increase in transitory shocks, greater sorting or entry/exit dynamics.wage inequality, productivity dispersion, technology

Estimating the Value of Discounted Rental Accommodation for London’s ‘Squeezed’ Key Workers

This new research shows: 1 The economic value of providing discounted rental housing to key workers is, on average, £27,000 per household. From this we have deducted the cost of providing it of c.£14,000. The net benefit to London’s economy per household is at least £12,500 per annum. 2 Although it is marginally cheaper to provide key worker housing in outer boroughs, there are significant costs to be offset – transport, time, etc, and these almost negate the benefits of doing so. And because costs of housing in outer boroughs are rising so quickly, the differential is disappearing. Wherever we look across London there is a problem of ‘affordable’ living. If we wish to avoid the ‘doughnut’ effect – evident in Paris – where the workforce is ‘ghettoised’ in an outer suburban ring, we need to make provision for key workers across London. Failure to do this will have serious implications for the London economy. 3 The approach to fixing rents in S106 agreements typically over-subsidises a percentage of tenants who could afford to pay more. A personalised rent model, which we have applied at the New Era Estate would be more cost effective and allow more key worker housing to be created