Single--crossover recombination in discrete time

Modelling the process of recombination leads to a large coupled nonlinear dynamical system. Here, we consider a particular case of recombination in {\em discrete} time, allowing only for {\em single crossovers}. While the analogous dynamics in {\em continuous} time admits a closed solution, this no longer works for discrete time. A more general model (i.e. without the restriction to single crossovers) has been studied before and was solved algorithmically by means of Haldane linearisation. Using the special formalism introduced by Baake and Baake (2003), we obtain further insight into the single-crossover dynamics and the particular difficulties that arise in discrete time. We then transform the equations to a solvable system in a two-step procedure: linearisation followed by diagonalisation. Still, the coefficients of the second step must be determined in a recursive manner, but once this is done for a given system, they allow for an explicit solution valid for all times.Comment: J. Math. Biol., in pres

Feed-in-Tariffs Financed by Energy Taxes: When do They Lower Consumer Prices?

This paper develops a theoretical model to highlight the bearing of market structures on retail price effects of a sfgFIT induced market entrance from green electricity. Moving from perfect competition via Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly to monopoly, we find that retail electricity prices are more likely to decline, when market concentration as measured by the HHI (from perceived market shares) is larger. In the extreme cases, the price effect is unequivocally negative (monopoly) or positive (perfect competition). One should note, that this result only holds for a given market structure. When firms leave the market, market concentration increases and so do electricity retail prices. When running the full gamut from perfect competition to monopoly by increasing the sfgFIT and thus successively driving firms out of the market the total price effect will be positive: perfect competitors produce at the average cost minimum and the monopolist sells at a price above average costs, which have been increased by the additional costs of green energy. We also show that in Cournot oligopoly and in monopoly markets, a required proportional quota of green energy in electricity production induces larger prices than the sfgFIT system with the same induced total amount of green electricity

Consumer-Optimal Information Design

In many trade environments - such as online markets - buyers fully learn their valuation for goods only after contracting. I characterize the buyer-optimal ex-ante information in such environments. Employing a classical sequential screening framework, I find that buyers prefer to remain partially uninformed, since such an information structure induces the seller to set low prices. For the optimal information signal, trade is efficient, and the seller only extracts the static monopoly profit. Further, I fully characterize all possible surplus divisions that can arise in sequential screening for a given prior

Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders

We study Dutch and first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders and show that the strategic equivalence between these formats no longer holds. Intuitively, as the Dutch auction unfolds, a bidder becomes more optimistic about her chances of winning; this stronger “attachment” effect pushes her to bid more aggressively than in the first-price auction. Thus, Dutch auctions raise more revenue than first-price ones. Indeed, the Dutch auction raises the most revenue among standard auction formats. Our results imply that dynamic mechanisms that make bidders more optimistic raise more revenue, thereby rationalizing the use of descending-price mechanisms by sellers in the field

Beschleunigung von Genehmigungsverfahren

Genehmigungsverfahren, Verwaltungsreform,

Persuasion Against Self-Control Problems

I derive a social planner's optimal information design in an environment with quasi-hyperbolic discounting consumers without commitment. Consumption induces instantaneous utility, but unknown delayed cost. Consumers may or may not acquire additional costless information on the cost parameter. The planner's optimal signal can be interpreted as an incentive compatible consumption recommendation whenever the cost parameter is below some cut-off. Welfare strictly exceeds the one under full information. I characterize distributional conditions under which welfare attains first best

Should they stay or should they go? Reactivation and Termination of Low-Tier Customers: Effects on Satisfaction, Word-of-Mouth, and Purchases

Many companies face the problem of having a substantial number of low-tier customers ? clients at the bottom of the customer pyramid. For this segment, it is necessary to either reactivate or terminate the customer relationships to increase profitability. Managers seek to learn more about marketing actions targeted towards low-tier customers and their response towards these actions. Therefore, we conducted a large field experiment in which we implemented a ?last call? marketing action for a large sample of low-tier customers of a catalogue retailer (N = 12,000). The action aims at sales reactivation, but in case a customer should not react, the relationship will be terminated. We measure customer response in terms of satisfaction, (positive and negative) word-of-mouth, and purchase behavior. We find no harmful effects from relationship termination, such as dissatisfaction or negative word-of-mouth. The results indicate that the ?last call? marketing action reactivates a small fraction of the low-tier customers. These customers remain active in the months following the action period. We discuss managerial implications of our findings and future research on low-tier customer segments.