A Comparison of Risk Evaluation in Emergency Medical Services Helicopter Operation Regulations

This study represents a comparison of Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) operations, between US Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), and European Joint Aviation Regulations Operations Specifications. Presently, US regulations allow HEMS operators to conduct work under FAR Part 135, Commercial Aviation Operations, or under FAR Part 91, General Aviation Operations. This allows HEMS operators to accept a greater level of risk by substituting lower minimum procedural standards under FAR Part 91 than under FAR Part 135, and may be partly culpable for a higher rate of fatal crashes in HEMS operations conducted under FAR Part 91. In stark contrast, explicit criteria and minimum operating considerations are stated in the European regulations. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been slow to take a similar clear and firm regulatory stance as that of its European counterpart regarding the human factors involved in the risk assessment of HEMS operations. Providing clearly defined steps to analyze and mitigate unnecessary threats, developing optimum performance guidelines, as well as minimum acceptable operational standards would benefit not only the US HEMS industry but also the patients and public it serves by reducing exposure to preventable dangers

Injury Risk and Noise Exposure in Firefighter Training Operations

Introduction: Firefighters have high rate of injuries and illnesses, as well as exposures to high levels of noise. This study explored the relationship between noise exposure and injury among firefighters. Methods: We recruited firefighters undergoing vehicle extrication and structural collapse emergency response training at a highly realistic training facility. Demographics, health status, body mass index (BMI), and history of serious injuries (i.e. injuries requiring first aid treatment, treatment in a medical clinic or office, or treatment at a hospital) were assessed at baseline, and daily activities, injury events, and near misses were assessed daily via surveys. Participants’ noise exposures were monitored for one 24-h period using noise dosimeters. We used a mixed-effects logistic regression model to estimate the odds of injury events and near misses associated with noise exposure as an independent variable. Results: Of 56 subjects, 20 (36%) reported that they had ever suffered a serious injury during firefighting activities, and 9 (16%) reported a serious injury within the past year. We estimated rates of 6.6 lifetime serious injuries per 100 FTE 16.1 serious injuries per 100 FTE within the past year. Our models indicated a significant increase in injury events and near misses among those with higher BMI, and as well as a dose–response relationship between near misses/injuries and increasing noise levels. Noise levels >90 dBA in the 30 min prior to time of injury or near miss were associated with substantially increased odds ratios for injury or near miss. Our models further indicated that perceived job demands were significantly associated with increased risk of injury or near miss. Conclusion: Our results suggest that noise exposures may need to be incorporated into injury prevention programs for firefighters to reduce injuries among this high-risk occupational group.This research was supported by a pilot project research training grant from the Center for Occupational Health and Safety Engineering (COHSE) at the University of Michigan, an Education and Research Center supported by training grant No. 2T42OH008455 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.Ope

Distributed Information Behavior Among Flight Crews in a Simulated Environment

The purpose of this study was to assess concepts from Information Science to develop and initially validate a framework to study the information behavior of flight crews in the civil aviation domain. Distributed use of information within groups remains a weak link between actual information, the meaning given to information, and the sense made of the information. Principles from information science, psychology, and communication studies are used to analyze how flight crews in a simulated environment (fail to) make use of essential, safety critical information through analysis of the corresponding flight transcripts using a six-point Information Behavior Grid. The results of this research indicate differences in the way flight crews identify, gather and use information based on their performance level. This study discerns that high performing flight crews practice different information behaviors than low performing or accident involved flight crews. This work serves as a way to operationalize crew resource management through understanding the social practice of information structuring within the distributed collective practice of the flight crew. This work also serves as a tool to inform crew training and is applicable to other domains where work is supported through distributed collective practice

Building a foundation to study distributed information behaviour

<br><b>Introduction.</b> The purpose of this research is to assess information behaviour as it pertains to operational teams in dynamic safety critical operations. <br><b>Method.</b> In this paper, I describe some of the problems faced by crews on modern flight decks and suggest a framework modelled on Information Science, Human Factors, and Activity Theory research to assess the distribution of information actions, namely information identification, gathering and use, by teams of users in a dynamic, safety critical environment. <br><b>Analysis.</b> By analysing the information behaviour of crews who have accidents and those who do not, researchers may be able to ascertain how they (fail to) make use of essential, safety critical information in their information environment. The ultimate goal of this research is to differentiate information behaviour among the distinct outcomes. <br><b>Results.</b> This research affords the possibility to discern differences in distributed information behaviour illustrating that crews who err to the point of an accident appear to practice different distributed information behaviour than those who do not. This foundation serves to operationalise team sense-making through illustrating the social practice of information structuring within the activity of the work environment. <br><b>Conclusion.</b> . The distributed information behaviour framework provides a useful structure to study the patterning and organization of information distributed over space and time, to reach a common goal. This framework may allow researchers and investigators alike to identify critical information activity in the negotiation of meaning in high reliability safety critical work, eventually informing safer practice. This framework is applicable to other domains

Measuring Safety Culture in a Non-Us Airline Using the Commercial Aviation Safety Survey

The purpose of this present study was twofold: firstly to test the psychometric appropriateness of the Commercial Aviation Safety Survey (CASS) for flight operations developed at the University of Illinois, in non-US environment, and secondly to assess the current state of organizational safety culture at a European airline. To achieve these objectives the CASS was administered in a web-based format to the flight operations department at a major European air carrier. The respondents reflected a representative employee distribution and a response rate of 31 percent. The internal consistency of the CASS indicated adequate reliability (all scores above 0.70). The survey revealed a generally positive safety culture that was broadly speaking, average, with the perception that management tended to lean toward delegating safety responsibilities to others in some areas and leaned toward collaborative safety efforts in other areas. The safety culture at this airline appears to be strongest in the areas of Middle Management (e.g. operations personnel) and weakest in the area of Organizational Commitment (e.g. going beyond compliance). Findings also show significant negative correlations between employees at the airline fifteen years or less and their perceptions of the airline’s safety culture. We compared these results to that of a US based airline. It is evident that this survey is capable of distinguishing between different safety cultures whether in America or Europe. Methodological considerations and improvements to the survey are also discussed

Organizational Factors in Commercial Aviation Accidents 1990-2000

Recently several major transportation accidents have brought significant attention to the role of organizational factors in supporting safety within high-risk critical systems. However, little is essentially known about the types of organizational factors that contribute to these accidents, as there has yet to be a comprehensive analysis of these factors. This paper elaborates on the types of organizational factors that have contributed to pilot-error related aviation accidents in U.S. commercial aviation. Specifically, we analyzed 60 accidents with organizational cause factors from 1990-2000. Results from this analysis indicate that the type and frequency of organizational factors that contribute to accidents varies across type and size of aviation operations. However, the data also argue for a more thorough analysis of organizational factors during an investigation so that a clearer understanding of the actual contributing factors to an accident involving pilot error can be discerned

Development and Validation of a Survey to Assess Safety Culture in Airline Maintenance Operations

This paper describes the development and validation of a survey to assess safety culture in airline maintenance operations according to the five-factor model of safety culture proposed by Wiegmann et al. (2002). Maintenance technicians at two FAR Part 121 scheduled passenger airlines (N = 109 and 76) completed the original version of the survey. The results yielded useful diagnostic information about the safety culture of each airline, but factor analyses indicated that the five-factor model may not be adequate to describe the data. A more complex model is proposed and modifications to the survey are suggested