Perceived Importance of Information: The Effects of Mentioning Information, Shared Information Bias, Ownership Bias, Reiteration, and Confirmation Bias

Participants were given information for and against the decriminalization of marijuana and discussed the issue in groups. Factors affecting rated importance of information after the group discussion were examined. Participants did not rate information that was mentioned during the discussion as more important than information not mentioned, and participants did not rate shared information they mentioned as more important than unshared information. Participants did rate shared information other group members mentioned as more important than unshared information others mentioned. Participants did not rate their own information as more important than other's information, and information that was repeated was not rated as more important. Participants did perceive information supporting their individual position as more important than information against their position, and this confirmation bias was lessened in groups containing an opinion minority. A comparison of minority and majority members in minority-containing groups found that minority members were more open to information than majority members

Out with the Humans, in with the Machines?: Investigating the Behavioral and Psychological Effects of Replacing Human Advisors with a Machine

This study investigates the effects of task demonstrability and replacing a human advisor with a machine advisor. Outcome measures include advice-utilization (trust), the perception of advisors, and decision-maker emotions. Participants were randomly assigned to make a series of forecasts dealing with either humanitarian planning (low demonstrability) or management (high demonstrability). Participants received advice from either a machine advisor only, a human advisor only, or their advisor was replaced with the other type of advisor (human/machine) midway through the experiment. Decision-makers rated human advisors as more expert, more useful, and more similar. Perception effects were strongest when a human advisor was replaced by a machine. Decision-makers also experienced more negative emotions, lower reciprocity, and faulted their advisor more for mistakes when a human was replaced by a machine

Investigating variation in replicability

Although replication is a central tenet of science, direct replications are rare in psychology. This research tested variation in the replicability of 13 classic and contemporary effects across 36 independent samples totaling 6,344 participants. In the aggregate, 10 effects replicated consistently. One effect – imagined contact reducing prejudice – showed weak support for replicability. And two effects – flag priming influencing conservatism and currency priming influencing system justification – did not replicate. We compared whether the conditions such as lab versus online or US versus international sample predicted effect magnitudes. By and large they did not. The results of this small sample of effects suggest that replicability is more dependent on the effect itself than on the sample and setting used to investigate the effect

The Effects of Regulation on the Establishment of Trust

99 p.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1998.Regulation was hypothesized to reduce the importance of trust within an interaction and prevent trust from being established. Buyers and Sellers traded goods in either a condition of complete regulation or no regulation. In the no regulation condition, Sellers could sell different quality goods than they had advertised, although Buyers found out after each trading session what they had actually bought. In the regulation condition, Sellers were regulated and always had to sell the same quality good they were advertising. In study 1, a new Buyer and Seller were brought into the trading for both conditions after 12 trading sessions. In study 2, after 12 trading sessions, participants in both the previously regulated and previously unregulated condition could pay a cost before buying the good to check if a Seller's offer was truthful. Therefore, in study 2 after 12 trading sessions, Sellers in the regulation condition were no longer automatically regulated on every trade. Trust and partners' reputation were more important to the vulnerable partner (the Buyer), especially when there was no regulation. Buyers in the no regulation condition in study one and all Buyers in study two had more extreme trust ratings in the Sellers than Sellers had in the Buyers, rating some Sellers high on trust and some Sellers low on trust. Sellers' use of deception was positively related to Buyers' trust in the Sellers. In study one, the new Buyer brought into the exchange was deceived more and the new Seller used more deception. However, there was no difference between conditions for Buyers' trust in the new Seller or between the new Buyers' trust in the Sellers. In study two, the previously regulated Sellers used more deception than did previously unregulated Sellers. However, participants in both conditions did not differ in their likelihood of checking the Sellers' offers. Overall, without regulation Buyers developed both more trust and distrust than Buyers with regulation, having more discrimination in their trust ratings of the Sellers.U of I OnlyRestricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETD

Forecasting another's enjoyment versus giving the right answer: Trust, shared values, task effects, and confidence in improving the acceptance of advice

In two experiments, participants received advice from another participant on a task either with a correct answer (intellective tasks) or without a correct answer (judgmental task), in which the participant had to make a forecast. In both experiments, the level of trust in the advisor and a perception of the advisor having similar values were important predictors of the acceptance of advice for a judgmental, taste forecast task, whereas advisor confidence was a more important predictor of the acceptance of advice on the intellective task. In Experiment 2, the face-to-face interactions between the decision-maker and the advisor were videotaped and coded. Advisors provided more information to decision-makers for the taste forecast than for the intellective task. Further, whether the advisor provided information to supplement their recommendation or not was a significant predictor of the acceptance of advice on the taste forecast, but not on the intellective task. The results are discussed in the context of previous research on advice, which has predominately used intellective tasks.Judge-advisor system Confidence Advice acceptance Expertise Similarity Intellective task Judgmental task

The Effects of Regulation on the Establishment of Trust

99 p.Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1998.Regulation was hypothesized to reduce the importance of trust within an interaction and prevent trust from being established. Buyers and Sellers traded goods in either a condition of complete regulation or no regulation. In the no regulation condition, Sellers could sell different quality goods than they had advertised, although Buyers found out after each trading session what they had actually bought. In the regulation condition, Sellers were regulated and always had to sell the same quality good they were advertising. In study 1, a new Buyer and Seller were brought into the trading for both conditions after 12 trading sessions. In study 2, after 12 trading sessions, participants in both the previously regulated and previously unregulated condition could pay a cost before buying the good to check if a Seller's offer was truthful. Therefore, in study 2 after 12 trading sessions, Sellers in the regulation condition were no longer automatically regulated on every trade. Trust and partners' reputation were more important to the vulnerable partner (the Buyer), especially when there was no regulation. Buyers in the no regulation condition in study one and all Buyers in study two had more extreme trust ratings in the Sellers than Sellers had in the Buyers, rating some Sellers high on trust and some Sellers low on trust. Sellers' use of deception was positively related to Buyers' trust in the Sellers. In study one, the new Buyer brought into the exchange was deceived more and the new Seller used more deception. However, there was no difference between conditions for Buyers' trust in the new Seller or between the new Buyers' trust in the Sellers. In study two, the previously regulated Sellers used more deception than did previously unregulated Sellers. However, participants in both conditions did not differ in their likelihood of checking the Sellers' offers. Overall, without regulation Buyers developed both more trust and distrust than Buyers with regulation, having more discrimination in their trust ratings of the Sellers.U of I OnlyRestricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETD