Games on graphs with a public signal monitoring

We study pure Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring based on a public signal. In such games, deviations and players responsible for those deviations can be hard to detect and track. We propose a generic epistemic game abstraction, which conveniently allows to represent the knowledge of the players about these deviations, and give a characterization of Nash equilibria in terms of winning strategies in the abstraction. We then use the abstraction to develop algorithms for some payoff functions.Comment: 28 page

EMG/ENG services rendered by clinical neurophysiology technologists in solo practice

CITATION: Bill, P. L. A., et al. 1998. EMG/ENG services rendered by clinical neurophysiology technologists in solo practice. South African Medical Journal, 88(11):1360.The original publication is available at http://www.samj.org.za[No abstract available]Publisher’s versio

A history based logic for dynamic preference updates

History based models suggest a process-based approach to epistemic and temporal reasoning. In this work, we introduce preferences to history based models. Motivated by game theoretical observations, we discuss how preferences can dynamically be updated in history based models. Following, we consider arrow update logic and event calculus, and give history based models for these logics. This allows us to relate dynamic logics of history based models to a broader framework

The Complexity of Synchronous Notions of Information Flow Security ⋆

Abstract. The paper considers the complexity of verifying that a finite state system satisfies a number of definitions of information flow security. The systems model considered is one in which agents operate synchronously with awareness of the global clock. This enables timing based attacks to be captured, whereas previous work on this topic has dealt primarily with asynchronous systems. Versions of the notions of nondeducibility on inputs, nondeducibility on strategies, and an unwinding based notion are formulated for this model. All three notions are shown to be decidable, and their computational complexity is characterised.

Asynchronous Omega-Regular Games with Partial Information

We address the strategy problem for ω-regular two-player games with partial information, played on finite game graphs. We consider two different kinds of observability on a general model, a standard synchronous and an asynchronous one. In the asynchronous setting, moves which have no visible effect for a player are hidden completely from that player. We generalize the usual powerset construction for eliminating partial information to arbitrary, not necessarily observation based, winning conditions, both in the synchronous and in the asynchronous case, and we show that this generalized construction effectively preserves ω-regular winning conditions. From this we infer decidability of the strategy problem for arbitrary ω-regular winning conditions, in both cases. We also show that our ω-regular framework is sufficient for reasoning about synchronous and asynchronous knowledge by proving that any formula of the epistemic temporal specification formalism ETL can be effectively translated into an S1S-formula defining the same specification