How to Form Good Habits? A Longitudinal Field Study on the Role of Self-Control in Habit Formation

Anouk van der Weiden, Jeroen Benjamins, Marleen Gillebaart, Jan Fekke Ybema and Denise de Ridder (2020). Frontiers in Psycholog

When Observing Gaze Shifts of Others Enhances Object Desirability

The present research explored when observing gaze shifts of another person, involving both the observer and a specific object, enhances desirability of the gazed-at object. Specifically, we offer an initial attempt to test the idea that a three-step sequence consisting of direct gaze at the observer, followed by object-directed gaze and then by direct gaze at the observer, cues the desirability of an object to the observer and hence increases the perceived desirability of the gazed-at object. We examined this hypothesis in three experiments by manipulating eye-gaze shifts and including a no-gaze control condition. In line with our prediction, results showed that the dynamic sequence of gaze shifts indeed increases perceived object desirability. These findings provide new evidence that a sequence of gaze behavior involving the observer and an object plays an important role in influencing affective evaluation of objects

On the course of goal pursuit: The influence of goal progress on explicit judgments of self-agency

The experience of causing our own actions and resulting outcomes (i.e., self-agency) is essential for the regulation of our actions during goal pursuit. In two experiments, participants indicated experienced self-agency over presented outcomes, which varied in distance to their goal in an agency-ambiguous task. In Study 1, progress was manipulated at trial level (i.e., stimuli moved randomly or sequentially towards the goal). In Study 2, progress was constant at trial level (sequential), but varied at task level (i.e., goal discrepancy of the outcomes was random or decreased over trials). Study 1 showed that self-agency gradually increased in the progress condition as unsuccessful outcomes were objectively closer to the goal, while self-agency increased exponentially upon full goal attainment in the absence of progress. The gradual pattern for the progress condition was replicated in Study 2. These studies indicate that explicit judgments of self-agency are more flexible when there is goal progress

On the course of goal pursuit:The influence of goal progress on explicit judgments of self-agency

The experience of causing our own actions and resulting outcomes (i.e., self-agency) is essential for the regulation of our actions during goal pursuit. In two experiments, participants indicated experienced self-agency over presented outcomes, which varied in distance to their goal in an agency-ambiguous task. In Study 1, progress was manipulated at trial level (i.e., stimuli moved randomly or sequentially towards the goal). In Study 2, progress was constant at trial level (sequential), but varied at task level (i.e., goal discrepancy of the outcomes was random or decreased over trials). Study 1 showed that self-agency gradually increased in the progress condition as unsuccessful outcomes were objectively closer to the goal, while self-agency increased exponentially upon full goal attainment in the absence of progress. The gradual pattern for the progress condition was replicated in Study 2. These studies indicate that explicit judgments of self-agency are more flexible when there is goal progress.Social decision makin

A matter of you versus me? Experiences of control in a joint go/no-go task

When interacting with others, people represent their own as well as their interaction partners’ actions. Such joint action representation is essential for action coordination, but may also interfere with action control. We investigated how joint action representations affect experienced control over people’s own actions and their interaction partners’ actions. Participants performed a joint go/no-go task, which is commonly used to measure to what extent people represent their own actions in spatial reference to their interaction partner (e.g., as ‘left’ vs. ‘right’). After each second trial, participants indicated experienced control over their own action, their interaction partner’s action, or over action inhibition. Despite this frequent interruption of the go/no-go task, we found strong evidence for the spatial representation of joint actions. However, this joint action representation did not affect experiences of control. Possible explanations and implications of these findings are discussed

A matter of you versus me? Experiences of control in a joint go/no-go task

When interacting with others, people represent their own as well as their interaction partners’ actions. Such joint action representation is essential for action coordination, but may also interfere with action control. We investigated how joint action representations affect experienced control over people’s own actions and their interaction partners’ actions. Participants performed a joint go/no-go task, which is commonly used to measure to what extent people represent their own actions in spatial reference to their interaction partner (e.g., as ‘left’ vs. ‘right’). After each second trial, participants indicated experienced control over their own action, their interaction partner’s action, or over action inhibition. Despite this frequent interruption of the go/no-go task, we found strong evidence for the spatial representation of joint actions. However, this joint action representation did not affect experiences of control. Possible explanations and implications of these findings are discussed

Individual differences in action co-representation : not personal distress or subclinical psychotic experiences but sex composition modulates joint action performance

Successful social interaction requires the ability to integrate as well as distinguish own and others’ actions. Normally, the integration and distinction of self and other are a well-balanced process, occurring without much effort or conscious attention. However, not everyone is blessed with the ability to balance self–other distinction and integration, resulting in personal distress in reaction to other people’s emotions or even a loss of self [e.g., in (subclinical) psychosis]. Previous research has demonstrated that the integration and distinction of others’ actions cause interference with one’s own action performance (commonly assessed with a social Simon task). The present study had two goals. First, as previous studies on the social Simon effect employed relatively small samples (N < 50 per test), we aimed for a sample size that allowed us to test the robustness of the action interference effect. Second, we tested to what extent action interference reflects individual differences in traits related to self–other distinction (i.e., personal distress in reaction to other people’s emotions and subclinical psychotic symptoms). Based on a questionnaire study among a large sample (N = 745), we selected a subsample (N = 130) of participants scoring low, average, or high on subclinical psychotic symptoms, or on personal distress. The selected participants performed a social Simon task. Results showed a robust social Simon effect, regardless of individual differences in personal distress or subclinical psychotic symptoms. However, exploratory analyses revealed that the sex composition of interaction pairs modulated social Simon effects. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed

How vertical elevation affects self-other integration as measured by the joint Simon effect

Earlier findings suggest that positions of power decrease self-other integration and increase psychological distance to others. Until now, however, evidence for this relation rests exclusively on subjective measures. The current research instead employed a vertical joint Simon task to measure self-other integration. This task assesses the extent to which people represent their own actions in reference to their co-actor's, also referred to as the joint Simon effect. Building on cultural associations between power and vertical elevation, we manipulated whether participants were in an elevated (high-power) or lower (low-power) seating position. Experiments 1a and 1b reanalyzed existing datasets and found that elevated (vs. lower) seating position decreased the joint Simon effect, consistent with predictions. Experiment 2 provides a high-powered replication of this finding. Yet, further analyses revealed that feelings of power - measured as a manipulation check and indeed demonstrating that the manipulation was successful - did not mediate or moderate the effect of seating position on the joint Simon effect. Therefore, it is possible that the effect of seating elevation was driven through other aspects of that manipulation than feelings of power. We discuss these and suggest ways to test these alternative explanations

Abnormalities in the experience of self-agency in schizophrenia: A replication study

People usually experience agency over their actions and subsequent outcomes. These agency inferences over action-outcomes are essential to social interaction, and occur when an actual outcome corresponds with either a specific goal (goal-based), and matches with action-outcome information that is subtly pre-activated in the situation at hand (prime-based). Recent research showed that schizophrenia patients exhibit goal-based inferences, but not prime-based inferences. Intrigued by these findings, and underscoring their potential role in explaining poor social functioning, we replicate patients’ deficit in prime-based agency inferences. Additionally, we exclude the account that patients are unable to visually process and attend to primed information

Multisensory integration underlying body-ownership experiences in schizophrenia and offspring of patients : A study using the rubber hand illusion paradigm

Background: Schizophrenia is a disorder of basic self-disturbance. Evidence suggests that people with schizophrenia may have aberrant experiences of body ownership: they may feel that they are not the subject of their own body experiences. However, little is known about the development of such disturbances. Methods: Using a rubber hand illusion paradigm, we assessed body ownership in patients with schizophrenia (n = 54), healthy controls (n = 56), children/adolescents at increased familial risk of developing schizophrenia (n = 24) or mood disorders (n = 33), and children/adolescents without this risk (n = 18). In this paradigm, a rubber hand (visible) and a participant’s real hand (invisible) were stroked synchronously and asynchronously; we then measured subjective illusory experiences and proprioceptive drift. Results: All groups showed the expected effect of the rubber hand illusion: stronger proprioceptive drift and increased subjective illusory experiences after synchronous versus asynchronous stroking. The effect of synchronicity on subjective experiences was significantly weaker in patients with schizophrenia than in healthy controls, and subjective ratings were positively correlated with delusions in patients. We found no significant differences between children/adolescents with and without increased familial risk. Limitations: Large individual differences raised questions for future research. Conclusion: We found subtle disturbances in body-ownership experiences in patients with schizophrenia, which were associated with delusions. We found no evidence for impairments in children/adolescents at increased familial risk of developing schizophrenia or a mood disorder. Longitudinal data might reveal whether impairments in body ownership are predictive of psychosis onset