Geometric structures on the complement of a projective arrangement

Consider a complex projective space with its Fubini-Study metric. We study certain one parameter deformations of this metric on the complement of an arrangement (=a finite union of hyperplanes) whose Levi-Civita connection is of Dunkl type--interesting examples are obtained from the arrangements defined by finite complex reflection groups. We determine a parameter interval for which the metric is locally of Fubini-Study type, flat, or complex-hyperbolic. We find a finite subset of this interval for which we get a complete orbifold or at least a Zariski open subset thereof, and we analyze these cases in some detail (e.g., we determine their orbifold fundamental group). In this set-up, the principal results of Deligne-Mostow on the Lauricella hypergeometric differential equation and work of Barthel-Hirzebruch-Hoefer on arrangements in a projective plane appear as special cases. Along the way we produce in a geometric manner all the pairs of complex reflection groups with isomorphic discriminants, thus providing a uniform approach to work of Orlik-Solomon.Comment: 70 pages, v2: We give a better (sharper) formulation of the main result and added some reference

Costs and Recovery Rates in the Dutch Liquidation-Based Bankruptcy System

We present evidence on the efficiency of the resolution of financial distress in bankruptcy in The Netherlands. We employ a unique data set based on the files of the trustees and court offices, which includes the characteristics of the firms before and in the bankruptcy procedures, the details of the bankruptcy process and the outcomes. This data allows us to measure the costs and recovery rates in the Dutch liquidation-based bankruptcy system, and to investigate the determinants of these costs and recoveries. We find that direct costs are on average 16%. The costs are lower in larger firms and firms with more bank debt. Costs increase with the time it takes to sell assets and the number of disputes the trustee has to deal with. The firm recovery rate is on average 37%, while the bank recovers on average 80%. The firm recovery rate is influenced by the asset structure and the capital structure. Moreover, an opportunity to continue operations in bankruptcy is chosen by about half the firms and this has a positive effect on recoveries.Bankruptcy;Direct costs;Liquidation;Recovery rates

Survival rates in bankruptcy systems:overlooking the evidence

Extensive research on bankruptcy still has not made it possible to end the efficiency discussion concerning the need for a reorganization provision in bankruptcy laws. In this paper, I discuss the pervasiveness of asset sales in bankruptcy procedures and the effect it has on survival rates. Without these figures on going concern asset sales Western countries show astonishingly low firm survival rates. In addition, it becomes clear that the bankruptcy system in the US may be under-researched to such an extent that it seriously confounds our view of bankruptcy resolution.

Corporate Architecture and Limited Liability

Abstract This paper studies the effect of limited liability on corporate architecture. Corporate architecture refers to the use of governance instruments within the firm to control the behavior of employees. Four general instruments are defined that form the basis of the firm as a governance arrangement. These four are decision control rights, reward schemes, information systems and conflict resolution rules. Limited liability influences the way in which an incorporated group of firms employs each of these instruments. An efficient use of the governance instruments in such a group implies that lower hierarchical levels, incorporated in subsidiaries, will have more discretionary decision rights, higher powered incentives and less information requirements than a group that does not organize its business risks in incorporated subsidiaries. Corporate groups thus differ in their governance arrangement from firms that have not organized in corporate groups. Alternatives that restrict limited liability have the effect of centralizing rights, flattening reward schemes and increasing investment in information systems. If corporate groups have attuned their architecture optimally, then restricting limited liability generates additional coordination costs