Predator avoidance in extremophile fish

Extreme habitats are often characterized by reduced predation pressures, thus representing refuges for the inhabiting species. The present study was designed to investigate predator avoidance of extremophile populations of Poecilia mexicana and P. sulphuraria that either live in hydrogen sulfide-rich (sulfidic) springs or cave habitats, both of which are known to have impoverished piscine predator regimes. Focal fishes that inhabited sulfidic springs showed slightly weaker avoidance reactions when presented with several naturally occurring predatory cichlids, but strongest differences to populations from non-sulfidic habitats were found in a decreased shoaling tendency with non-predatory swordtail (Xiphophorus hellerii) females. When comparing avoidance reactions between P. mexicana from a sulfidic cave (Cueva del Azufre) and the adjacent sulfidic surface creek (El Azufre), we found only slight differences in predator avoidance, but surface fish reacted much more strongly to the non-predatory cichlid Vieja bifasciata. Our third experiment was designed to disentangle learned from innate effects of predator recognition. We compared laboratory-reared (i.e., predator-naïve) and wild-caught (i.e., predator-experienced) individuals of P. mexicana from a non-sulfidic river and found no differences in their reaction towards the presented predators. Overall, our results indicate (1) that predator avoidance is still functional in extremophile Poecilia spp. and (2) that predator recognition and avoidance reactions have a strong genetic basis

Risk factors for anxiety and depression among pregnant women during the COVID-19 pandemic: Results of a web-based multinational cross-sectional study.

Objective To assess risk factors for anxiety and depression among pregnant women during the COVID-19 pandemic using Mind-COVID, a prospective cross-sectional study that compares outcomes in middle-income economies and high-income economies. Methods A total of 7102 pregnant women from 12 high-income economies and nine middle-income economies were included. The web-based survey used two standardized instruments, General Anxiety Disorder-7 (GAD-7) and Patient Health Questionnaire–9 (PHQ-9). Result Pregnant women in high-income economies reported higher PHQ-9 (0.18 standard deviation [SD], P < 0.001) and GAD-7 (0.08 SD, P = 0.005) scores than those living in middle-income economies. Multivariate regression analysis showed that increasing PHQ-9 and GAD-7 scales were associated with mental health problems during pregnancy and the need for psychiatric treatment before pregnancy. PHQ-9 was associated with a feeling of burden related to restrictions in social distancing, and access to leisure activities. GAD-7 scores were associated with a pregnancy-related complication, fear of adverse outcomes in children related to COVID-19, and feeling of burden related to finances. Conclusions According to this study, the imposed public health measures and hospital restrictions have left pregnant women more vulnerable during these difficult times. Adequate partner and family support during pregnancy and childbirth can be one of the most important protective factors against anxiety and depression, regardless of national economic status.pre-print2752 K

The Objective Conception of Substance in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason

El propósito de este artículo es examinar una dualidad en la concepción objetiva de la substancia de la "Crítica de la razón pura" de Kant. Con este fin se analiza el esquema trascendental de la categoría de substancia y accidente. Nuestra hipótesis es que en el texto kantiano pueden distinguirse dos diferentes concepciones de la substancia. Por un lado, las substancias1 son los objetos relativamente permanentes de nuestra experiencia cotidiana. Por otro lado, la substancia2 es la materia absolutamente permanente de la que están compuestas las substancias1. Dado que las substancias1 son accidentes o modos de existir de la substancia2, ambas concepciones son parte de una teoría coherente.The aim of this paper is to examine a duality in the objective conception of substance in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. With this purpose in mind, I analyze the transcendental schema of the category of substance and accident. My hypothesis is that two different conceptions of substance can be distinguished in the Kantian text. On the one hand, substances1 are the relatively permanent objects of everyday experience. On the other hand, substance2 is the absolutely permanent matter of which substances1 are made. Since substances1 are accidents or ways of existing of substance2 , both conceptions are part of a coherent theory.Fil: Arias, Martin. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Rosario. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes; Argentin

The transcendental schema of the categories of quantity as temporal determination

El objetivo del presente artículo es mostrar que dos tesis acerca de la naturaleza de los esquemas trascendentales son válidas para el caso del esquema trascendental de las categorías de la cantidad. Semejantes tesis son: (1) los esquemas trascendentales son procedimientos de síntesis y al mismo tiempo las propiedades temporales fundamentales de los objetos empíricos producidas por tales procedimientos. En el caso del esquema trascendental que nos ocupa, por un lado, el esquema en tanto procedimiento es denominado por Kant "número" (Zahl). Por otro lado, sostenemos que el esquema en tanto producto viene dado por lo que Kant llama "magnitud extensiva" (extensive Größe). (2) Los esquemas trascendentales no son determinaciones del tiempo puro, sino determinaciones temporales de lo empírico. En otras palabras, las síntesis de los esquemas en tanto procedimientos no determinan la intuición pura, sino que determinan temporalmente la multiplicidad empírica.The objective of this article is to show that two theses about the nature of transcendental schemas are valid for the case of the transcendental schema of the categories of quantity. These theses are: (1) transcendental schemas are procedures of synthesis and, simultaneously, the main temporal properties of the empirical objects produced by these procedures. In the case of the transcendental schema that we are studying, on one hand, Kant calls the schema, insofar as it is a procedure, a “number,” (Zahl). On the other hand, we hold that the schema as a product is determined by what Kant calls “extensive magnitude” (extensive Größe). (2) Transcendental schemas are not determinations of pure time, but temporal determinations of empirical things. In other words, the syntheses of schemas as procedures do not determine pure intuition but, rather, they temporally determine empirical multiplicity.Fil: Arias, Martin. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin

On the ground of the necessity of empirical laws of science in an improper sense in Kant. A critique of Michael Bennett McNulty

El objetivo de este trabajo es criticar un artículo de Michael B. McNulty publicado en 2015, a saber, “Rehabilitating the Regulative Use of Reason: Kant on Empirical and Chemical Laws”. En este artículo, McNulty examina la concepción kantiana de la necesidad de las leyes empíricas pertenecientes a lo que, en los Primeros principios metafísicos de la ciencia de la naturaleza, se denomina ciencia en un sentido “impropio”. McNulty considera la única ciencia en sentido impropio mencionada por Kant, a saber, la química. En su artículo, McNulty presenta una interpretación original e interesante de esa concepción. Según esta interpretación, ciertas ideas de la razón, que el autor llama “elementos”, son el fundamento de la necesidad de las leyes químicas. Haremos tres críticas a esta interpretación. 1) La tesis de McNulty según la cual desde la perspectiva de la razón las leyes químicas son estrictamente necesarias es cognitivamente irrelevante para nosotros. 2) McNulty no menciona textos de Kant que muestren claramente que su interpretación del fundamento de la necesidad de las leyes químicas es correcta. 3) Nuestra interpretación de la necesidad regulativa de las leyes químicas es más cercana a la concepción kantiana de esas leyes que la lectura de McNultyThe aim of this paper is to criticize an article by Michael B. McNulty published in 2015, namely, “Rehabilitating the Regulative Use of Reason: Kant on Empirical and Chemical Laws”. In this article, McNulty examines Kant’s conception of the necessity of empirical laws belonging to what, in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, is called science in an “improper” sense. McNulty considers the only science in an improper sense mentioned by Kant, namely, chemistry. In his article, McNulty presents an original and interesting interpretation of that conception. According to this interpretation, certain ideas of reason, which the author calls “elements”, are the ground of the necessity of chemical laws. We will make three criticisms of this interpretation. 1) McNulty’s thesis according to which from the perspective of reason chemical laws are strictly necessary is cognitively irrelevant for us. 2) McNulty never mentions any of Kant’s texts as clearly supporting his interpretation of the ground of the necessity of chemical laws. 3) Our interpretation of the regulative necessity of chemical laws is closer to Kant’s conception of these laws than McNulty’s reading.Fil: Arias, Martin. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Rosario; Argentin

On the differences and relationships between Kant’s conceptions of empirical psychology and pragmatic anthropology

El objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar las diferencias y relaciones entre las concepciones kantianas de dos disciplinas. La primera es la psicología empírica contenida en la Metafísica de Baumgarten, que Kant empleaba para dar sus lecciones de antropología. Consideraremos principalmente la interpretación kantiana de esta psicología. La segunda es la antropología pragmática. Con respecto a esta última disciplina, tendremos en cuenta las lecciones de antropología de Kant y la publicada Antropología en sentido pragmático. Mostraremos que, aunque las concepciones kantianas de la psicología empírica y la antropología pragmática son esencialmente diferentes, hay relaciones entre las mismas. Nuestra conclusión es que la psicología empírica permanece como un cierto enfoque metodológico dentro de la antropología pragmática. Tal enfoque consiste en la consideración de los fenómenos internos, y es uno, entre otros, de los recursos metodológicos empleados por la antropología pragmática.The aim of this paper is to show the differences and relationships between Kant’s conceptions of two disciplines. The first is the empirical psychology contained in Baumgarten’s Metaphysics, which was employed by Kant to give his lectures on anthropology. We will consider mainly Kant’s interpretation of this psychology. The second is pragmatic anthropology. With regard to the last discipline, we will take into account Kant’s lectures on anthropology and the published Anthropology in pragmatic sense. We will show that, although Kant’s conceptions of empirical psychology and pragmatic anthropology are essentially different, there are relationships between them. Our conclusion is that empirical psychology remains as a certain methodological approach within pragmatic anthropology. Such approach consists in the consideration of inner appearances and is one, among others, of the methodological resources employed by pragmatic anthropology.Fil: Arias, Martin. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. Instituto de Filosofía "Dr. Alejandro Korn"; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Rosario; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin

The transcendental schema of the categories of quality

Este artículo examina algunos pasajes del capítulo del esquematismo de la "Crítica de la razón pura" de Kant. Ofrezco un análisis detallado del esquema trascendental de la cualidad. Sostendré que el esquema de la cualidad es, por un lado, un procedimiento de síntesis que, en pocas palabras, consiste en la intensificación progresiva de una cualidad dada a partir de la ausencia de la misma. Por otro lado, el esquema de la cualidad es la propiedad producida por ese procedimiento, a saber, la magnitud intensiva. Mediante ese análisis esbozaré una interpretación general de los esquemas trascendentales.This paper examines some passages of the Schematism chapter in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. I offer a detailed analysis of the transcendental schema of quality. I hold that this schema is, on the one hand, a procedure of synthesis that briefly consists in the progressive intensification of a given quality from the absence of it. On the other hand, it is also the property produced by this procedure, that is, intensive magnitude. Through this analysis I outline a general interpretation of transcendental schemata.Fil: Arias, Martin. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin

Is empirical psychology, according to Kant, a natural science?: A critical evaluation of Patrick R. Frierson’s commentary

En su interesante "Kant´s Empirical Psychology" (2014), Partrick R. Frierson intenta mostrar que, para Kant, la psicología empírica es una ciencia natural que contiene leyes naturales causales. El objetivo de este artículo es exponer y criticar concisamente el intento mencionado. Las tres tesis principales de nuestra exposición crítica pueden resumirse de la siguiente manera: 1) dado que la categoría de causalidad no puede aplicarse en el dominio del sentido interno, que es el campo de estudio de la psicología empírica, no es posible establecer leyes causales en el dominio en cuestión; 2) si fuese posible formular tales leyes, ellas no podrían ponerse a prueba, porque no es posible manipular los fenómenos internos a fin de realizar experimentos con ellos; 3) aunque, de acuerdo con Kant, su antropología pragmática es una ciencia, esto no implica que la psicología empírica, disciplina con cuyo enfoque está vinculada la primera, sea igualmente una ciencia.In his interesting Kant’s Empirical Psychology (2014), Patrick R. Frierson attempts to show that, for Kant, empirical psychology is a natural science that contains natural causal laws. The aim of this paper is to concisely expound and criticize such attempt. The three main theses of our critical exposition can be summarized as follows: 1) given that the category of causality cannot be applied in the strict sense in the domain of inner sense, which is the field of study of empirical psychology, it is not possible to establish causal laws in the domain in question; 2) if it were somehow possible to formulate such laws, they could not be tested, because it is not possible to manipulate inner phenomena in order to carry out experiments with them; 3) although, according to Kant, his pragmatic anthropology is a science, this does not imply that empirical psychology, discipline with whose approach the former is related, is likewise a science.Fil: Arias, Martin. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin